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This thesis examines the emergence and governance of dual-use concerns associated with 
biotechnological innovation. Previous work has engaged with various facets of the dual-use 
issue from a wide range of theoretical perspectives. This includes, for example, the study of 
the dual-use issue as an ethical dilemma facing the scientific community (Miller and Selgelid 
2007) and as a challenge to international arms control and non-proliferation regimes directed 
at biological and chemical weapons (Kelle, Nixdorff, and Dando 2006). Work in this area has 
also included educational (Rappert 2009) and other types of ‘active research’ (Rabinow and 
Bennett 2012) approaches, which have focused primarily on the scientific community. A key 
gap in this literature is the absence of comprehensive explanatory frameworks which address 
how and why governance initiatives are developing in national contexts, which could lead to 
clearer understandings of the scope and prospect of dual-use governance.  
To this end, this thesis takes a comparative case study approach to characterise the emergence 
of dual-use governance regimes directed at the nascent techno-scientific field of synthetic 
biology. The work focuses on developments in the emergence of the field in two national 
cases studies; the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Empirically, the work 
draws upon several types of source material, including elite interviews as well as primary and 
secondary document analysis. In theoretical terms, academic debates about constructivist 
approaches to the study of securitization processes are utilized in order to help refine the 
analytical framework developed within this study.  
This thesis represents the first substantive comparison of UK and US approaches to the 
governance of dual-use aspects of cutting-edge life science research and biotechnology. It 
identifies and characterises four key domains of dual-use governance at national level. 
Further to this, the work traces the various impacts of these domains on the emergence and 
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scope of dual-use governance in the case of synthetic biology in a US and UK context. In 
particular, this work reveals the role that existing laboratory safety and security regimes play 
in defining the scope of dual-use problems. It also identifies a number of attempts within the 
New and Emerging Science and Technology domain to move beyond these restrictive 
framings. Analysis reveals a series of challenges facing such initiatives which can be 
explained with reference to the institutions and norms within the key domains of governance 
as well as the relationship between these domains.  
This work also reveals the extent to which dichotomous presentations of bottom-up verse top-
down governance options represent a crude understanding of the politics of dual-use issues. 
In particular, analysis reveals how key aspects of the synthetic biology community, scientific 
institutions and industry have played a fundamental role in shaping the scope and nature of 
government responses to dual-use concerns in relation to certain dual-use issues associated 
with the field.  
Finally, this thesis also demonstrates, through the utilisation of two policy process heuristics, 
that securitization theory could benefit greatly from further engagement with policy theory, 
particularly in the context of analytically eclectic research in the context of the study of non-
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Every so often, a story appears in the popular press which discusses the prospect that a 
specific scientific breakthrough or technological development might be misused by terrorists, 
criminals or governments. Often, such concerns exist as a vague anxiety and are accepted as 
an unwelcome and often unpreventable consequence of progress. Occasionally however, 
certain concerns are understood to go beyond the pale, to the extent to which they beg the 
question; should certain research and technology be prohibited, censored or otherwise 
controlled in the name of security?   
Over recent decades, some aspects of cutting-edge biotechnology and life-science research 
have been discussed in such terms. This has included research which demonstrates how to 
make pathogens more transmissible and more deadly. It has also included new and emerging 
technologies which may make it easier so synthesise tightly regulated pathogens. Such 
research and technology is often said to have ‘dual-use’ potential. This is in the sense that it 
could conceivably benefit humanity but could also contribute to the risk that biology will be 
used to cause harm. 
The dual-use issue can be conceived in ethical terms. There are two basic approaches to 
thinking ethically about the issue. The first approach prioritises the identification and 
quantification of risks and benefits in decision making. Within this approach the dual-use 
issue is often discussed in terms of the need to balance the imperatives of security and 
scientific progress. Some dual-use concerns involve potentially catastrophic and irreversible 
consequences, an anxiety which has long precedent in the societal assessment of science and 
technology. For example, it is at the root of current concerns that scientists could create self-
replicating nano-machines which could envelope the whole world. This type of anxiety was 
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also at the heart of fears that the first nuclear tests could set fire to the sky.  The emphasis on 
consequences, lends its self to questions about the need for foresight and precaution.  
A second approach to thinking about dual-use issues relates to culpability. This type of 
thinking lends itself to questions about who, and to what extent, people and institutions are 
responsible for the negative consequences of innovation. It also involves thinking about how 
these responsibilities should be discharged.   
Both types of consideration are brought to mind in an often quoted interview1 given by Julius 
Robert Oppenheimer, a prominent contributor to the Manhattan project. Speaking 20 years 
after witnessing the detonation of the first atomic bomb he recalled: 
‘We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people 
cried, most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the 
Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his duty and 
to impress him takes on his multi-armed form and says, "Now, I am become Death, 
the destroyer of worlds." I suppose we all thought that one way or another.’ 
Yet, innovation is a collective and societally embedded process. Our eye is often drawn to 
those ‘actually there’ at those (often) mythical moments of creation or discovery. However, 
this issue goes beyond the responsibilities of researchers. These responsibilities also extend to 
those institutions which support and govern innovation. This then involves broader reflection 
upon the appropriate relationship between innovators and broader society.  
Indeed, when I was first exposed to discussions about the dual-use life sciences I remember 
feeling frustrated with some of the academic and policy literature which focused on the 
ethical responsibility of individual research teams involved in controversial research. What 
interested me, was the broader political context of these discussions. Specifically, I was 
interested, in question of why some contemporary and foreseen science and technologies 
were being discussed as being dual-use in the first place; where as others were not. More 
                                                            
1
  This quote came to notoriety  when it appeared the documentary The Decision to Drop the Bomb 
(1965), produced by Fred Freed 
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fundamentally, I was also interested in the specific purposes and consequences of dual-use 
governance discussions and initiatives. I was also vaguely aware at the time, that there was 
some variance in how responses to dual-use concerns were developing in different national 
contexts. As early as the mid-2000’s, comparisons were already being made between US and 
European approaches to dual-use issues in innovation in both academic and policy literature. 
This comparison then, seemed to be a good starting point to think about the broader political 
context which gave impetus and significance to dual-use discussions. In the US context, it 
appeared that dual-use issues were being taken much more seriously as a homeland security 
threat. In particular, the huge Bush era investment in biodefense at the time, was being 
associated with conflicting narratives which framed such investment as both a source and 
response to dual-use issues.  In contrast, within the UK, it seemed as though the government 
was being less proactive in this issue area, and felt comparatively tranquil. Such contrasts, in 
the context of an absence of in-depth analysis of the politics of dual-use issues across national 
contexts, motivated me to develop a clearer understanding of the key factors shaping the 
emergence of policy.  
The focus of the thesis further developed as I began to examine the way in which the 
emerging field of synthetic biology was being discussed as a source of dual-use concern.   
Importantly, these discussions were also supplemented with a range of policy initiatives, 
which were emerging from government, industry, as well as the scientific community. As I 
was interested in how dual-use concerns emerged, and the extent to which concerns related to 
governance responses, the field seemed a natural focal point for a comparative case study. 
It was apparent however, that addressing such questions required the development of a 
suitable analytical framework to help focus and structure comparative analysis. As there had 
been no substantive attempts to do this within the academic literature, I was left with the task 
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of finding a suitable framework. My focus was initially drawn to frameworks of ethical and 
risk analysis. However, I felt that deductively applying such established approaches would 
fail to capture the broader political context of the issue area. For me then it made sense to 
utilise a more inductive approach to the study of the issues area. It was about this time that I 
was introduced to theoretical debates occurring within the International Relations and 
Security Studies literature. In particular I became interested in main-stream constructivist 
approaches to the study of political processes. This then, would form the bases of my 
decision to focus on Securitization Theory; a sub-field of Security Studies. What followed 
was an in-depth analysis of the governance of dual-use aspects of synthetic biology, which 
involved interviewing experts, analysis of policy documents as well as attendance to a 
number of conferences.2 
In the following section, I introduce the structure of this thesis.  
                                                            
2
  This included meetings organised as part of the project my thesis was embedded in. These took place at 
the Australia National University and Bradford University. It also included a number of international 
conferences on dual-use issues which were organised primarily by scientific organizations and 
academics. Added to this I also attended three international conferences on Synthetic Biology. This 
included Synthetic Biology 5.0 held at Stanford University in Summer 2012.  
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1.2 Thesis Outline  
In chapter two the central focus of this thesis is outlined. This includes a general introduction 
to the issue area, previous academic research, as well the aims of the thesis. It is argued that it 
is important to distinguish between four domains of dual-use governance. Each of these 
domains is associated with a largely discreet set of institutions, interests and styles of politics.   
This chapter outlines specific aspects of this broader political context which are important in 
understanding the governance of dual-use issues. The chapter also discusses the potential 
value and limitations of conceptualising the dual-use issues as a complex type of risk.  
In chapter three, an analytical framework is developed in order to provide a clearer 
understanding of how dual-use issues emerge and are responded to. The framework builds 
primarily on insights from securitization theory. Scholars in this field have been reflecting on 
the politics and practice of security for over decade and a range of analytical concepts are 
identified for use in the task in hand. One key part of this framework is a distinction between 
the concepts of primary and secondary securitization.  
In chapter four, the field of synthetic biology is introduced as a techno-scientific field of dual-
use governance. The field of synthetic biology was chosen as a focus because it was the field 
that had been associated most prominently with dual-use concerns. Within this chapter there 
is an introduction to the way in which science and technology are framed as part of dual-use 
problems.  
In Chapters five and six, there is an in-depth analysis of the emergence of, as well as 
responses to, concerns about dual-use aspects of synthetic biology in a US and UK context. 
Analysis focuses on the current state, as well as prospect, of dual-use governance in these 
national contexts.  
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In chapter seven, there is a structured analysis of the case studies, before conclusions, and 





















2.1 The Pre-History and Emergence of the Dual-Use Concept 
Historically, human inquiry has often led to unforeseen findings that have had immediately 
obvious applications as military technologies. For example, gunpowder was supposedly 
discovered by 'Taoist alchemists looking for elixirs of love’ (Reid 1969, 1). State militaries 
have also long possessed the inclination, expertise and resources to identify and harness 
seemingly benign discoveries and technologies in the development of new weapons. For 
example, the first manned air balloon flights of 1783 spawned a host of both civilian and 
military projects to put the new technology to use. Various militaries in the early 1800s 
experimented with hot-air balloons as bombers, as well as for observation, communication 
and transportation (Holmes 2009, chap. 8). Likewise, military projects have been understood 
to have contributed to a host of civilian applications, often referred to as military spin-offs; an 
often stated example of this is the internet.  
Particularly since the Second World War, exchanges between military and civilian science 
have been actively encouraged, as this was often understood as making good economic sense. 
Bearing this history in mind, it is unsurprising that the term ‘dual-use’ hasn’t always had the 
negative connotation that it has today (Miller, Selgelid, and Bruggen 2011, 8–11). 
The close relationship between military and civilian innovation has also been understood to 
complicate efforts to control sets of technologies for security reasons. This includes the 
prevention of the proliferation of ‘taboo’ weapons, which are weapons against which there 
are stigmas regarding development and use. In the context of nuclear, chemical and biological 
arms control there are technologies and materials which are necessary for both maleficent and 
benign applications. For example, nuclear reactors as well as fissile material can be used to 
produce nuclear power, as well as nuclear weapons. In this context, the term ‘dual-use’ refers 
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to technologies that are understood to have both legitimate peaceful (civilian) and illegitimate 
or controlled (military) applications within the international community. Since at least the end 
of the Second World War states have attempted to control who had access to dual-use 
technologies, primarily through systems of licensing and the harmonisation of export 
controls. Up until around the turn of the 21st century much less consideration was given by 
states to controlling civilian research and emerging technology because of the potential for 
hostile misuse. There is, however, a precedent of such controls, especially in times of 
heightened economic competition or conflict (Relyea 1994). 
This history suggests that there is certainly nothing new about the idea that science and 
technology can be used for dual-purposes, which may be understood to be both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’, and may at times need controls. But never has such a broad range of both research and 
technology (both existent and foreseen) been discussed in terms of misuse potential.  Added 
to this, never have such a broad range of stakeholders concerned themselves with the 
governance of this issue. In this respect, the development of dual-use governance over the 
past decade in relation to the life sciences can be understood as an unprecedented project.  
Explanations for these developments include: increased levels of anxiety, particularly within 
the US security community about the threat of bioterrorism and biological WMDs, increased 
concerns about emerging and re-emerging infectious disease, understood failings of an 
inadequate international biological arms control regime as well as increased stakeholder 
engagement with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) regime (Fidler and 
Gostin 2008). Added to this, developments in scientific and technology (i.e products and 
underlying systems of innovation) can also generate and galvanise security concerns (Kelle, 
Nixdorff, and Dando 2006; 2012). Furthermore, as societies have become more cognisant of 
the societal impact of scientific and technological developments, there has been increased 
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pressure upon those that support innovation to evaluate, minimise and communicate risks 
(Jasanoff 2005). This may also provide an explanation for the increased levels of dual-use 
concern in relation to new and emerging science and technology.  
Taken together, these observations point to the idea that the emergence of dual-use concerns 
is not just dependent on new security fears or technological developments, but is rather the 
result of more complex political processes. This suggests that while misuse concerns may be 
as old as science, today’s dual-use issues represent unprecedented policy challenges. The 
following section provides an overview of the modern manifestation of the dual-use issue in 
relation to the life sciences.  
2.2 The Emergence of Dual-Use concerns about the Life Sciences in the 2000s 
In the early 2000s, several pieces of life science research involving pathogenic viruses were 
given public and institutional attention as examples of dual-use research that represented a 
cause for concern. The first group of examples related to the concern that published research 
could provide terrorists with the information required to synthesise pathogens; providing a 
novel route to acquisition. One of these experiments demonstrated how to resurrect the 1918 
Spanish Influenza virus from frozen human remains (Tumpey et al. 2005). Another 
experiment demonstrated how to construct the Polio virus utilising mail-order polynucleotide 
sequences (Cello 2002). 
The second group of examples related to the concern that the manipulation of existing 
pathogens that may lead to the development of super-viruses. Such concerns were expressed 
in relation to bioterror scenarios, but also in relation to much better resourced, nationally 
funded bio-weapon projects. An example of this was an experiment which accidently 
uncovered the means by which to make the mouse-pox virus (a relation to the human 
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smallpox Variola virus) more virulent (Jackson et al. 2001). This kind of experiment became 
a focus of concerns about the development of new biological weapons of terror and mass-
destruction.  
The examples above are commonly used for illustrative purposes; however, at least a dozen 
specific experiments are publicly known to have been reviewed for dual-use potential 
internationally in the period 2001-2009 (Zmorzynska et al. 2011, 375). Since this time, two 
experiments relating to the manipulation of the avian influenza virus3 have also been subject 
to emergency reviews at national and international institutions (Implementation Support Unit 
2011 and Edwards, Revill, and Bezuidenhout 2013). Reviews of specific pieces of dual-use  
research of concern have all tended to focus on the specific aims, results and potential risks 
and benefits of the research, as well as the risks and benefits of stifling such research 
(Zmorzynska et al. 2011, 374). Since the emergence of the dual-use issue in 2001, debates 
about dual-use research have sometimes become entangled with discussions about the 
controls of foundational technologies and research agents. This includes most notably 
technologies that can be utilised to synthesise polynucleotide sequences,4 which may increase 
the availability of ‘select-agent’ pathogens5 to people who are not subject to existing systems 
of safety or security oversight. The term ‘select-agent’ pathogens is used here to denote a 
range of infectious agents which are controlled through various governance mechanisms 
because of their historic or foreseen utility as biological weapons, as well as the serious risks 
associated with the accidental release of pathogens from laboratories. This includes a wide 
                                                            
3
  Commonly known as the bird flu virus or the H5N1virus, which is the name of a specific virus strain.  
4
  This includes various forms of genetic material found in viruses, bacteria, plants and animals ranging 
from very short single or double stranded DNA molecules, all the way up to gene-length and genome 
length sequences. These molecules are fundamental to the development and functioning of the basic 
biological processes which constitute biological organisms. For a great accessible introduction see 
Noble (2006). 
5
  Particularly viruses, which usually comprise of genetic material, as well as a protein and lipid ‘coat’.  
The latter two components are essential to the infection process, as well as the survival of the virus in 
its virion state (i.e example when virus exists as a  single infective particle and is not inside a host cell, 
utilising the cells resources to reproduce) 
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range of pathogens which can infect livestock, crops and humans.  
Distinctions can be made in relation to the scope and focus of current dual-use discussions; 
specifically there have been three focal points of academic analysis and policy discussion. 
These are outlined below:  
Dual-use Research 
The traditional understanding of scientific research is that it involves a collection of 
institutions and practices which contribute to the development of understanding and practical 
knowledge. Within most conceptions of science, there is an assumption that ‘applied’ and 
even ‘basic’ research can contribute to the development of technologies. The term ‘dual-use 
research’ is usually used to denote specific scientific experiments, or else categories of 
scientific research, which could be foreseeably misused. In 2004, an influential report 
(National Research Council 2004) identified seven types6 of research as being of particular 
concern. This included research which makes pathogens more deadly, transmissible or 
demonstrates how to make pathogens more practically viable as a weapon. Since this 
publication, discussions about the governance of dual-use research have focused on a series 
of key intervention points in the research process between the funding and publication stage. 
The first has been the need for vetting and monitoring those with access to dangerous 
laboratory pathogens. The second has been the need for laboratory safety and laboratory 
biosecurity in order to prevent accidents and theft. The third has been the need for responsible 
publication practices within the scientific community, and where necessary, censorship. This 
                                                            
6
  Experiments of concern would be those that: 1) would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; 
2) would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; 3) would enhance the 
virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen virulent; 4) would increase transmissibility of a 
pathogen - this would include enhancing transmission within or between species; 5) would alter the 
host range of a pathogen; 6) would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities; 7) would 
enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.  
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is based on the concern that scientific papers may provide useful information to would-be 
bioterrorists. Finally, discussions have focused on the need for ethical, safety and security 
assessment in relation to ‘high-risk’ pathogens from as early as the funding stage in the 
research process (National Research Council 2004).  
Dual-use Technology 
Traditionally, technology is understood to include physical and abstract tools which are 
developed to solve real-world problems. Such technologies may have direct applications, or 
else provide the basis for the development of technologies with other applications (facilitating 
technologies). Traditional models of technology generation place emphasis on the role of the 
state and privately funded research in underpinning technological developments.  
The term ‘dual-use technology’ is generally used to refer to existing technologies, as well as 
emerging technological capabilities, which could foreseeably make it easier for terrorists to 
access, produce and weaponize biological agents. In relation to the concept of dual-use 
technology, there has been a particular focus upon technologies which have been understood 
to contribute to the de-skilling of processes needed for production and manipulation of 
pathogens. This trend is also associated with the increasingly broad dissemination of many 
biotechnologies as they become cheaper and easier to use ( for example Tucker 2012).  
Dual-use Techno-science 
The term techno-science has a complex intellectual heritage, and has often been used to 
denote changes and trends within scientific practice, as well as specific normative stances on 
the role of science in modern societies. Recent discussion about dual-use techno-science 
emphasises the non-linear nature of innovation, the co-productive nature of society and 
science, and the increasing role of politics and values in shaping research priorities (Schmidt 
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et al. 2009). Within this understanding, greater emphasis is placed on the contexts in which 
innovation occurs, and the political process which give these developments significance. 
There is also greater emphasis on anticipatory and precautionary approaches to dual-use 
issues (for example Kelle 2012).  
Each of the above facets of innovation has become central to discussions about the 
governance of dual-use aspects of the life-sciences. A key question within this thesis is how 
each of these facets has emerged as a focal point of discussion and how solutions to dual-use 
issues have been developed, tabled and implemented. In the following section, there is a more 
in-depth introduction into this central line of enquiry.  
2.3 Studying the Manifestation of Dual-Use Concerns in the 21st Century  
In the previous section, it was argued that the dual-use issue at its most fundamental revolves 
around the concern that scientific and technological progress may be utilised for both 
beneficial and nefarious purposes. There have been numerous examples of research and 
technology being discussed in terms of dual-use potential in the previous decade, particularly 
within the US and Europe. This includes research which revealed new ways to make 
pathogens more deadly, and technology which makes it easier to produce tightly controlled 
agents traditionally associated with bioweapon programmes. This thesis examines the 
political context of emergent debates about the governance of dual-use aspects of new and 
emerging science and technology. The research is carried out with a specific focus on dual-
use governance activities related to the techno-scientific field of synthetic biology, a field 
which has been most prominently associated with dual-use discussions in the past decade. 
The analysis focuses on two national case studies: the UK and the US.  
It is widely understood that national security concerns and responses to the bio-terrorist 
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attacks of 2001 are essential to understanding the emergence of the dual-use issue as a 21st 
century challenge (McLeish and Nightingale 2007). However, what is less clear in academic 
analysis is how these developments have impacted upon the governance of specific areas of 
cutting-edge science and technology. This research provides new insights into the process 
through which dual-use issues emerge as governable problems by contrasting the political 
processes that surround the emergence of dual-use policies in the US and the UK. The US 
and UK provide for an interesting comparison, due to their contrasting responses to the threat 
of bioterrorism in the post 9/11 world (Lentzos and Rose 2009).  
This thesis will provide researchers and policy shapers with a means to understand the 
underlying political processes which have impacted upon the emergence of dual-use 
governance within these states.  
Thesis rationale 
The development of the central line of enquiry within this thesis is based on several premises. 
The first assumption is that the emergence of dual-use issues on policy agendas is 
underpinned by: 
a) The emergence of fears about terrorism, specifically bioterrorism, in both public 
and policy circles, with a particular focus on the threat from non-state actors7  
This has resulted in a wide range of responses at national and international level 
                                                            
7
  The literature on this issue is sizeable and wide ranging. However, key journals in which there has been 
discussion of the emergence and response to the threat of bioterrorism are the Journal of Bioterrorism 
and Biodefense (2010-) and Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 
(2003-). The issue has also emerged in several infectious disease, clinical micro biology journals – 
most notably the Journal of Emerging Infectious Diseases (from 1998 onwards). The issue has also 
appeared in security and non-proliferation journals such as Survival (from 2007 onwards). In addition, 
there have been a series of books and edited volumes which have tracked the history of the emergence 
of the issue, notably Carus (2002), also in relation to public health (Patel and Rushefsky 2005, chap. 8)  
(Mellehovitch 2004) (Fidler and Gostin 2008)(Koblentz 2009) 
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focused on predicting, preventing and mitigating the risk of biological attacks 
from terrorists and states. This development has also been reflected in the 
broadening agenda of the BTWC as an international regime, in which a greater 
emphasis has been placed on the threat of sub-state terrorism over the previous 
decade. 
b) The dominant pre-conception that we are currently experiencing a rapid period of 
development in the technical and intellectual capabilities within the life sciences  
These developments are also associated with expanding and changing modes of 
technological innovation and use. This has been understood to involve the ever 
wider dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge, which is coupled with 
a ‘de-skilling’ dynamic – meaning that less capital, training and practical life 
science expertise is required to use and even develop cutting-edge bio-based 
technologies (Schmidt 2008; Tucker 2011). This has been understood by some 
policy shapers to present a challenge to existing governance frameworks directed 
at safety, as well as those directed against the misuse of science and technology 
(Bowman et al. 2013, 63).  
c) Changes in the relationship between science and democratic societies  
These developments have led to new collaborative assessment regimes directed at 
innovation and cutting-edge technology. These regimes have involved a wider 
range of stakeholders than ever before, which has led to a greater emphasis on 
precautionary approaches and ‘up-stream’ engagement with the research and 
development process. This approach is often contrasted to more ‘traditional’ 
approaches of responding to the risks generated by emerging scientific and 
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technological products on an ad hoc base, through the application of pre-existing 
risk management frameworks.8 
The second set of assumptions relate to the governance of new and emerging science and 
technologies. The development of emerging governance frameworks at a national level has 
been complicated a broad range of stakeholders engaging with the issue, which is prone to 
political contestation. This has generated a certain ‘fluidity’ in the development of dual-use 
governance in national contexts. However, despite its novelty, dual-use governance is still 
best understood with reference to pre-existing ideational and institutional frameworks that 
have dominated the governance of science and technological risk, and national security.  
The third set of assumptions relates to the appropriate level of analysis in dual-use 
governance. While the improvement of dual-use governance is generally understood to 
require international responses, national level policy development and implementation 
remains central to the oversight of dual-use issues. This is typified, for example, by the main 
international regime tasked with preventing the development of biological weapons (the 
BTCW), which is primarily dependent on national level implementation. As a result, there is 
a focus on national level policy initiatives within this work; this means that international 
initiatives and actors are only referenced when these factors are understood to be of direct 
relevance to domestic level policy.   
A final key set of assumptions is that the politics and practices of security have been of some 
importance in the development of dual-use governance, but that the specific significance of 
these factors remains under theorised. By giving closer scrutiny to this area, it may be 
possible to reveal trends in the governance of the issue which are not currently given 
                                                            
8
  In relation to biotechnologies See  (Jasanoff 2005).  In relation to convergent biotechnologies such as 
Synthetic biology see (M. Schmidt et al.. 2009) Also with relation to techno-sciences more generally 
see (Kaiser, Maasen, and Kurath 2010a) 
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attention in the dual-use governance literature.9 
This leads to a line of enquiry which can be formulated as a research question: 
To what extent are the conceptions, practices and politics of security relevant to 
understanding the governance of dual-use aspects of new and emerging science and 
technology at national level in the UK and in the US? 
In answering this question there are three interrelated focal points of analysis: 
1. The ‘subject’ and ‘scope’ of dual-use governance. This involves identifying which 
specific aspects of techno-scientific fields have been constructed as presenting a dual-
use concern and the relationships between these concerns and pre-existing discourses 
and practices. These questions reflect a central line of enquiry for scholars such as 
Vogel, who has examined the impact of the framings of science and technology on 
our understanding of how threats involving bioweapons are socially generated. There 
is also a need to examine the role of constructed security threat scenarios within this 
process (Vogel 2006; 2008a; 2012), as well as pre-existing approaches to the 
identification and management of risks. 
2. The ‘politics’ and ‘practice’ of dual-use governance. This involves examining the 
generation, development and implementation of policy initiatives, and their political 
context. In particular there is an emphasis on explaining why certain approaches to 
conceptualising and addressing dual-use issues are adopted, and the extent to which 
such approaches are successfully implemented.  
                                                            
9
  The discussion of security and securitization have been common in relation to dual-use governance. 
Notable examples include  McLeish and Nightingale 2007, Bruggen 2012, Lentzos 2006 and Lentzos 
and Rose 2009. The discussion of the  securitization of aspects of public health is also relevant to 
understanding dual-use governance activities Kelle 2007, Davies 2008,  Jin and Karackattu 2011 and 
Cook 2010. However, there has yet to be a comprehensive securitization analysis of the governance of 
dual-use aspects of new and emerging science and technology.  
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3. The ‘nature’ and ‘prospect’ of national approaches (i.e. styles of governance and 
politics) to the issue of dual-use governance. In particular, there is an emphasis on the 
role of risk assessment rationales within dual-use governance. Such rationales are 
interesting because there is some disagreement about the wisdom and prospect of risk 
management in the context of the governance of the dual-use issues (Fleming 2007; 
Kelle 2012). Attention is also given to the emergence of coalitions between 
stakeholders, as well as to new channels of policy development.  
Now that the reader has been introduced to the scope and purposes of this thesis, the 
remainder of the chapter is dedicated to explaining the emergence and nature of the dual-use 
issue as a policy challenge in the US and UK context.  
2.4 The Four Domains of National Dual-use Governance 
Dual-use issues have generally been understood to require a web of responses from a wide 
range of stakeholders (Rappert and McLeish 2007). The rise of ‘governance webs’ within the 
dual-use discourse reflects a broader trend within the BTWC, the international regime tasked 
with preventing the development of biological weapons (McLeish and Feakes 2008, 6). 
Within this understanding there tends to be enthusiasm, as well as optimism about the extent 
to which collaboration between institutions can foster effective policy development and 
implementation at national level. However, such a perspective risks neglecting the distinct 
‘political and normative frameworks’ as well as distinct ‘styles of reasoning’ (Fidler and 
Gostin 2008, 12, 15) which inform the decision making of stakeholders in this area at 
national level. Such differences can hinder the development and implementation of policy, 
even if there is an agreement between stakeholders that a response to the issue is required. 
This means that it is important to map the broader political context which informs the way in 
which different actors engage with the dual-use use issue as a political problem.  
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In the following section the various institutions, stakeholders and dominant governance 
paradigms are introduced. In order to structure the comparison between the UK and the US, 
four ‘domains of governance’ have been identified. The term ‘domain of governance’ refers 
to largely discreet areas of governance which comprise of normative and legal frameworks, 
institutionalised processes of reasoning and decision-making, and political constellations of 
actors. This type of conceptualisation of the institutions and ideational landscape of emerging 
fields of governance has already been utilized in the definitive work of Fidler and Gostin 
(2008), who examined changes in the way in which infectious disease is governed in the US 
context. Within this work, they pay particular attention to the role of norms and institutions 
found within the generally discreet domains of public health and national security governance 
in the emergence of new initiatives directed against the threat posed by infectious diseases in 
the 21st century. This work served not only to highlight the historical and institutional context 
in which governance emerges, but also allowed for the conceptualisation of the practices, 
underlying rationale and overall purposes of the broad range of activities directed at the broad 
issue of infectious disease. 
Within this thesis, the issue of interest is dual-use rather than infectious disease, and this has 
led to the identification of a different set of domains. The domains identified within this 
thesis are ‘Biosafety’, ‘Anti-terrorism’, ‘Public Health’ as well as ‘New and Emerging 
Science and Technology Governance’. These domains of governance are now introduced in 
the UK and US context. 
2.4.1 New and Emerging Science and Technology Domain 
The societal assessment of New and Emerging Science and Technology (NEST) is often 
typified as involving the public and media discussion of controversial technology and 
research. Notable examples of technology which have received substantial attention include 
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human cloning, genetic modification technology and nanotechnology. However, NEST 
assessment involves a broader set of activities than public dialogue between scientists and 
wider society. For example, decisions and recommendations made by NEST ethics 
institutions (such as the US Presidential Commission on Bioethical Issues or the European 
Group on Ethics) have had very real impacts on the practice and regulation of science in 
relation to given issues such as stem cell research. In the following section, the domain of 
‘NEST assessment’ is further elaborated.  
Within both the US and Europe, state funded life science projects have increasingly had an 
Ethical, Legal and Social Issues (ELSI) aspect. The earliest project of this type was the 
Human Genome Project, which began in the 1990s. Within this project, 3% to 5% of the 
project budget was allocated to the study of these issues. In essence, ELSI projects associated 
with new and emerging fields have increased institutional capacity for social scientists, 
ethicists, lawyers, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to engage with discussions about 
new and emerging technologies. The development of this practice can be explained with 
reference to the fundamental changes in the nature of scientific research that have occurred 
since the middle of the 20th century (Gibbons, Limoges, and Nowotny 1994). Gibbons et al. 
(1994) refer to the development of a 'Mode 2' of scientific production which has four 
characteristics: 
− knowledge is increasingly produced in the context of application (as opposed to 
the production of 'pure' science, which may then be utilised in the development of 
applications); 
− science increasingly draws upon theoretical elements from various fields; 
− knowledge is produced in a wider variety of sites that ever before; and 
− participants in science have grown more aware of the social implications of their 
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work, just as society has become more aware of the way science and technology 
impacts lives (adapted from Jasanoff 2005, chap. 2). 
Kaiser et al. (2010) argue that these developments have underpinned the emergence of 
‘assessment regimes’ around new and emerging convergent techno-scientific fields over the 
previous decade. (Kaiser, Maasen, and Kurath 2010a, chap. 1). This includes, for example, 
nanotechnology, as well as synthetic biology. These regimes can be understood to comprise 
of a wide range of stakeholders who have applied a diverse set of assessment rationales to 
emerging fields. There are three central dimensions of these emerging regimes (based on 
categories developed by Kaiser, Maasen, and Kurath 2010a, xiii):  
Democratising dimension 
Since at least the Second World War there have been calls for the democratisation of 
innovation processes. This involves the development of political systems which allow society 
to engage with the evaluation of new and emerging science and technology. The extent to 
which these aims are aspired to and reached in contemporary NEST politics is of course 
contested. For example, there has been much discussion of how scientific developments 
should be communicated to the public, with many within the scientific community argue that 
there is a requirement to ‘educate’ the public about new and emerging technologies. This can 
be in contrasted to more participatory approaches which seek to make the scientific 
community more cognisant public concern and needs (for example Hagendijk and Irwin 
2006; Bowman 2008; Nerlich, Elliott, and Larson 2009).  
Despite the occasional charge that ELSI initiatives will always remain an exercise in ‘talking-
shop’ public engagement, ELSI activities have inspired many actors and institutions from 
wider society to engage with the governance of new and emerging technologies, and this has 
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led to new institutions and forms of collaboration in relation to NEST issues (Kaiser, Maasen, 
and Kurath 2010a, xv). It is likely that the increased involvement of a wide variety of actors 
in techno-scientific fields, particularly in the early stages, may have had some discernible 
impact upon dual-use discussions.  
Anticipatory dimension 
The anticipatory element of NEST governance involves an emphasis on the evaluation of 
science and technology before its products are legion. Official (often government) bioethical 
institutions play a fundamental role in the evaluation of biotechnology. Bioethical analysis is 
often conducted in terms of how a specific aspect of a moral value system is conceivably 
impacted upon by a new invention. This value system could be centred on either the rightness 
or wrongness of actions in themselves (deontological) or by their consequences 
(consequentialism). Within recent decades, and in the US in particular, discussion has also 
focused on mid-level ethical principles, such as ‘justice’ or ‘public beneficence’ (Beauchamp 
and Childress 2001). Within European context in particular conceptions of precaution have 
also become predominant within the ethical discourse. 
However, anticipatory discussions are not only restricted to official bioethical forums and 
discourses. A wide range of institutions and interest groups also exist which aim to impact on 
the emergence of policy in relation to cutting-edge fields (Jasanoff 2005, 28).  Dual-use 
issues are a recent addition to concerns about biotechnology, which means that the political 





Finally, there has been increasing societal attention to the idea of transforming innovation 
processes, rather than just seeking to better facilitate communication between scientists and 
the public. This is to make these processes more responsive to societal needs, and enable prp-
active rather than re-active approaches to identifying and managing potential risks. This move 
‘up-stream’ in the scientific development process has led to a greater focus on the practices 
and processes of scientific development, as well as increased attention upon the pre-emptive 
governance of emerging technologies. In recent years an increasing number of projects in 
fields such as synthetic biology have included an ‘up-stream’ element which have tended to 
involve  anthropologists and STS scholars (Rabinow and Bennett 2012). It is conceivable that 
such projects may have local, and even national or international impacts on the emergence of 
dual-use governance regimes surrounding specific areas of science and technology.  
Dual-use Nest governance in US and UK contexts 
In the discussion of other governance domains within this thesis, existing literature has 
allowed for distinctions to be made between national styles of governance of dual-use issues. 
However, for several reasons it is important to remain tentative about US and UK styles of 
governance within the NEST domain in relation to dual-use governance. First, there is an 
absence of literature which has examined how dual-use issue have been incorporated into 
NEST governance activities. While it may be tempting to assume that dual-use issues are 
dealt with in identical ways to other issues on the NEST agenda in national contexts, it is 
already becoming clear that dual-use issues have not been neatly incorporated into existing 
NEST governance frameworks (Edwards and Kelle 2012, 6; Rabinow and Bennett 2012). 
Second, even if the dual-use issue can be understood to have been incorporated into existing 
NEST governance systems, NEST governance approaches adopted in relation to a given 
techno-scientific field are also contingent on the norms of dominant actors and the 
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institutional landscape, as well as historic and cultural factors (Jasanoff 2005, 17–22). This 
means, especially in the context of convergent technologies, that there is likely to be variance 
in NEST governance norms between different techno-scientific fields of dual-use concern. 
For these reasons the NEST domain is characterised for the UK and US case studies with 
direct reference to the field of study, namely synthetic biology, in this thesis. This is in 
contrast to the other domains of dual-use governance, in which the nature of governance 
responses appear to be less contingent on the politics surrounding a specific techno-science.10 
An approach to structuring this comparison is outlined below. 
Within the NEST literature, one approach to analysing the politics surrounding new and 
emerging science and technology has been to identify ‘typologies’ of NEST governance. 
Such typologies can be utilised for a variety of analytical purposes; within this thesis, 
however, they are utilized to help structure comparison. The typologies used in this thesis 
(introduced below) are taken from a European 5th framework funded project conducted by 
Rob Hagendijk and Egil Kallerud,11 which involved case study research on EU countries. 
However, comparable typologies have been identified widely within the technology risk 
governance literature (Renn 2008, 385; Löfstedt and Vogel 2001; Jasanoff 1986, 79–83). 
Discretionary: In discretionary governance, policy making takes place with virtually no 
explicit interaction with ‘the public’. Decisions are taken with very little input to the 
policy process by any group outside of the institutions directly responsible for science 
and technology policy (essentially, government departments and closely related 
industrial and scientific bodies). 
                                                            
10
  This is an issue which is subject to further in-depth discussion in later chapters.  
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Corporatist: Within corporatist governance, differences of interest between stakeholders 
are recognized as inputs to processes of negotiation in which workable compromises 
are sought. The processes of negotiation take place within a closed or highly regulated 
space, so the decisive feature is the question of admission and recognition of 
legitimate stakeholders. 
Educational: Educational modes of governance assume that conflicts or tensions 
regarding science and technology policy are founded on a lack of knowledge on the 
part of the public. Hence it is necessary to educate the public through dissemination of 
scientific (expert) knowledge in order to create an informed public of scientific 
citizens that understand the experts’ assessment of the problems and possibilities of 
science. 
Market: Market governance is based on the notion that science and technology can be 
governed through the economic mechanisms of demand and supply. The value of 
science comes from the surplus value created through its commercialisation and the 
general contribution to the generation of wealth in society. Scientific governance 
should be supportive of this potential. In this mode, the public participates as 
customers and consumers in a market when they make decisions about purchasing a 
product. 
Agonistic: Agonistic governance takes place under conditions of confrontation and 
adversity, when decisions have to be made in a political context where positions are 
strongly opposed. 
Deliberative: Deliberative governance rests on the ideal that governance of science can be 
based on strong public support deriving from a continuous public debate of, and 
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engagement with, science. Consensual agreements developed within the framework of 
the public sphere serve as foundations for legitimate policy decisions. In this mode, 
members of the public do not partake as consumers of science, but as scientific 
citizens.  
Each of these approaches to the governance of science may have shaped the governance of 
dual-use issues. It is also possible to conceive of how the political contentiousness of the 
dual-use issue in either of the nation states may have impacted upon the adoption of a model 
at various points in time.  
These typologies suggest that public engagement can be given a different level of priority 
within NEST regimes, with various motivations and styles of implementation. There may 
also be different understandings of the extent to which stakeholders should seek consensus 
over issues, and how this should be publicly discussed. Furthermore, all of the above are 
dependent on political conditions which can alter over time. 
This suggests that, in the analysis of the development of dual-use governance at national 
level, close attention should be given to the nexus between NEST governance as well as to 
developments within other domains. In particular, politicisations of relationships between 
stakeholders, as seen in the biosafety domain in the US, can have resonating effects within 
the NEST domain. It may also be argued that the adoption of certain NEST approaches may 
impact upon deliberative processes in other domains, encouraging or restricting the range of 
stakeholders within the deliberative process of policy development. These themes are 





2.4.2 Biosafety Domain 
The term biosafety refers to principles and practices directed at preventing the unintentional 
release of biological organisms and toxins into the environment, as well as the protection of 
personnel working with dangerous organisms and other biological materials. States are 
required to implement biosafety policies under international health law, and also increasingly 
under agreements made in relation to international bio-security. This is outlined in the figure 
below:  
 
Table 1 International agreements covering biosafety and biosecurity 
From: Bakanidze, Imnadze, and Perkins (2010) 
 
An addition to this spectrum would also be the The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety an 
agreement made under the convention of biological diversity which entered into force in 
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2003. However, biosafety policies have generally tended to be developed and implemented at 
national and sub-national level within the UK and the US.12 
In the US as well as in the UK, existing biosafety law, institutions and practices have been 
understood to be central to the implementation of policies directed against the misuse of the 
life sciences. However, the politics of biosafety is quite distinct within these states. In the 
following sections, the biosafety domain is introduced in these national contexts.  
Biosafety and the dual-use issue in the US 
In the US, laboratory biosafety governance first developed in relation to classified biological 
research. Since the 1950s, biosafety information has been made available to the wider 
scientific community through a series of publications and conferences (Fleming 2007, 109). 
The Asilomar process also stimulated the emergence of biosafety governance activities 
during the 1970s in the broader scientific community. The process led to the publication of a 
set of voluntary guidelines for the physical containment of recombinant DNA molecules. In 
the 1980s two institutions within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
would also collaborate in a consultation process that led to the development of a set of 
guidelines for worker safety as well as for public health in response to potential biohazards 
associated with the possession and use of pathogens (National Research Council 2004, 41–
46). This included the development of a tiered categorisation system based on the hazards 
particular pathogens pose. The most dangerous pathogens, which includes many classic 
biowarfare agents, are referred to as ‘select-agents’(Greenberger, Kovacs, and Mike 2010, 
11). 
                                                            
12
  Although some aspects of UK biosafety policy can be understood to have been impacted upon by EC 
legislation, specifically the Environmental  Protection Act of 1990, the  so-called Green Bill 1990, 
which focused on the controlling the environmental  release of GMOs. However this has also been 
implemented  domestically through Health and Safety institutions. 
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Since the establishment of the select-agent system, the NIH has also taken on responsibility 
for the oversight of genetic engineering research. This responsibility has been discharged 
through encouraging the adoption NIH guidelines in all institutions (both domestic and 
international). In order to receive NIH support, institutions must establish an institutional 
biosafety committee (IBC) to ensure transparency and compliance with the guidelines. These 
committees must consist of at least five members, two of which cannot be affiliated with the 
institution which represents the interests of the surrounding community (National Research 
Council 2004, 35). 
Private organisations, as well as non-NIH federally funded institutions, are not legally 
required to adhere to the NIH guidelines. However, some private organisations as well as 
federal agencies have voluntarily developed and registered their IBC’s with the NIH. There 
are a series of motivations for this, including ensuring compliance to anti-terrorism law, as 
well as protection against private litigation (Knowles 2012, 50). There are also a series of 
other regulations concerning the handling of hazardous materials, specifically from the 
Environment Protection Agency and  Department of Agriculture; however, these regulations 
focused on the transport of pathogens rather than research practices (Steinbruner et al. 2005, 
23).  
Within the US, concerns about bioterrorism created a large impetus for quick and decisive 
responses to the threat posed by the misuse of select-agents.  As Atlas states: 
In only five years, the regulatory regime for possession of certain Microorganisms 
and toxins in the United States went from a permissive atmosphere, in which 
biosafety was the primary concern and the laboratory facility, not the individual 
scientist, the focus of regulation, to a situation in which biosecurity is of prime 
importance and individuals face criminal sanctions if they violate any of the 




Lack of faith in the existing biosafety regime also impacted upon discussions of dual-use 
research oversight. In 2003, the NRC report entitled Biotechnology Research in the Age of 
Terrorism identified the IBC system as a mechanism by which it was possible to review the 
misuse potential of any experimental of concern. The ability and suitability of these 
institutions in discharging this role has been a source of political contention within the US 
since this time.13 This debate was certainly stimulated by the publication of research 
conducted by the Sunshine Project in 2004, which evaluated IBCs based on several criteria 
that essentially revolved around public accountability. These criteria centred on how IBC 
reviews were recorded by institutions, and how accessible this information was to the public. 
They claimed that only 4% of the intuitions they contacted demonstrated adequate 
accountability (The Sunshine Project 2004, 4). They also identified over 30 companies with 
NIH funding, some of whom who were conducting biodefense research on ‘select-agents’ that 
had no NIH registered biosafety committee (The Sunshine Project 2004, 14). Since this time 
further criticisms of the  IBC centric approach within the US have also emerged which have 
also focused on the absence of compliance within NIH funded institutions as well as the 
absence of voluntary application of these guidelines within the private sector (Race and 
Hammond 2008). 
To sum up, the nexus between existing biosafety frameworks and dual-use governance 
remains a source of contestation within the US. This politicisation is undoubtedly important 
in making sense of emergent debates about responses to concerns about bioterrorism. This 
idea is subject to examination in later chapters.  
Biosafety and the dual-use issue in the UK 
In the UK, laboratory biosafety has been regulated since the emergence of concerns about 
recombinant DNA in the 1970s. Over time, the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has 
become central to the oversight of research involving potentially dangerous pathogens and 
organisms, as well as laboratory and medical biosafety (Jasanoff 2005, 55; Nightingale and 
Mcleish in Lyall et al. 2009, 174).  Health and safety measures, generally speaking, involve 
                                                            
13
  For a an introduction written at the time see Couzin (2004). See also a letter from 11 prominent 
members of the scientific community which discusses the weaknesses of IBCs (Cook-Deegan et al.. 
2005). Another sceptical perspective on biosafety within institutions is provided in J.B. Tucker 2003. 
See also Klotz and Sylvester 2009, chap. 7 and Corneliussen 2006.  
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legal duties for employers, employees and contractors in the workplace. The primary 
legislation of biosafety in relation to genetically modified organisms, as well as biological 
agents, is the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act (1974). This act created the HSE, which can design and implement 
secondary legislation in this area. The policy is in the main implemented through the 
Biological Agents Unit of the HSE, which also contributes to the development of secondary 
legislation. Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the HSE has implemented new 
regulations. An advisory committee within the unit tasked with ‘advising the Health and 
Safety Commission, the Health and Safety Executive, Health and Agriculture Ministers and 
their counterparts under devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as required, on 
all aspects of hazards and risks to workers and others from exposure to pathogen’s14 has also 
produced a series of annual reports and other publications, such as guidance for practitioners, 
which can be used to indicate the work and perspectives of the unit.15 
The secondary legislation frameworks which are understood to be relevant to biosafety within 
the unit is the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations (2002), the 
Genetically Modified Organism (contained Use) Regulations (2000) as well as The 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (1999). The relationship between 
these regulatory frameworks in terms of the types of duties that they have created for 
employers, employees and contractors are outlined in the figure below 
                                                            
14  http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/acdp/ar2004.pdf. 
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Table 2 The relationships between UK health and safety regulatory frameworks 
From: Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (HSE) 2005 
Nightingale and McLeish argue that in the main that UK legislators, have concentrated on 
tightening pre-existing health and safety practices and have not introduced any radically new 
requirements in response to concerns about the intentional misuse of biological agents and 
toxins (Nightingale and McLeish in Lyall et al. 2009). The HSE has identified publicly the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) as a relevant regulation to its work 
since at least 2006. However, since the terrorist attacks of 2001, there have not been 
substantive changes to the policies of the biological agents implementing unit within the UK 
(Corneliussen 2006). Neither have there been substantive changes to laboratory biosafety 
practices, including those involving research on dangerous pathogens (McLeish and 
Nightingale 2005; Nightingale and McLeish in Lyall et al. 2009). Since the emergence of 
concerns about bioterrorism, the biosafety system of the UK has received attention in relation 
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to the accidental escape of the foot and mouth disease virus from the high-level containment 
laboratory at Pirbright. This incident did provide an opportunity for reflection on anti-
terrorism, as well as biosafety policies, in high-level biosecurity laboratories. Under the 
review that followed, however, it was found that the HSE was not required to take on further 
anti-terrorism roles in relation to biological agents (House of Commons, Innovation, 
Universities, Science and Skills Committee 2008, 16). 
To sum up, dual-use concerns have not been understood to challenge the UK biosafety 
system. A key reason for this, is faith in the long established legally enforced controls on 
laboratories. These controls have also been understood, within the HSE as well as at 
parliamentary level, in the context of extra sets of checks and enforcement in relation to 
schedule 5 agents provided by the police force by the National Counter-Terrorism Security 
Office (NaCTSO) (House of Commons, Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills 
Committee 2008, 16). The impact of this on dual-use politics in a UK context is discussed 
further in later chapters and is contrasted with biosafety politics within the US.  
2.4.3 Anti-terrorism Domain 
Anti-terrorism policies in general terms are designed to prevent or mitigate the use and threat 
of violence by states and sub-state actors to coerce persuade and gain public attention. 
Concerns about bioterrorism were galvanised in the anti-terror domain and received increased 
public attention following the US Amerithax attacks of 2001, where the September 11th 
attacks in the US were shortly followed by the arrival of letters containing anthrax spores at 
five major US media offices. Several weeks later the offices of two US Senators were also 
targeted. Five people died, and at least sixty people were harmed. These events contributed to 
heightened anxiety in the US as well as in Europe about the threat posed by bioterrorism. 
Although the source of the anthrax spores was eventually identified as a US defence 
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laboratory, there have been concerns about the other means by which terrorists could access 
and use dangerous pathogens. Following these events the synthesis and even the modification 
of select-agents by terrorist groups are scenarios which have received both policy maker and 
public attention.  
There is a long history of controls on scientific research and cutting-edge technologies within 
both the US and the UK. Since at least the Second World War, both states have sought to 
protect the advantage gained from military scientific progress. In the Cold War era, the vast 
majority of science and technology of military interest was developed in a military context. 
Security regimes have developed within leading states (and between allies) that utilised 
inward looking controls to prevent the leakage of military-related technology, scientific 
knowledge and expertise to their enemies. This primarily involved controls over exports, in 
addition to the screening and restriction of personnel access to classified technologies and 
associated scientific and information (Relyea 1994). Since the BTWC was signed into force 
in 1972, states have also been required under international law to prevent the production, 
development and stockpiling of biological weapons within their jurisdictions. This has tended 
to be enforced through the criminalisation of such activities.  
Towards the end of the Cold War era many states became increasingly concerned about the 
threat posed by the international trade of chemical and biological agents and technologies that 
could contribute to prohibited state level or sub-state weapons programmes. This led to the 
emergence of the so-called ‘Australia group’, which is a voluntary, informal export-control 
arrangement between member states.  
Increasing apprehension of the dual-use nature of simple and widely available biological 
techniques, materials and technologies, as well as the growing significance of international 
terrorism, has galvanised dual-use concerns. These concerns in turn have led to fears that 
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existing national regulation and international agreements can no longer be relied upon to 
prevent rogue states and particularly sub-state actors from developing terror weapons (Sims 
2009; J.B. Tucker 2003; Kelle, Nixdorff, and Dando 2006). At international level this has led 
to the reassertion of states obligations under article IV16 of the biological and toxin weapons 
convention in UN resolution 1540 which required states to establish domestic controls to 
‘prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of 
delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials’17 
Concerns about the misuse of scientific research also resulted in the extension of the remit of 
the Australia group in 2002, who since this time has sought to control the spread of 
technology by ‘"intangible means", including via e-mail, phone, or fax’.18 
Developments within the life sciences have been perceived to necessitate a turn away from 
traditional arms control approaches towards broader biosecurity policies. The table that 
follows outlines characteristics of biological pathogens which make traditional non-





                                                            
16
  Article iv reads:  Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery 
specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under 
its control anywhere. 
17
  Available at http://www.un.org/sc/1540/. 
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Fissile materials Biological Pathogens 
• Do not exist in nature • Generally found in nature 
• Non-living, synthetic • Living, replicative 
• Difficult and costly to produce • Easy and cheap to produce 
• Not diverse: plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium are the only fissile materials used in 
nuclear weapons 
• Highly diverse: more than 20 pathogens are 
suitable for biological warfare 
 
• Can be inventoried and tracked in a 
quantitative manner 
• Because pathogens reproduce, inventory 
control is unreliable 
• Can be detected at a distance from the 
emission of ionizing radiation 
• Cannot be detected at a distance with available 
technologies 
• Weapons-grade fissile materials are stored at a 
limited number of military nuclear sites 
• Pathogens are present in many types of 
facilities and at multiple locations within a 
facility 
• Few non-military applications (such as 
research reactors, thermo-electric generators, 
and production of radioisotopes) 
• Many legitimate applications in biomedical 
research and the pharmaceutical/ biotechnology 
industry 
 
Table 3 Contrasts between the characteristics of nuclear and biological weapons as a subject of oversight 
From: (J. B Tucker 2006) 
National responses to the new threat of bioterrorism in the 21st century can be understood to 
have impacted upon the emergence and governance of dual-use issues in several ways at 
national level. Primarily this has involved increased legal controls upon select-agents. 
Paradoxically, however, concerns about bioterrorism have also led to calls for increased 
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engagement in research with agents and biological processes that have been of highest misuse 
concern, especially within the US (Tucker 2003), an issue discussed at greater depth in this 
thesis in relation to the public health domain. In the following section the nature of the US 
anti-terrorism domain, as well as its impact on dual-use governance, is discussed.  
 The anti-terrorism domain and the dual-use issue in the US  
Within the US, government security controls over science and technology have generally 
been understood in the context of the requirement for the state to encourage the openness of 
science to the greatest extent possible. This is epitomised in the US context in the Directive 
on Fundamental Research Exemption NSDD-189 (1985), which asserts that ‘basic’ research 
should be exempt from controls on dissemination to the fullest extent possible. In the US 
restrictions have primarily involved controls over exports and screening of personnel working 
in military research. This has also led to, at times, controls over research and technology 
developed outside a military context. Relyea (1994) highlights this oversight system involved 
censorship and suppression as well as invention secrecy. These were in the main 
implemented through a series of federal regulations under the Atomic Energies Act of (1954), 
which allows for the classification of state funded research. 
During the Cold War period, the focus of US biological non-proliferation policy was on the 
prevention of states acquiring biological weapons of mass destruction. It wasn’t until towards 
the end of the Cold War period that US attention turned to domestic terrorist threat. This is 
exemplified in the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act (1989). This act made it illegal for 
anyone (without good reason) to knowingly develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, acquire, 
retain, or possess any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or 
knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so.  
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Seven years later, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996), 
primarily in response to the 1984 Rajneeshee Salmonella bioterrorism incident as well as the 
failed Aum Shinrikyo anthrax attack in Kameido Japan. The Act expanded upon the 1989 Act 
in several ways, with a focus on ensuring terrorist threats and attempts were covered under 
the regulation. This Act also broadened provisions to explicitly include the use of 
recombinant DNA technologies in the synthesis of new of existing pathogens (Ferguson 
1997). Under this Act, the legal basis for a select–agent regulatory framework was also 
established. The Centre for Disease Control (CDC), an organisation within the US DHS 
department, was charged with the development of a list of select-agents, as well as of 
regulations to prevent national and international terrorism (Ferguson 1997, 359). 
Since 2001 several anti-terrorism Acts have impacted upon the oversight of select-agents. 
The first is the USA Patriot Act (2001), The Act impacted upon the program by criminalising 
the shipping, possession, and receipt of select-agents for restricted persons.19 This Act also 
expanded on existing bio-weapons statute, explicitly criminalising the possession of select-
agents without just cause (USA Patriot Act of 2001, sec. 817). 
Under the Bioterrorism and Preparedness Act 2002, as well as the Agricultural Bioterrorism 
Acts of 2002, two institutions were charged with the development, maintenance and oversight 
of lists of select-agents. The first was the HHS (Department of Health and Human Services) 
                                                            
19
  Under the Patriot act restricted persons are understood to include any person who: 
(A) is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year; 
(B) has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 
year; 
(C) is a fugitive from justice; 
(D) is an unlawful user of any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)); 
(E) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(F) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution; 
(G) is an alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence ) who is a national of 
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan or Syria, or any other country to which the Secretary of 
State, pursuant to applicable law, has made a determination (that remains in effect) that such country 
has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism;  
(H) has been discharged from the Armed Services of the United States under dishonorable conditions. 
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which already had responsibilities under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
1996 (sec. 511); the second was the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Under these acts, 
the HHS and USDA were also required to co-ordinate with each other. 
Since this time the CDC within the HHS, as well as the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS), have developed three select-agent lists. The CDC is responsible for a list 
dealing with public health and the APHIS is responsible for two separate lists dealing with 
plants and animals. In essence, however, each of these lists is associated with a comparable 
set of legal requirements. Under these regulations, all entities possessing ‘select-agents’ are 
required to designate an individual who is responsible for ensuring safe research practices, 
storage, transport and reporting of loss, theft and accidents (See, for example, Hallie 2011). 
Since the implementation of the new select-agent rules, there has been sustained criticism of 
these regulations within the US. Many of these criticisms constitute attacks on the wisdom of 
controlling select-agents as a strategy to prevent misuse more generally (Rambhia, Ribner, 
and Gronvall 2011). Added to this there has been sustained concern within government and 
federal agencies that scientific research may have been negatively impacted upon unduly by 
the implementation of anti- terror regulations related to select-agents (Knezo 2002, 2). 
Prominent members of the scientific community also continue to express concerns publicly 
about the impact of controls on medical and biodefensive research (for example Franz et al. 
2009). Such contentions have led to a series of institutional and academic investigations into 
the impact of US select-agent controls (Dias et al. 2010; Fischer 2006; Franz et al. 2009).  
Another key issue area within this domain has been contestation over the suitability and 
effectiveness of scientific self-governance in relation to the threat of terrorist misuse of 
research. Following the Amerithrax attacks there were heightened concerns within aspects of 
the US executive that existing declassified information related to bio-weapons research, as 
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well as cutting-edge life science research, could be utilised by terrorists. Essentially, the 
responses to terrorism relevant to the practice of life science research were laid out in the 
House of Representatives Resolution 514 (2002). The resolution expressed concern about the 
publication of a piece of research that demonstrated how to construct the polio virus utilising 
commercially produced polynucleotide sequences. These concerns were expressed with 
reference to terrorist groups as well as states of proliferation concern. The resolution called 
for publishers and editors as well as the broader scientific community to develop ethical 
standards to ensure against the publication and dissemination of dangerous information. The 
resolution also called for the executive to conduct a review of statute and policy regarding the 
publication and classification of research in light of the recently emerged concerns.  
Following the resolution, a joint editorial statement appeared in Nature which stated that its 
actions came in response to a meeting between scientific leaders, national security 
professionals and government aides (Atlas et al. 2003). The statement reminded readers of 
the ‘active role’ that key journals had taken so far in the development of responses to 
biosecurity concerns. It was also argued that the scientific community had dealt with such 
concerns with regard to nuclear technologies; thus they were well placed to lead discussions 
on this issue (Atlas et al. 2003). The statement affirmed the journal’s responsibility to ensure 
the advancement of biodefense research. There was also an assertion of the author’s 
commitment ‘to dealing responsibly and effectively with safety and security issues that may 
be raised by papers submitted for publication, and to increasing our capacity to identify such 
issues as they arise’ (Atlas et al. 2003). This commitment also included the implementation 
of policies to review papers of dual-use concern, and where necessary modify, or censor 
publications. The actions of the scientific community have been characterised by some as 
pre-emptive attempts to stave off regulations. For example, Harris and Steinbruner of the 
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Harvard Sussex CBW programme stated that ‘US scientific organizations moved quickly to 
minimize the possibility of government-mandated restrictions on fundamental research, 
offering governance by scientists themselves as an alternative’ (Harris and Steinbruner 2005, 
2). Bearing in mind the political context just described, it is unsurprising that there have been 
a series of investigations into the dual-use review policies of biomedical Journals in the US 
and internationally since this time (Aken and Hunger 2009; Resnik, Barner, and Dinse 2011). 
 The most influential report produced on the issue of US dual-use research oversight remains 
‘Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism’ (National Research Council 2004). This 
document advocated the extension of existing scientific self-governance and biosafety 
practices in the context of existing national regulations. The report also called for the 
establishment of the National Scientific Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a board 
which is primarily tasked with providing guidance to the US government on dual-use issues. 
The subsequent work of this board is subject to in-depth examination in chapter 5. 
To sum up, on the surface level developments within the US anti-terrorism domain have 
appeared sporadic, and often been characterised as involving vocal aspects of the scientific 
community resisting government intervention. However, such a characterisation neglects the 
fact that, at a national and international level, leading scientists and scientific institutions 
have contributed to a number of initiatives aimed at improving the understanding and 
governance of dual-use issues. So far within the academic literature, the specific impacts of 
this political environment on the emergence of dual-use governance in relation emerging 
fields of science and technology remain unclear and contested. This in part stems from the 
vested interest the broader scientific community is understood to have in relation to dual-use 
issues. These observations inform analysis in later chapters.  
The anti-terrorism domain and dual-use issues in the UK 
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In the UK, there have been no major changes in scientific practice resulting from dual-use 
concerns aside from increased controls over select-agents, as discussed within this chapter 
with regard to the biosafety domain. The primary response to concerns about the misuse of 
scientific research in the UK in the period 2001-2003 was the development of an ethical code 
of conduct for the scientific community, by the scientific community. This had broad support 
from the Home Office, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee: 2003), funding councils and learned societies. There were also 
initiatives being developed by academics which have been  discussed at international level 
since the 2nd BTWC inter-sessional process (Rappert 2009). It was emphasised by Pearson at 
the time that in order to be effective, such codes would need to draw upon current regulations 
and also be embedded in existing governance frameworks, such as those directed at health 
and safety and the BTWC (Pearson 2004). However, even from this early period, some 
cynicism was expressed in relation to the value and motivation of scientific codes. For 
example, a 2004 report on a meeting co-organised by the Royal Society and Welcome Trust 
stated that 
‘although some scepticism was expressed about the value of codes of conduct, it was 
suggested that the scientific community should take the lead in determining any codes 
of conduct or good practice, to pre-empt their introduction through legislation or other 
‘top down’ approaches’ (Royal Society and Wellcome Trust 2004, 1).  
The Royal Society and Wellcome Trust also supported other forms of self-governance as 
early as 2004, usually with an explicit preference for this approach over legislation. Another 
approach identified was the extension of research funding review procedures. However it was 
unclear at the time how potential dual-use research could actually be identified in the absence 
of a risk assessment framework (Royal Society and Wellcome Trust 2004, 1). Another 
approach discussed in 2004 was the  restriction of the communication of research results, but 
it was made clear that ‘the very strongly and widely held belief was expressed that preventing 
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publication of basic research would not prevent its misuse’ (Royal Society and Wellcome 
Trust 2004, 3). There were also a series of arguments provided against censorship. The first 
argument related to the practical unfeasibility of censorship. This included the idea that 
censored scientific information could be communicated via other formal and informal routes 
(including email, conferences and publication in alternative journals or on websites). The 
second argument was that research which was censored was likely to be conducted by other 
researchers ‘within two years’ anyway (Royal Society and Wellcome Trust 2004, 3). The 
third argument related to the impact which censorship could have on the development of 
science and technology. Specifically, it was argued that the open publication of research was 
essential to knowledge exchange, as well as to the peer review process. The final argument 
related to accidental findings; it was stated that the publication of accidental ‘dual-use’ results 
(such as the now notorious mouse-pox experiment) would make other scientists aware of 
potential unintended results (Royal Society and Wellcome Trust 2004, 3–4). 
Following the publication of the US National Academies of Science’s (NAS) ‘Biotechnology 
Research in an Age of Terrorism’ report in 2004, the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBRSC), Medical Research Council (MRC) and Wellcome Trust began to 
implement policy changes directed against the risk of misuse. Such activities were described 
in a joint BBSRC, MRC, Wellcome Trust publication and included 
[the] introduction of a question on application forms asking applicants to consider 
risks of misuse associated with their proposal; [the] explicit mention of risks of 
misuse in guidance to referees as an issue to consider; [the] development of clear 
guidance for funding committees on this issue and the process for assessing cases 
where concerns have been raised; [and the] modification of organisational guidelines 
on good practice in research to include specific reference to risks of misuse (BBSRC, 
MRC and Wellcome Trust 2005). 
Despite explicit reference to dual-use issues and the NAS report in guidance to those 
involved in funding application processes at the MRC, Wellcome Trust and BBRSC, there 
remains no publicly available evidence that any research applications have been modified as 
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a result of dual-use concerns within the UK. Indeed, in the context of an earlier statement 
(2004) made by the Wellcome Trust and the BBRSC, it is unclear how dual-use work could 
be identified and what action could actually be taken if there had been dual-use concern. In 
response to the perceived absence of awareness and understanding within the scientific 
community, a key area of activity within the UK has been awareness-raising among 
scientists. However, research conducted as part of a the Wellcome funded ‘Building A 
Sustainable Capacity for dual-use bioethics’, as well as other projects associated with the 
Universities of Exeter and Bradford, have highlighted that educational activities have tended 
to be limited in nature, with dual-use issues only beginning to enter a limited number of 
ethics courses provided for scientists.20 
To sum up, in response to concerns about bioterrorism, the UK government tightened up 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity; however, since this time public and press attention in 
relation to the issue has been minimal. UK scientific institutions, motivated primarily by 
concerns about bioterrorism in the early 2000s, have implemented some dual-use policy. 
However, these activities have had very little impact on the actual practice of scientific 
research so far. Key activities in this area have been small initiatives, primarily conducted by 
academic researchers, designed to have impacts at a more local level and in relation to 
specific fields. This suggests that the domain has a minimal impact on the governance of the 
majority of new and emerging fields of science and technology within the UK. These themes 
are taken up in analysis in later chapters.  
2.4.4 The Public Health Domain 
The term public health essentially refers to, ‘the science and art of preventing disease, 
prolonging life and promoting health through the organized efforts and informed choices of 
                                                            
20
  http://www.brad.ac.uk/bioethics/Monographs/. 
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society, organizations, public and private, communities and individuals’ (Winslow 1920). 
The state tends to take a leading role in the field of public health provision within liberal 
democratic states; however, many activities may also be conducted in partnership with the 
private sector. The primary functions of public health systems are disease surveillance and 
intervention, which require having complex and risk-specific systems in place. Increasingly, 
public health theory, practice and capabilities are considered important in responding to the 
risk of biological attack, and are related to increased concerns internationally about the threat 
of infectious diseases, regardless of origin (Kelle 2007; Aldis 2008; Fidler and Gostin 2008). 
A term often utilised to describe this area of governance in the US and EU is ‘Bio-
preparedness’. In its broadest sense, this term can be used to define all activities within states 
which are understood to improve the ability of governments and responsible organisations 
(such as Public Health institutions) to predict, prevent and respond to biological based 
incidents. This also includes activities directed at the attribution of responsibility for bioterror 
attacks (Lentzos and Rose 2009). In order to provide a boundary to my own understanding of 
this area of governance within this thesis, the term ‘public health domain’ is used to denote 
the role of public health thinking, institutions and resources in dual-use governance. This 
includes bio-defensive research capacity.   
The Public Health domain and the dual-use issue in the US  
In the US since at least the early 1990s, the dual-use issue has been placed in the context of 
long-standing concerns within aspects of the US government about the threat posed by 
bioterrorism (Wright 2006; Reppy 2006; 2008; Kelle 2007). Such concerns, supplemented by 
growing concerns about natural infectious disease, have led to the growth of public health 
and security infrastructures directed at the threat of bioterrorism and naturally occurring 
infectious diseases. In 2004, for example, four pillars of US ‘biodefense’ were identified: 
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- Threat Awareness, which includes biological weapons-related intelligence, 
vulnerability Assessments, and anticipation of future threats. 
- Prevention and Protection, which includes interdiction and critical 
infrastructure protection.  
- Surveillance and Detection, which includes attack warning and attribution. 
- Response and Recovery, which includes response planning, mass casualty 
care, risk Communication, medical countermeasures, and decontamination. 
     (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2004) 
Within the US context there has been a sustained discussion of the consequences of the policy 
collision that occurred between national security and public health within both academic and 
policy literature in the period following 2001. The speed at which events unfolded following 
the 2001 attacks undoubtedly contributed to the intense politicization of this issue within the 
public health domain. This politicization led to debates about the skewing of institutional and 
funding priorities, particularly in regard to the Bio-shield programmes which involved large 
investment into a failed small-pox vaccination programme (Fidler and Gostin 2008, 101). 
Another development relevant to the dual-use issue is the expansion of US bio-defence 
research, including work on select-agents pathogens.21 This has led to a vastly increased 
number of high level containment facilities, and considerably increased the number of 
individuals working with select-agent pathogens. Bearing in mind the disordered and un-
legislated nature of biosafety governance structures within the US, it is unsurprising that this 
issue has led to concerns domestically. It has also created an imperative and mechanism for 
the identification of dual-use threats, with defence laboratories as well as private companies22 
actively assessing published work for dual-use potential, as well as the feasibility of the 
misuse of this information by terrorists. 
                                                            
21
  Most notably the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Centre.  
22
  The author interviewed a researcher at one of these companies involved in assessing the dual-use threat 
posed by civilian research, who wished to remain anonymous, and who would not reveal details of the 
federal contract this work was conducted under.  
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This practice has not been without criticism domestically for two primary reasons. The first is 
the absence of a convincing means of risk assessment; for example, Carus and Petro argue 
that it may be necessary to undertake research to address threats validated by US Intelligence 
(Petro and Carus 2005). However, others have been more sceptical of the reliance on the 
intelligence community with regard to bio-weapon capabilities. Leitenberg (2005, 88) and 
Vogel (2008b) have argued that US Intelligence has tended to overestimate the bio-weapon 
capabilities of enemies, and that it has done so with regard to the current bio-terror threats. 
This suggests that any risk/benefit analysis of biodefense research at federal level may be 
skewed by worst-case and inaccurate bioterror threat assessments. The second cause for 
concern has been the risks associated with such research, including local concerns about 
laboratory accidents (Klotz and Sylvester 2009) and the risk of the leakage of technology and 
know-how from biodefense laboratories into the hands of state enemies terrorists (Tucker 
2006). There also have been numerous criticisms of the US pursuit of threat characterisation 
research, which involves the creation of bioweapons in order to test defensive measures 
without transparency and convincing international oversight (Bansak 2011; Klotz and 
Sylvester 2009; Steinbruner et al. 2005).  
The impact of these discourses on the governance of specific emerging science and 
technologies remains unclear within the existing literature. However, this situation certainly 
suggests an increased institutional capacity for the identification of dual-use aspects of 
biotechnology within this domain, as well as the possibility of political contention over the 
appropriate response to such concerns.  
Such tensions have emerged from the very real conflicts that exist between homeland security 
and public health communities. As Fidler and Gostin have highlighted, traditionalists within 
the public health and security realms have resisted weaving these previously separate realms 
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together. Much of this conflict has revolved around the role and governance of the 
biosciences in response to the threat posed by pathogens (Fidler and Gostin 2008, 2). The 
concerns of non-proliferation experts have also been prominent within this domain.  
To sum up, in the public health sector political disagreements over threat characterisation 
research and military investment into the biosciences in response to bioterror threats have 
informed discussions about the dual-use issue in the US. In later analysis the specific impacts 
that these debates have had on the governance of new and emerging science and technology 
are examined. 
The Public Health domain and dual-use issues in the UK 
Within the UK, Lentzos and Rose (2009) have identified several institutions which  are 
central to the state’s capacity to predict, prevent and mitigate the threat of bioterrorism in the 
public health domain. The primary institution is the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), 
which sits within the Cabinet Office and works in partnership with government departments 
as well as key stakeholders to enhance the UK's ability to prepare for, respond to and recover 
from emergencies.23 The Health Protection Agency is another institution with a mandate 
related to the threat posed by infectious disease. In addition, more than thirty other state, 
quasi-state and non-state bodies were also identified by Lentzos and Rose as having 
responsibilities in this domain. The primary role of these institutions in the UK context 
appears to be galvanising existing health surveillance and emergency response infra-
structures in order for them to deal with bio-attack scenarios. As Lentzos and Rose state, the 
UK approach to bio-threat management, whatever its source, is one of ‘resilience’ (2009, 
245).  
                                                            
23
  http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/civil-contingencies-secretariat. 
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In the UK context there has been little vocal disagreement between organisations within the 
public health domain about bioterror response policies between institutions, although dissent 
directed at regulatory burden is common within the scientific community. The lack of bio-
defence research imperative within the UK has also meant that, in contrast to the US, little 
energy has been directed towards identifying and responding to misuse concerns surrounding 
‘grey-area’ bio-defence research by academics and policy makers. The current focus on 
preparedness, especially within the UK, has also contributed to a situation where there is less 
attention paid to science and technology developments in domestic policy formation, as 
policy is focused more heavily on responding to the misuse of research rather than attempting 
to identify specific research that could be misused, or justifying investment into technical 
responses to the issue.  
2.5 Synthesising Domains: Dual-Use Risk Pre-Assessment Regimes 
So far in this chapter, a broad collection of largely independent governance activities at 
national level have been introduced under the label of dual-use governance. This chapter has 
also provided a broader ideational and histo-political context of these activities, which has led 
to the identification of four domains of dual-use governance. It has been demonstrated that 
the dual-use issue been constructed as a series of largely discreet challenges by stakeholders 
in each of these domains.  
In both the US and the UK there are institutional overlaps between the domains identified, for 
example, scientific institutions have played a role in many of the domains as a source of 
expertise or as a target for governance activities. There is also likely to have been flows of 
ideas and knowledge between the domains via the various international policy shaping 
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networks that have developed in the previous decade.24 So far, however, care has been taken 
within this chapter not to imply that there exists an overall single ‘project’ or ‘rationale’ 
which unites each of the governance activities identified. This is because an essential step in 
understanding the governance of dual-use issues is to appreciate that, while most policy 
makers in this field would agree that dual-use governance to some extent incorporates each of 
the activities identified above, there have not necessarily been self-aware national projects to 
define overall goals or develop the political and institutional capacity to reach them. This 
means that care must be taken not overestimate the extent to which such responses are 
integrated as part of a broader governance scheme. Such assumptions are tempting 
considering the prominence of holistic governance discussions within the literature. For 
example, the ‘web of prevention‘ concept came to prominence as early as 2004 in an 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) statement which defined the project of 
preventing the hostile use of the life sciences as involving ‘a range of synergistic measures’, 
meaning that dual-use governance was ‘by necessity a multidisciplinary endeavour’ (ICRC 
2004). The ‘web of prevention’ concept has since been used in several ways in academic 
literature, and it is worth briefly distinguishing these in order to demonstrate how the concept 
is utilised within this thesis.  
The concept can be utilised in two central ways in academic analysis. First, it may be utilised 
to denote the scope and consequences of a cumulative set of practices, as well as the means 
by which actors have co-operated within a conceived regime. This then enables discussion of 
the nature and prospect of an overall regime. The second use of the web concept is as part of 
                                                            
24
  These networks have developed as a result of institutional governance activities associated with learned 
societies and non-governmental organisations such as the Centre for Scientific Culture Alessandro 
Volta network, the BTWC (especially in relation to review conference and inter-sessional processes), 
academic projects such as the Wellcome funded Dual-use Bioethics Project, US government 
departments such as the US department of HHS,  the NSABB meetings and report consultation process,  
and a series of  ELSI and bio-security activities related to the field of Synthetic biology, including 
notably the S.Bx series of events.  
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the development of a ‘gold standard’ for dual-use governance regimes, against which the 
‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ of existing governance can be evaluated.  
Within this thesis the concept of the governance web is utilised in the first, non-normative 
sense, as a key conceptual step in delineating the practices and politics of existing governance 
frameworks in the UK and the US. It has already been demonstrated in this chapter that the 
US and the UK exhibit some variation in how dual-use issues have been addressed in the 
domains identified. However, before it is possible to compare these ‘styles’ of dual-use 
governance, it is necessary to de-limit the extent of these governance frameworks and to be 
more explicit in the criteria by which they are compared.25  
The risk governance literature provides some useful concepts for characterising dual-use 
governance styles in national contexts. In the following section I draw upon several scholars 
associated with the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), a non-governmental 
organisation founded in 1999, in order to ‘bridge the increasing gaps between science, 
technological development, decision-makers and the public’.26 While the academic literature 
associated with this organisation is tightly bound with conceptions of what ‘good’ risk 
governance should look like, it also provides a series of analytical heuristics, firmly grounded 
in existing institutional approaches to risks in developed nations which can act as a departure 
point for the discussion and analysis of dual-use governance activities.  
The first concept of interest is that of ‘systemic risk governance’. This can be defined in 
contrast to ‘simple’ risk problems, which generally involve the unquestioned application of 
pre-defined institutional decision-making routines to risk problems as they manifest, utilising 
existing standards and decision-making processes. In comparison, systemic risk governance 
                                                            
25
  In effect, addressing this issue ensures that I am explicit about how I conceptualise the ‘phenomenon of 
interest’(George and Bennett 2005) within this study.  
26
   Further information available at http://www.irgc.org/. 
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problems are characterised by complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity (Renn 2008; Renn, 
Klinke, and Asselt 2011; Klinke and Renn 2006). These issues are complex, as they do not 
involve simple causal chains of events with easily quantifiable consequences, but rather a 
large set of intervening variables. These issues are uncertain, as there is insufficient data or 
information to convincingly assess the probability and outcomes of bad events. They are also 
ambiguous, as they typically include conflicts over values, such as different stakeholders 
taking contrasting ‘legitimate’ standpoints on a given issue (Renn, Klinke, and Asselt 2011, 
235). Different aspects of the dual-use issue can be conceptualised as ‘systemic risks’. To 
give some examples, the risks posed by terrorist scenarios are complex because of the 
number of variables in threat assessment, with regard to the technology as well as to the 
intentions and capabilities of actors. There is also an absence of criteria for measuring the 
probability and effects of misuse of research and technology by terrorists groups, meaning 
discussions are largely based on analogy. Finally, there is ambiguity with regard to how the 
values of ‘scientific freedom’ and ‘security’ should be conceptualised and balanced.27 The 
concept of ‘systemic risk governance’ is further unpacked below, and some categories of risk 
governance behaviour, relevant to describing dual-use governance activities, are introduced. 
Systemic risk governance involves multi-stage processes directed at the identification, 
communication and evaluation of risks. Of particular interest within this thesis are the 
activities which occur during what is known within risk governance literature as the ‘pre-
assessment’ phase. The term ‘pre-assessment’ refers to the normal political process by which 
novel issues (i.e. risks/threats) tend to be identified and constructed as governable problems 
within modern societies. The pre-assessment phase is of most interest within this thesis, as it 
                                                            
27
  Despite that fact that all stakeholders within dual-use governance may not have conceived of the dual-
use issue as a ‘systemic’ rather than ‘simple’ risk issue, it still makes sense to conceptualise dual-use 
governance more broadly as systemic risk governance, as this concept includes the type of activities 
seen within the governance of simple risk issues. 
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describes the type of activities that have been discussed or have already been implemented in 
the relatively short time period that dual-use techno-sciences have been on the agenda. This 
phase is also most important in identifying and framing dual-use issues, and therefore most 
revealing in relation to the ideational, discursive and histo-political factors that give shape to 
dual-use governance. Renn has identified four interrelated components that would be 
expected in the pre-assessment stage or in an emerging systemic risk regime (Renn 2008, 48–
52). The first component is the framing of the problem, which often involves disagreements 
over problem definition (such as the scope, severity, causation). The second component 
involves systematic searches for new hazards, which may, for example, see an institution 
being tasked with an in-depth systematic enquiry into the area in order to identify the extent 
and source of risks. The third component is to identify existing systems or risk governance 
already in place within relevant institutions to identify and respond to the problem in hand. 
The final component is the selection of scientific criteria for risk assessment in which 
involves the adoption of key assumptions, conventions an procedural rules for assessing risks 
(Renn 2008, 49) and may involve the development of initial plans for the ‘roll-out’ of these 
conventions across relevant institutions. Within the analysis which follows, the extent to 
which these types of activities are taking place as part of an overall national approach to the 
governance of dual-use issues will be examined.  
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, two central lines of argument have been developed. The first relates to the 
range of responses to dual-use issues which have emerged within the four domains of 
governance identified within the US and the UK. Each of these domains provided a distinct 
political context for dual-use governance initiatives which emerged primarily in the period 
between 2003 and 2006. However, existing literature has not traced the effects of the politics 
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and practices within each of these domains on the governance of specific biotechnology 
fields of dual-use concern. It is clear that this requires further investigation in order to 
develop a clearer understanding of the practice and broader political context of dual-use 
governance at national level. Second, discussion of the concept of overarching models of 
national responses to dual-use issues, such as ‘governance webs’ and specific ‘risk-
reassessment regimes’, has so far suggested an absence of agreed overarching political and 
scientific rationale to bring to bear on dual-use issues. This means that the current situation 
within a national context is best understood as a patch-work of relatively discreet governance 
activities (Kelle 2012b). A key question which emerges as a result of this conceptualisation 
of the political landscape is the extent to which there have been political attempts to 
overcome the challenges raised by dual-use as a complex risk issue within national contexts. 
Such actions, by necessity, involve attempts to transform norms within domains, as well as to 
alter relationships between these domains with regard to the dual-use issue. This is in 
addition to questions about how various domains have generated policy initiatives, and 
impacted upon the implementation of these initiatives.  
In the following chapter an analytical framework is developed which allows for these lines of 
enquiry to be further developed. In particular, this involves paving the way to examine the 
scope, politics and practice of dual-use governance within the UK and the US. 
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Chapter Three: Theory and Methods 
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3.1 Overview and Introduction 
This chapter begins by arguing that the concept of ‘security’ is a suitable departure point for 
the study of dual-use governance. This claim is based on trends as well as gaps within 
existing academic and policy literature which addresses the dual-use issue. Following this, 
the sub-field of securitization theory is introduced as an appropriate field to provide a basis 
for an analytical framework for the study of the emergence of dual-use governance. This is 
followed by the development of an analytical framework for the study of the emergence and 
practice of dual-use governance which is tailored to the requirements of a comparative case 
study. It is also argued that certain concepts utilised within this study are of value to other 
constructivist scholars who utilise securitization theory. Finally, the research design and 
methodologies adopted in this thesis are discussed. 
In the context of the overall thesis, this chapter is intended to outline how an analytical 
framework has been developed in order to refine and address the central research question, 
which specifically relates to: 
- the subject and scope of dual-use governance 
- the politics and practice of dual-use governance 
- the nature and prospect of national approaches to dual-use governance.  
3.1.1 Dual-Use, Security and Academic Research 
References to ‘security’ are rife within the dual-use governance literature; this is not at all 
surprising considering the nature of the issue under discussion, as well as the political context 
in which the issue emerged.  What is interesting however, is the different roles that ideas 
related to security have played within existing academic research. Through briefly exploring 
these roles, this section provides an account and justification for the approach adopted within 
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this thesis. Within this approach a specific analytical conception of security becomes the 
focus of a comparative analysis of dual-use governance within the US and the UK. 
Within academic studies of dual-use issues, conceptions of ‘security’ have played a 
fundamental role in the emergence, design and analysis of enquiry.  First, academics have 
studied security as a ‘value’ which, does or should, impact upon decisions about dual-use 
issues. This is most apparent in the work of ethicists who have looked at this area (Miller and 
Selgelid 2007).  A second way in which academics have studied this area is to focus on the 
transformations of scientific practices and innovation policy in the name of security(Rabinow 
and Bennett 2012). Third, academics have sort to develop a clear conceptualisation of 
security as an ends in relation to dual-use issues. This has included work how to approach the 
dual-use issue from a risk-assessment perspective (Tucker 2012), or work which outlines 
more holistic approaches to conceptualising the overall project of dual-use governance 
(Rappert and McLeish 2007).  A final type of work, however, has sort to emphasise the 
contingency in way in which dual-use issues can become (or fail to become) conceived as 
security threats. As well as the nature of contemporary security practices in given contexts, 
and how these help co-produce dual-use concerns (Rappert 2007).  Each of these areas has 
impacted upon the development of research within this thesis. However, there are some key 
ideas and observations within this literature which have been fundamental to how I 
understand and have chosen to study the politics of security which surround dual-use issues.  
The first,  is that dual-use governance has commonly been understood to involve an 
institutional, ideational and co-operational ‘overlap’ between formally distinct areas of 
governance (McLeish and Nightingale 2007; Fidler and Gostin 2008). However, the nature 
and extent of the overlap at policy level does not appear to be uniform within the US and 
Europe, despite the fact that many academics have claimed that there were comparable levels 
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of concern expressed about bioterrorism in both Europe and the US in the 5-7 year period that 
directly followed the terrorist attacks of September 11th (Rees and Aldrich 2005; Lentzos 
2006; Meyer 2009). This suggests that it is not possible to simply explain away the question 
of why dual-use governance is different in the UK and the US with reference to subjective 
levels of fear of bio-terror attack experienced within key institutions in Europe and the US. 
The contrast between US and European approaches to bioterrorism in particular has attracted 
interest from scholars in the field, and certainly does not appear straightforward (Lentzos 
2006). Instead, there are an innumerable range of ideational, institutional and historical 
factors which could be understood to impact upon the phenomena of dual-use governance 
within the UK and the US.  In the context of this thesis, there is a requirement to identify and 
examine some important and specific aspects which can help in conceptualising the practice 
and politics of dual-use governance. A focus on the politics of security is an obvious 
approach, particularly when one bears in mind that comparisons made between US and 
European approaches by policy practitioners and commentators are usually implicitly or 
explicitly along a non-security/ security axis.28 Despite this, little attention has been paid to 
the political process by which the principles of dual-use governance have been developed and 
institutionalised in relation security discourses, institutions and practices- as well as the 
effects this has in relation to specific dual-use issues.  Such thinking, leads to questions about 
who can make issues subject to security governance, the nature of such political processes, as 
well as the ideational aspects prevalent in the governance of dual-use issues as a security 
                                                            
28
  For example, in relation to proliferation risks associated synthetic biology, a classified report from the 
Ottawa embassy in  response to an Australia group meeting highlights the view that ‘US and EU 
approaches represented two ends of the scale’ (C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 
OTTAWA 000716 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB (ASOUZA) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019 TAGS: 
PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], PREL [External Political Relations], ETTC [Trade and 
Technology Controls], CA [Canada] SUBJECT: CANADA: RESPONSE TO AUSTRALIA GROUP). 
NON-PAPERS REF: A. STATE 087595 B. STATE 087596 C. STATE 087597 D. STATE 088010  
available at http://dazzlepod.com/cable/09OTTAWA716/?rss=1.  
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challenge.  In the following sections there is an introduction to how the field of security 
studies can potentially provide insights into this issue area. 
2.2 The Concept of Security and the Fractured Field of Security Studies  
The term ‘security’ refers to a region of human experience and behaviour which is political 
and fluid; it is unsurprising then that the meaning of term is essentially contested. Within the 
academic field of security studies, there are a number of divergent conceptualisations of the 
definition of security, as well as divergent approaches to its study. The table below, for 
example, outlines some key approaches and indicates some fundamental distinctions between 
major contemporary approaches to the study of international security:  
 Referent 
Object 
Views of Power View of Truth Main research 
focus 
Realism States Material  Objective Power-balancing 














Subjective Reproduction of 
social order 
Critical Theory Humans and the 
earth 
Varies Subjective Emancipation of 
all humans from 
harm 





Table 4 A comparison of the major approaches within international relations theory 




The historical route that the field of security studies has taken in its development has shaped 
epistemic and ontological debates within the field. These developments stem from the 
changing practices in military security, the widening ‘scope’ of security studies in academia, 
the development of theoretical trends within IR and socio-political theories more generally 
(Baldwin 1997; Buzan and Hansen 2009). The debates between the various perspectives on 
the study of security have encouraged analysts to define themselves explicitly in relation to 
existing intellectual divides within the field. These long-standing discussions have also 
impacted upon the framing of debates within sub-fields of security studies.  
Balzacq states that while ‘in the abstract such [ontological and epistemic] discussions might 
be justified, they are often distracting at the empirical level’ (Balzacq 2009, 57). With this is 
mind, discipline-specific debates are addressed throughout this chapter in order to clarify the 
approach adopted. The intention, however, is certainly not to supplement ‘the cottage 
industry’ (Baldwin 2001, 7) of redefining the concept of ‘security’ in terms of long-standing 
debates within or between branches of security studies. Instead, the aim is to develop and 
apply an analytical framework to the problem in hand in a replicable manner, which is drawn 
predominantly from a sub-field of security studies. This being said, it is also hoped that 
analytical tools developed within this work may be described in such a way that they might 
be useful to other scholars working within the security studies sub-field this work focuses 
upon.  
3.2 An Introduction to Securitization Theory 
Securitization theory, which has become established as a sub-field within security studies in 
the past decade, is well placed to address the question of the relationship between the 
concepts of dual-use governance and security. First, the sub-field focuses on the political 
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processes by which issues do or do not end up being governed as security issues, as well as 
the nature and consequences of security governance. As Buzan et al. (1998, 32) state,  
[the field of] securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding 
of who securitizes, on what issue, for whom, why, with what results and, not least, 
under what conditions.  
Second, there has been rich theoretical and increasingly methodological discussion within 
this sub-field (McDonald 2008; Balzacq and Burgess 2010). This has generated a valuable 
source of practical insights, as well as conceptual tools, relating to the issue at hand.  
It is worth noting, however, that such pragmatism has raised its own challenges in the context 
of the study of security. In more traditional approaches to the study of international security, 
scholars have studied object threats to states, such as the military capacities of enemies, 
which were usually other states. However, increasing constructivist approaches have emerged 
which focus on the way in which such threats are constructed by actors (Smith 1999). This 
reframing of security threats, however, has also been associated with the study of a wider 
range of issues. As a consequence, the self-evidence of the scope of security studies has been 
brought into question. Such developments have also cast doubt over the ability of security 
scholars to continue to contribute constructively to understandings of security politics and 
practice.  
The publication of Security: A new framework to analysis in 1998 reflected the growing 
dominance of a new approach to security studies. Within this approach greater emphasis was 
placed on the processes though which security challenges were identified and responded to. 
In particular this approach reflected an articulation of a research agenda which focused on the 
means by which issues are lifted above the democratic norms of politics, allowing actors to 
do something they would not be able to do under ‘normal’ circumstances.   
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Essentially, within predominant understanding of securitization, a securitizing actor identifies 
an existent threat to a referent object that requires some (usually urgent or somehow 
unprecedented) response. This is known as a securitizing move. Securitizing moves are said 
to be successful when strategic audience(s) accept that the threat is in existence and requires 
a response advocated by the securitizing actor. This success is understood to be dependent on 
the qualities of the securitization move (i.e. rhetorical qualities of a communication which 
identifies a threat), as well as socio-historical factors (facilitating conditions) (Buzan, Wæver, 
and Wilde 1998, chap. 2). 
The aim of all self-proclaimed securitization research fits within the broad remit of the field 
to answer the question of ‘who securitizes, on what issues for whom, why, with what results 
and, not least, under what conditions’.29 There has also been general consensus on the 
terminology used; however, it is widely agreed among those who have reviewed the 
securitization literature that certain vagaries in key concepts within early descriptions of the 
theory have provided for a rather diverse set of interpretations and applications (Balzacq and 
Burgess 2010). This certainly rings alarm bells for those who would seek to establish an 
underlying intellectual rationale for the field of securitization studies, an issue which is 
addressed in depth later in this chapter. However, in the context of the more pragmatic 
approach adopted within this thesis, such debates have also highlighted the necessity for 
analysts to be clear about how they utilise securitization theory in their research designs and 
to be more explicit about how key analytical concepts are defined, as well as how they 
foresee their work contributing to securitization theory development and application.  
3.3 Developing Securitization Theory in and for Analytical Eclectic Studies 
                                                            
29
  This does not account for critical school readings of securitization theory, which often seem to ‘talk 
past’ these aims  and ask questions related to whether actors ‘should’ have securitized in given 
situations, for example Floyd 2007. 
 69 
 
Even though an analytically eclectic approach (Sil and Katzenstein 2010) is adopted within 
this study, I argue that the conceptual tools developed here may be useful to the various types 
of constructivist scholars working with securitization theory. The term analytically eclectic is 
used here to refer to research which can be characterised as involving: 
 (a) Open-ended problem formulation encompassing complexity of phenomena, not 
intended to fill gaps in paradigm-bound scholarship. 
(b) Middle-range causal account[s] incorporating complex interactions among 
multiple mechanisms and logics drawn from more than one paradigm. 
(c) Findings and arguments that pragmatically engage both academic debates and 
practical dilemmas of policymakers/practitioners.  
     (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 19) 
In relation to point (a), this research is not meant to constitute an attempt to solve problems 
within existing research paradigms. Instead, the iterative process of engaging with policy and 
academic literature on this dual-use issue has led to the identification of concepts and theories 
developed by academics which are of use in developing a clearer conceptualisation of the 
broader political context of dual-use issues. An important device in this process is the 
development of middle range causal counts (b) which may contribute to more generalizable 
findings about the issue area. Such understandings are important for academics and policy 
makers in thinking about the emergence of dual-use concerns, as well as the feasibility of 
political responses to such concerns.  
This being said, as Sil and Katzenstein (2010, 43) make clear, it is still completely feasible 
for researchers to engage in analytically eclectic research while still identifying strongly with 
a specific research paradigm (such as constructivism). For example, it can make sense to 
utilize consistent terminology drawn from a single paradigm when communicating some 
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aspects of the research method and design. This is particularly the case if researchers have a 
specific research community in mind (beyond the policy issue area they are studying) when 
presenting theoretical and methodological aspects of their research. For example, such 
practice is already common within contemporary security studies research where scholars 
attempt to speak to broader theoretical and methodological themes. A good recent example of 
this is Galbreath and McEvoy (2012). Such work is of course important in helping to 
maintain the link between needs of policy makers and academic research (Sil and Katzenstein 
2010, 1). 
In the case of this research, it is hoped that aspects of it will be of interest to constructivist 
security scholars without an immediate stake in the dual-use issue area. The term 
‘constructivist’ is used here with reference to ‘mainstream’, ‘positivist’ constructivism 
(Wendt 1999, 39–40) – this includes scholars who may sit on either side of the 
agency/structure debate when it comes to designing research, or who emphasise the role of 
language in the study of security (Fierke and Jørgensen 2001). Uniting these scholars is an 
epistemological commitment to scientific principles in the design and practice of research. 
This is in contrast to post-positivist scholars, including post-structuralists, who reject 
scientific conceptions of theory and theory development, such as hypothesis testing, the 
centrality of causality in explanation and comparative case study research design, within 
social research.  Be that as it may, there is no reason for positivist scholars to neglect the 
interesting lines of enquiry that post-structuralists have often taken up (Wendt 1999, 40). 
With this in mind, my work on securitization theory draws upon post-structuralist 
securitization research, and involves the examination of discourse and discourse production, 
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an issue that has traditionally been neglected by positivist scholars. However, I do not engage 
in the development of securitization theory for post-structuralist scholars within the field.30  
My understanding of what constitutes ‘good theory’ reflects my rejection of the post-
structuralist epistemology, and within this work the importance of the concepts of accuracy, 
falsifiability, explanatory power, progressivity, consistency and parsimony’ (Vasquez 1995, 
230), which are widely valued scholarly conventions, are apparent in the way in which I 
develop my own analytical framework and carry out research. While I do not necessarily 
believe that these constructs help us get at a true picture of social reality ‘out-there’, I 
certainly follow the more ‘pragmatic’31 line of reasoning that these scientific philosophical 
principles are (and indeed should be) important means to formulating and evaluating theory 
within the social sciences, particularly in context of problem focused policy research. 
Nevertheless, many of the critiques provided by post-positivists serve to reveal the potential 
for ‘bias’, the ignorance of the role of language in the construction of social meaning, and the 
potential for the oversimplification of the social world in positivist theory (Fierke 2001, 116–
118). Such critiques have been taken on board within my own research design and I have 
chosen to utilise a multi-focus analysis which helps to prevent over-simplification and the 
inaccurate interpretation of the meaning and consequences of social phenomena. The work is 
multi-focus in the sense that it deals with micro-political accounts of the dual-use issue within 
various political forums. In this context, careful processes allow me to cross-reference and 
                                                            
30
  This point is made here to distinguish the Author’s epistemological commitments, rather than arguing 
that methodological post-structuralists should or do engage in securitization research. Indeed, while 
Weaver, the architect of securitization theory, rather infamously describes himself as a ‘post-
structuralist realist’, he himself has not embraced a post-structuralist epistemology on this issue – see 
Floyd  (2010, 23–28). 
31
   The term here is used to refer to the type of pragmatism outlined by Katzenstein and Sil (2008, 124), 
who describe pragmatism as sitting in the middle ground between analytically rigid positivism and 
relativist subjectivism, involving the application of coherent philosophical principles in the generation 
of policy relevant forms of knowledge. In particular, the concept is understood to refer to research 
which aims to ‘reorganize, define, connect and solve substantive problems’. 
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validate observations made in relation to multiple sources of evidence in the process of 
developing qualified generalizable rules.  
Such epistemological discussion aside, the remainder of this section is dedicated to 
addressing the question of how this thesis can contribute to securitization theory 
development; this is despite the charge that more intellectually pragmatic approaches do not 
contribute to the development of existing theory (Katzenstein and Sil 2008, 124). This 
involves the development of analytical concepts through the ‘pragmatic fusion’(Katzenstein 
and Sil 2008, 124) of analytical concepts developed within securitization theory, as well as 
concepts drawn from outside of the field, including concepts from risk governance theory as 
outlined in chapter two.  
Securitization Studies and Theory Development 
Several scholars have investigated the philosophical underpinnings of securitization theory, 
which has involved identifying political, linguistic, sociological and post-structuralist theories 
as being important to the study of securitization processes (Floyd 2010, chap. 1; Hansen 
2011, 358). Discussion of political theory has included the ideas of Schmitt (1996), who 
focuses on the distinction between ‘normal’ low political processes and the ‘high drama’ of 
security related political processes – an idea prevalent in the works of Wæver (Buzan, 
Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 24–26; Williams 2003; Rita Floyd 2010, 17–19). Increasingly, 
however, there has been focus on the collective nature of decision and policy making in 
security politics (Wæver 2011, 467). This has emphasised the idea that security policy 
making necessarily involves more than one actor; therefore, even securitized politics does not 
normally involve the dominance of a single actor or discourse. Others scholars have 
identified the importance of linguistic philosophy, specifically ‘speech-act’ theories, in 
understanding the process of securitization. Speech-act theory has also been employed as a 
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theoretical framework for discussions about balancing the role of securitizing actors and 
audiences in the legitimization of activities which utilise the rhetoric of security, as well as 
how to adequately incorporate ‘facilitating conditions’ into the study of securitization 
processes (Stritzel 2007; Balzacq 2005; Huysmans 2011). Sociological theories have also 
been employed, and advocated (Balzacq 2010a, 37), in the examination of contextual factors 
relating to securitization processes. This has included the use of Goffman's (1974) 
dramaturgical analysis (a type of sociological ‘frame analysis’) of securitization events, 
which focuses on how the identities of securitizing actors and their audiences interact in 
institutional contexts (Salter 2008). Discussions of post-structuralist theory have focused on 
the discursive construction of security threats, with particular emphasis on the concepts of 
discursive formation and governmentality. These scholars have tended to focus on the 
discursive process by which issues are constructed as governable security problems (Stritzel 
2007; Rita Floyd 2010, chap. 1; Hansen 2011). 
Investigations into the philosophical heritages of securitization theory have demonstrated that 
it has been successfully applied by a wide range of scholars with a diverse range of epistemic 
and ontological commitments. This suggests that attempts to develop an underlying, 
philosophically-grounded theory of securitization perhaps risk creating the misleading 
perception that there is theoretical unity in the field. Such an endeavour also risks squeezing 
the field into a Procrustean bed of sociological, linguistic or post-structuralist paradigms, 
which could unnecessarily limit analytical and methodological scope.  
There is now consensus within the field that the existence of such variance must not stunt the 
ability of scholars to produce new theory that may contribute to the field. This is reflected in 
the way that early critics of the antecedent Copenhagen approach, as well as members of the 
Copenhagen school, note the importance of ensuring meta-theoretical means for collaboration 
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between these between linguistic and sociological approaches to securitization theory 
(Balzacq 2010b, 26; Balzacq 2010a, 36–37). This is to ensure that securitization theory does 
not become several relatively discreet sub-fields which can no longer benefit from each other. 
In pursuit of this goal, two approaches have been advocated.  
Balzacq (2010) suggests that both linguistic and more sociological securitization research can 
be considered to contribute to the study of a broader conception of securitization grounded in 
social theory. Within this conception, the work of the Copenhagen School occurs mainly at 
one level of a three level conception of securitization study. At this level, securitization is 
understood to include acts (including, but not limited to speech-acts), agents (actors’ 
identities and socially constructed objects) and context (agents’ interaction with their 
surroundings). Balzacq’s model is useful insofar as identifying the analytical strengths and 
limitations of various theoretical conceptualisations of the securitization process; it also 
provides a broadened range of research methodologies (consisting of theoretical frameworks 
and research methods) that scholars may choose from. However, Balzacq’s work is less 
useful in providing guidance to scholars about how to conceptualise the theoretical 
contribution of their work to the overall development of securitization theory. This is because 
Balzacq’s approach is heavily informed by sociological thinking and this does not necessarily 
speak to approaches which are informed by political or linguistic theory.  
Wæver offers an alternative approach to understanding the collective project of securitization 
studies, arguing that securitization is an ‘idea theory’, meaning a theory with one simple core 
idea that is used by analysts (Wæver 2011). He argues that researchers should distinguish 
between the core concepts of securitization and cumulated knowledge from the diverse range 
of empirical studies in the field. Within this conception, the central concepts of securitization 
theory (i.e. actors, audiences and securitization moves) are freestanding from changing 
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practices of security and without underlying philosophical or methodological groundings. 
This understanding of securitization theory emphasises the importance of developing a set of 
conceptual tools which can be used by the various categories of scholars identified, as well as 
in the context of more interdisciplinary analysis.  It is this latter approach which allows the 
appropriate level of flexibility and structure for scholars to contribute to theory development. 
In the following section I take up the task laid out by Wæver and characterise some useful 
analytical concepts, which will then be embedded into my own analytical framework.  
3.4 Securitization and the Potential Utility of Policy Process Models  
The previous section highlighted the need for new conceptual tools which can be employed 
by the wide range of scholars operating within the field, as well as within interdisciplinary 
case-study analysis. The following section demonstrates how policy process models can be 
useful in achieving these objectives. 
First, they can provide focus, structure and limits within analysis, which are of central 
importance in interdisciplinary studies, as well as in multi-level approaches, such as that 
identified by Balzacq (2010a, 36–37). This can help the analyst to identify which factors are 
and are not relevant with regard to policy outcomes. Second, such tools can be utilised by 
linguistic focused scholars to overcome a commonly identified analytical weakness of this 
type of research. This is the issue of adequately incorporating histo-political and contextual 
factors into the study of ‘speech act’ events and the production and reproduction of ‘security 
discourses’. Policy models can provide a straightforward institutionally, historically and 
politically situated ‘environment’ for discourses and ‘speech-acts’ to occupy within an 
overall process of securitization. Finally, policy models also help to make the assumed 
relationships between central concepts within analytical frameworks more explicit, for 
example, the relationship between actors and audiences or individual securitization moves 
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and overall policy outcomes with relation to a given issue. For example, high level 
‘securitizing’ communications to the public are often identified as important within studies of 
securitization processes; however, there tends to be little investigation into what these acts are 
actually designed to achieve or explanation of how these activities relate to governance 
outcomes. The absence of explanation within existing research is based on implicit 
understandings of the relationship between policy makers and the public. The adoption of a 
clearly defined policy process model would provide a means for scholars to make their 
understandings of such relationships more explicit.  
Despite the utility of these models to the various approaches to the study of securitization, the 
discussion of policy process models has been conspicuously absent from the work of Critical 
Security School scholars, who have published largely in the Security Dialogue Journal. It is 
early-career scholars who have taken up the challenge of investigating the utility of policy 
process models. This dynamic has favoured tentative explorations, as well as demonstrations 
of the value of well-known and conceptually parsimonious policy models, specifically 
multiple streams and linear models. However, it may also be the case that securitization 
scholars have had sound theoretical reasons for avoiding more complex theories of the policy 
process. With this latter point in mind, the following section reflects on the range of policy 
theories available and the suitability of these for use in securitization research.  
3.5 The Selection of Policy Process Models in Securitization Case Study Research 
The primary purpose of policy analysis frameworks has been to help analysts to 
conceptualise complex political processes which involve a wide range of actors, institutions 
and discourses (Sabatier 2007, 4). Sabatier has identified several categories of policy models 
for used in the US and Europe; these are: 
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The policy stages heuristic: Policy is studied as a series of identifiable stages in the 
overall process of policy development. 
Institutional Rational Choice: This approach focuses on how the rules of institutions 
affect the behaviour of rational self-motivated individuals.  
Multiple stream models: Within this approach policy process is studied as several 
largely (ideationally and institutionally) discreet streams of activity. The approach is 
used primarily to help explain why policy initiatives emerge when they do.   
Punctuated- Equilibrium framework: This approach focuses on the causation and 
consequences of periodic shifts from instrumentalist forms of policy making to 
periods of major policy change.  
The advocacy collation framework: This approach focuses on the development of 
collectives who share policy beliefs within policy making communities – in essence, 
this approach focuses on the condition that lead to policy-learning across groups of 
policy makers.  
Policy diffusion framework: This approach examines how ‘policy innovations’ 
spread between political systems.  
Large N- models: These approaches focus on macro-variance with states, and the 
effect on policy (i.e. budgetary expenditures, public opinion) (Sabatier 2007, 8–10). 
Sabatier  (2007, 3–4) has argued that many of the policy model frameworks can also be used 
in complimentary ways in applied research. Such a perspective makes sense in more 
inductive approaches to theory, as each of the policy models have analytical advantages as 
well as shortcomings, such as blind-spots and analytical bias. It is therefore tempting to 
utilise a combination of the wide range of models to study securitization processes. This 
suggests that there is potentially a wide range of ways to conceptualise the policy process 
within this research, and in securitizing research more generally. However, before selecting a 
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policy theory model to use, it is worth making explicit the requirements for use within this 
thesis.  
The first set of criteria for the selection of a policy process model are that it needs to be 
suitable for a comparative small-n research design, which makes up the bulk of securitization 
research. The comparative nature of the research design does not exclude any of the dominant 
theoretical frameworks, as many of these have emerged from comparative studies and since 
been widely utilised as a means to structure comparisons. The requirement for an approach 
suitable for small-n models leads to the exclusion of several predominant frameworks 
designed for large N-studies, which can be dismissed due to the well-known differences in 
the analytical focus of small-n and large-n research designs. In addition, there are in practical 
terms simply not enough cases, or at least cases for which there is adequate information, to 
make such comparisons in relation to dual-use governance at national or sub-national level.  
The second set of criteria relate to the suitability of the theory for use within inter-
disciplinary analysis, as well as for the wide range of academics that employ securitization 
theory. First, it is required to be suitable for identifying facilitating conditions (historical, 
discursive, and institutional) and actors, and helping to place their activities in an institutional 
context. There is no reason why any policy models should be rejected due to this criteria, as 
policy process models, according to Sabatier (2007, 3–4), all models represent an attempt to 
take these factors into account, although with varying levels of success. 
The second requirement is that the policy model should be simple to apply within analysis; 
this stems from the low level of explicit use of policy models within existing securitization 
literature, as well as the need for the policy heuristic to be transposable enough for use in the 
wide range of approaches to the study of securitization identified above. While traditionally 
theoretical ‘parsimony’ is seen as anti-ethical to more detailed and rich small-n analysis 
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(George and Bennett 2005, 31), it is worth reiterating the point that the policy process model 
described here is understood to be one transposable piece of conceptual apparatus that can 
embedded in broader theoretical frameworks used in the context of other applied research. In 
the following section, the two models which have already been advocated within the 
literature are evaluated according to these criteria. This then informs the development of a 
synthesised model.  
3.5.1 Linear Model of Policy Development 
The linear model of policy development is best thought of as a heuristic for breaking down 
complex policy processes into more manageable set of stages (Sabatier 2007, 6). The stages 
most commonly identified within policy studies textbooks are: 1) issue identification and 
recognition; 2) appearance on agendas; 3) policy formulation; 4) policy adoption; 5) policy 
implementation and 6) policy evaluation. Sabatier has also highlighted that many authors of 
the policy process literature have utilised this heuristic to provide a boundary for the focus of 
their research, which has led to stage-specific bodies of literature (Sabatier 2007, 6). This 
model was widely employed in the early stages of the development of the field of policy 
studies; however, the approach is now understood to be inadequate in the formulation of 
causal explanation across stages. The approach also risks conceiving the policy process as a 
single linear process. Despite these limitations, this heuristic provides a straightforward 
means to group and describe governance activities. Recently Bright (2010) has utilised a 
simple linear policy model in a single case study. Within this work he also went some way to 
theorising the ways in which securitization processes may manifest at various stages of the 
policy process, which were intuitively developed from the ‘special’ type of politics usually 
associated with securitization. This included: 
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- Agenda setting – the rhetorical reference to security at the agenda 
setting stage was understood as a means to raise the issue on agendas. 
- The possibility that existing governance structures may be ignored or 
compromised at the policy formation stage.  
- The ‘legitimation’ of the deployment of significant resources at the 
implementation stage. 
- The use of the grammar of security in the evaluative stage. 
This compartmentalisation of the securitization process certainly appears a straightforward 
way to conceptually untangle complex securitization processes. However, as previously 
outlined with regard to a general critique of linear policy, this approach risks neglecting 
cross-stage factors. For example, to what extent can actions at the various stages be 
considered part of a collective project, and who, if anyone, could be understood to be the 
driving force behind policy emergence? Another implicit issue with such a framework is that 
there is still a requirement to conceptualise more explicitly the role of historic, ideational and 
institutional practices within the policy making process, and this framework alone provides 
little guidance on how to incorporate these factors. Léonard and Kaunert (2010) have already 
advocated Kingdon’s (1984; Kingdon and Thurber 2010) three streams model as a means to 
better address some of these issues in the study of securitization. In the following section, the 
utility of this model to this thesis is examined in detail.  
3.5.2 Kingdon’s Three Streams Model of Policy Change 
Kingdon’s dissatisfaction with the linear and rational nature of some approaches to the study 
of the policy process motivated the development of his three streams model. He framed his 
thesis with the question ‘How does an idea’s time come?’, and sought to develop a theoretical 
framework which focuses on the role of identities and institutional norms in the agenda 
setting process. Within Kingdon’s model, policy change is conceptualised as consisting of 
three essentially independent streams (problem stream, policy steam and the politics stream), 
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which converge at key moments called policy windows. These policy windows can be 
understood to represent the alignment of political conditions, which allow a policy to make it 
through the selection process. These policies are usually advocated by identifiable ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ who utilise various types of political resources available to them to get specific 
policies on agendas. Each of these streams is now outlined. 
The problem stream involves the identification of a pressing problem that requires attention. 
In this stream, policy makers begin the process of framing an issue as a solvable political 
problem. Actors’ identification and framing of an issue depends on a wide range of histo-
political factors, including actors’ identities and events. Actors also utilize a series of 
rhetorical approaches to convince others to address a given issue. This includes references to 
causality, severity, recent examples, novelty, as well as attempting to assign the responsibility 
of dealing with the issue to a target institution (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Kingdon suggests 
several routes by which issues may gain attention as a problem: the routine monitoring 
activities of institutions, dramatic events or studies by government agencies, governmental 
researchers or academics. It is also worth highlighting that just as problems can emerge 
within this stream, they can also fade away. There are a number of reasons for this; policy 
makers may feel that the problem has been adequately addressed (by themselves or others) or 
actually ‘solved’, there may be a perception that the problem has somehow ceased to be, or 
fatigue may set in amongst advocates when it becomes clear that actors of strategic 
importance will not address the issue.32 
                                                            
32
  Based on Kingdon (1984, 2nd:103–104). However, I am careful here in distinguishing between the idea 
of the problem ‘actually’ disappearing, and the idea that there is a perception among key actors that the 
problem has disappeared. This is especially important in more systemic and complex issues, 
as compared to say ‘brute’ problems with directly observable causation and effects, 
such as the ‘millennium bug’ problem which almost instantaneously disappeared on the 2nd of January 
2000, or the complete eradication of a specific disease such as the agricultural Rinderpest virus. See 
also Floyd (2010, 32–33) on this issue, who distinguishes between  the idea of ‘brute’ threats and 
constructed threats.  
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Kingdon pinpoints ‘policy communities’ to be of central importance to understanding the 
policy stream. Policy communities are usually well-networked and operate according to 
values and norms that may be quite distinct from other policy communities as well as from 
other stakeholders. Within this thesis, the term ‘policy domain’ has been used in order to 
capture the dominant discourses, institutional settings, practices and favoured governance 
tools utilised within a given policy making environment that have impacted upon dual-use 
governance (NEST, anti-terrorism, public health, biosafety). Within each of these domains, 
decision makers identify potential solutions and select ‘appropriate’ policies based on criteria 
such as technical feasibility, value and the extent to which they can be sold to strategic 
audiences such as politicians and other policy communities (Kingdon 1984, 2nd:125–143). 
This can lead to the identification of a single policy or short-list of potential policy options 
which may vary in nature depending on the level of ‘fragmentation’ in relation to a given 
issue within a given domain (Kingdon 1984, 2nd:118–121). In cases of more diverse 
fragmentation, ‘competing’ policy proposals may be developed. It is worth highlighting that 
institutional path dependency and ideational factors can be understood to have a particular 
impact upon the decision process at this level, as this is the stream in which the fine details of 
policy programmes are developed and refined.  
The politics stream is heavily associated with ideas of legitimacy, power and persuasion. 
Kingdon identifies several important facets of the political stream, including public mood, 
pressure group campaigns, election results, ideological distributions in political institutions 
and changes in administration and powers, and institutional relationships (Kingdon 1984, 
2nd:145–165). In essence, these factors impede or facilitate actors in building strategic 
coalitions of decision makers in pursuit of implementing a particular policy. The politics 
stream can have more of an effect on the policy process in certain situations. Politically 
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controversial issues which are likely to emerge suddenly and dramatically seem to increase 
the role of the political stream in the policy process. This impact can be both facilitative (i.e. 
increased funding) or deleterious (i.e. rejection of long standing policy approaches in favour 
of something new). In contrast, when issues don’t receive public or policy maker attention, 
and an issue is successfully argued (if it even needs to be) to fall within the remit of an 
existing governing institution, then the politics stream becomes much less important (unless 
extra resources are required to deal with a new issue). 
The three streams theory provides an explanatory framework for the emergence of a given 
policy initiative. At certain historic moments, conditions are right for a policy to be 
developed and implemented. These moments are referred to by Kingdon as ‘policy windows’. 
These selection pressures may be heavily institutionalised, meaning that the approach leads to 
a relatively deterministic policy process. However, within Kingdon’s framework, individual 
agency is also understood to play a role in the emergence of policy. Policy entrepreneurs, 
who may work from various positions inside and outside formal politics, are understood to 
play various roles within the administration literature. These include: 
- Advocating new ideas and developing proposals: These may initially 
be free of existing institutionalised governance structures.  
- Defining and reframing problems: Often with specific actors or 
domains of government in mind. 
- Specifying policy alternatives: Particularly in the context of issues 
seeming to require collaborative governance, where there may be 
several possible ways for the same issue to be governed.  
- Brokering ideas among the many policy actors: This is in order to 
build a coalition of support.  
- Mobilizing public opinion: This is in order to create the right political 
environment for a given policy. 
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- Setting the decision making agenda: This involves identifying 
decisions and agreements that need to be made in the process of 
developing and implementing policy. 
(Roberts and King 1991, 152). 
Criticisms of the multiple-stream model 
Zahariadis (2007, 80–83) has highlighted the key criticisms laid out against the use of 
multiple streams framework. The first relevant issue relates to the scope of the framework, 
particularly in the context of the appreciation of the multiple stages of policy making. This is 
because the model was initially developed for the study of the agenda-setting state of policy 
making. Kingdon, as well as several other scholars, has successfully applied the framework to 
various stages of the process (Zahariadis 2007, 80). Heuristically, there is no reason why the 
framework can’t provide an initial structure to analysts at the various stages of the policy 
making process. These stages can then be used to structure observation related path 
dependency, framing effects and institutionalisation. This can be considered a strength rather 
than a weakness of the approach, as it provides a heuristic to investigate the role of different 
actors, discourses and institutions at various levels of the securitization process.  
A second charge made against the framework is based on the claim that streams are less 
independent than the heuristic would suggest. This may well be the case; however, careful 
process tracing and elite interviews can reveal points at which these streams interact. This 
characteristic may be an advantage in the context of a securitization research, as it is widely 
agreed that securitization can involve actors breaking the normal rules of politics. For 
example, securitization may involve developments in the politics stream impacting upon 
norms or practices within a given policy stream to an unusual extent. An obvious example of 
this would be the provision of more resources for biodefense based on decisions made in the 
political stream, which led to more ambitious projects being considered within the policy 
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stream. Therefore, the points of interaction between streams, for the purposes of this research, 
can be conceived as an aspect of analysis rather than a limitation if it is adequately 
acknowledged.  
A hybrid of the three streams and linear models: Incorporating agency ideas and institutions 
into the securitization process.  
Leonard and Kaunert (2010) have already argued that policy process models, such as the 
three streams model, can provide a clear conceptualisation of securitizing actors and 
audiences, including the relationships between the actors and the overall policy making 
process. Likewise, Bright (2010) has argued that securitization theory can provide 
expectations of how the rhetorical deployment of security will affect specific policy 
processes.  I have also demonstrated that policy models can be developed and utilised in a 
way that draws attention to structuring factors (such as identity, discourses institutions) at 
various stages of the policy processes. Specifically, I have outlined how linear and the 
multiple streams model can be utilised in a complimentary way within empirical research.   
To sum up, this model provides a straightforward heuristic, designed with the requirements of 
securitization scholars in mind, with sufficient structure to help analysts identify important 
agency intervention points as well as the role of key histo-political factors in the emergence 
of policy. This is achieved without unnecessarily constraining the scope of analysis, a charge 
which has been made against discipline-specific attempts to contribute to the development of 
the field. In the following section I utilise this model for the development of my own 
analytical framework.  
3.6 Analytical Framework for the Study of the Securitization of Dual-Use Issues 
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In this research, the aim is to make claims about the role of security politics (understood to 
refer to actors, discourses and institutions) in the emergence of the distinct dual-use 
governance assessment regimes that have emerged within the UK and the US. Other research 
into securitization processes has not always made the governance of a specific issue the focal 
point of research. The original analytical framework of Wæver in Security: A new framework 
for analysis, for example, focuses on ‘sectors’ (military security, environmental security, 
economic security, societal security, and political security), which were utilized to distinguish 
the ‘rules’ of securitization in relation to a broad range of issues which had emerged on the 
security studies agenda in broader policy domains (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, chap. 1). 
Within my own work, however, the focus is on a much narrower set of institutions and 
discourses. This means that I am examining the process and consequences of securitization 
with the aim of discerning some ‘rules’ of security politics (i.e. who securitizes, what do they 
securitize, under what conditions and with what effects) in relation to the dual-use issue. In 
this respect, my preoccupations align more closely with those scholars who have utilised 
securitization theory to examine how ‘logics of security’ (i.e. discourses associated with the 
national security domain) , ‘security practices’ (i.e. policies of control usually developed and 
prevalent the national security domain) and the ‘politics of security’ (i.e. the ‘emergency’ 
political processes associated with securitization) have impacted upon the emergence of 
specific policies directed at a given issue (Hansen 2011; Rita Floyd 2010; Cook 2010; 
Emmers 2009; Hameiri and Jones 2013). 
Securitization and the subject of governance  
All manner of issues can be constructed as security threats; however, within case studies it 
usually appears that some rather specific (even archaic) aspects of a much broader field are 
identified to be of dual-use concern. This then leads to questions about the political and 
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discursive process through which the scope of such concerns have become set, or at least 
dominant, within the discourse. As has already become clear, claims about the scope of 
problems and the nature of responses are likely to be heavily influenced by pre-existing 
governance domains. However, emergent issues can also be understood to challenge existing 
predominant practices and styles of reasoning. Simply put, one approach to thinking about 
dual-use issues is to prioritise pre-existing governance frameworks when thinking about the 
scope of dual-use problems. A second is to emphasise imagining new scenarios of misuse 
which can’t be addressed by existing frameworks. The latter approach tends to generate 
concerns which cannot be addressed purely through incremental improvements to existing 
governance systems. A key question in the context of this thesis is the significance of these 
approaches in the emergence of dual-use policy and national styles of dual-use governance. 
With this in mind, it makes sense to briefly characterise these two types of logic: 
Scenario heuristics involve interrelated (and often implicit) assumptions about the 
intentions and capabilities of misusers, as well as the misuse potential of science and 
technology. Such heuristics may also emphasise ‘possibility’ rather than ‘probability’ 
(Vogel 2006). As these scenarios are generated outside existing regulatory 
frameworks, there is likely to be an absence of conventions to quantify such issues as 
risks. This means that such scenarios are often associated with ‘precautionary’ styles 
of reasoning and may be articulated as part of a call for anticipatory responses in the 
absence of scientific evidence.  
Pre-existing governance rationalities set the scope for dual-use problems with 
reference to foreseeable coverage given by existing or emerging systems of oversight. 
These framings place greater emphasis on the resilience or adaptability of existing or 
proposed systems in addressing the dual-use issue. Such approaches also tend to 
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discount misuse scenarios which cannot be addressed through modest adaptions of 
existing governance systems.  
The identification of these styles of reasoning and argumentation within the discourse can 
provide only a partial understanding of the political processes which underpin the emergence 
of dual-use governance. In the following section, the analytical framework utilised to address 
this question is outlined.  
Securitization and the question of how and why issues become subject to governance  
In this thesis, the question of ‘how’ an issue becomes subject to governance is understood to 
relate to the mutually constitutive ideas of agency and structure. This question comprises of a 
series of interrelated sub-questions related to the means by which human agency impacts on 
the emergence of dual-use governance, as well as the enabling, structuring and constraining 
histo-political and ideational factors which give impetus, meaning and limit to the scope of 
this agency. This understanding is in keeping with a more ‘mainstream’ or ‘consistent 
constructivist’ approach33 to the study of security. It can be usefully contrasted to more 
language focused approaches which concentrate on linguistic features of securitization 
‘events’,34 or on the linguistic processes through which actors construct security threats. It is 
also in contrast to more micro-sociological explanations which focus exclusively on the way 
in which security and securitizing practices are reproduced by actors in a given context. In 
this respect, I follow the approach of those scholars who have emphasised that the study of 
‘emergency policy’ should not be restricted to a focus on an enabling step which justifies 
‘dramatic emergency measures’, or acts purely as a system for maintaining a state of 
                                                            
33
  For more on the idea of consistent, or mainstream constructivism in securitization theory see: 
McDonald 2008; Thierry Balzacq 2009. For more on constructivism more generally see Fierke and 
Jørgensen 2001. This issue is also discussed in Fierke 2007, 181–182.  
34
  The term ‘securitization events’ is sometimes used with a negative connotations by constructivist 
scholars, such as McDonald (2008, 576), who associate this with the analytical narrowness of studying 
rhetorical acts of securitization. 
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emergency politics. These scholars argue that security politics should not simply be studied 
as a symbolic watershed moments, involving a distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’ 
politics. This is because such an approach creates an artificial and analytically unhelpful 
dichotomy between security and normal politics (Fierke 2007, 187–190). Instead, security 
politics can be studied with much greater reference to the institutional/governance context in 
which all policy is generated, including situations where policy appears draconian or 
unprecedented.  
As has already been outlined, securitization scholars have so far tended to study either the 
emergence of specific security policies or the impact of ‘emergency’ politics in relation to a 
given issue area. However, both of these types of securitization may be studied as part of a 
single case-study. Below, distinctions are made between ‘primary politics’ and ‘secondary 
politics’ in securitization processes, both of which are subject to study within this thesis.  
Primary politics: Securitization is sometimes thought of as a form of political crisis 
in which institutionalized elites mobilize in response to the issue. Vuori (2008, 72) 
explains that, in times of crisis ‘securitization processes may be restricted to inner 
elite audiences and struggles.’ Thus, policy windows open for would-be policy 
entrepreneurs who are in the right place at the right time, and who may attempt to 
develop policy responses within this closed environment.35 While there may 
eventually be pressure on parties from various stakeholders to ‘open up’ policy 
development in western democratic countries, early responses to crises, especially in 
relation to the threat of terrorism, are almost always dependent on the decisions and 
resources of the state. These situations prioritise the role of political elites early on in 
                                                            
35
  Leonard and Kaunert (2010, 68) have suggested that policy entrepreneurs are closely related to the 
concept of  securitizing actors.  I agree, although as has already been argued within this work, this is 
not to suggest that identifying an ‘entrepreneur’ means that the ‘cause’ of securitization has been  fully 
explained. Such explanation would require reference to broader political conditions. 
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the shaping of the process through framing and path dependency effects.   
It is worth highlighting at this point that, while retrospectively many primary 
securitization moves appear urgent, drastic, and even draconian in nature, these 
policies were not necessarily advocated for ‘irrational’ reasons by the actors. This 
appears to be a tendency in the thinking of some scholars who have applied 
securitization theory. This distinction also makes the question of ‘why’ actors engage 
in primary securitization more meaningful.  
A more useful approach to thinking about primary security politics is to frame it as a 
political process which shapes the rules, defining which future decisions are made in 
relation to a given topic. This may involve, for example, the establishment of a legal 
framework which gives power to an institution to make a decision, or implement 
policy on a given issue. It might also involve the establishment of broader political 
process designed to generate policy on an issue in the future. Primary securitization, 
then, essentially involves the formation of agreements, though consensus or coercion, 
over the rules by which policies are made in the future, including the rules about who 
participates in the process and how.  
Secondary politics: This involves the process through which policy options are 
developed, articulated and implemented in the context of agreements about the overall 
process of policy development. It will usually involve the application of existing 
governance frameworks to a given issue by an established regulatory body. However, 
this may also involve sui generis governance activities when a new channel of policy 
development has been opened up (perhaps through a primary securitization process).  
The study of secondary politics involves analysis of the historical and political factors 
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have impacted on specific policies throughout their life cycles. This includes, for 
example, how actors have strategically engaged with policy development and 
implementation processes, as well as the identification rationales which have been 
utilized to inform and challenge policy initiatives. In also includes reference to the 
role of the broader political environment in supporting or hindering specific policy 
initiatives.    
Another key question within securitization literature is how analysts can make defensible 
claims about the motivations of actors who engage with security politics. For clarity of 
explanation, and in-keeping with the trend within the field, I approach this issue with a focus 
on the securitizing actor.  However, answering this question is ultimately understood to relate 
to the agency of all actors involved in security politics, including those who resist 
securitization.  The question of ‘why’ actors securitize has been approached in various ways 
by scholars of securitization, who differ on ontological and epistemological grounds. Gad and 
Peterson(2011) have argued that over the previous decade, the issue of ‘intentionality’ has 
been understood by securitization scholars in three ways. Their way of grouping 
securitization research is utilised below to explain how the issue of intentionality is 
understood within the thesis.  
The first understanding is that securitization involves actors in a position of power making a 
decision to secure a referent object through a securitization move. Within this understanding, 
securitizing actors wilfully decide to construct an issue as a security threat and communicate 
this decision to audiences, who either refute or accept this claim (Pram Gad and Lund 
Petersen 2011, 318). This approach to understanding the securitizing move emphasises the 
‘top-down’ or ‘imposed’ nature of successful securitization, as it does not account for the role 
of audiences in the production of the security threat. Within this understanding, the agency of 
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audiences is reduced (they can only receive the communication and make a decision to accept 
or refute it), and the agency of the securitizing actor in emphasised. Securitizing actors 
‘design’ a securitization move based purely on their own purposes, but tend to frame their 
communication in a way that ensures support. This understanding has led to more critical 
scholars, such as Floyd, to seek ways to normatively evaluate securitization moves based on 
the distinction between what actors claim to be doing when they securitize, and what they 
actually do (Rita Floyd 2010, 1–2).  
This approach neglects the idea that, in the process of policy development, actors (including 
audiences and facilitating actors) may continue to exert their agency following a 
securitization move. To claim that successful securitization always involves command and 
control type policy implementation, orchestrated entirely by the unchangeable will of a single 
securitizing actor, seems to set the bar for ‘successful securitization’ impossibly high in the 
context of modern democracies, where securitization policy necessarily involves a wide range 
of actors and institutions in the overall policy process. To give an example, a securitizing 
actor may initially choose to implement a certain policy, and all relevant audiences may 
agree, but during the process of policy implementation, actors involved in the process may 
convince the securitizing actor that the implementation of this policy must be modified in 
some respects to be feasible.36 This suggests that while securitization moves may involve the 
dominance of actors and discourses, the outcome of securitization should still be studied as 
the result of collective action, rather than as a process by which issues are lifted above the 
political in the context of modern democratic states.  
                                                            
36
  This approach also (perhaps unfortunately) raises questions about the critical approach of Floyd 
referred to the in the previous paragraph, as from a more cynical perspective  it provides a rich seam of 
potential excuses for why securitizing actors don’t always act as they say they will. 
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The second approach is closely linked with Ole Wæver, the founder of the CS school, who 
has remained influential in debates within the field. According to this way of thinking, 
securitizing actors and audiences in effect agree on rules about the future discussion of a 
given threat. The way in which agreements between the securitizer and audiences are reached 
is through a linguistic process, or ‘event’, which results in an acceptance of a shared 
discourse of securitization. Within this conception, there is no scope for assessing reasons 
that actors securitize aside from the communications between these actors. This 
understanding is very much restricted to the study of the intentions of actors in securitization 
processes and confines the study of securitization processes to discourse analysis, usually of 
public texts. 
Wæver’s decision not to address actor intentionality in relation to the securitization processes 
is based on post-structuralist leanings within his thinking (Floyd 2010, 10–32), rather than 
been an essential aspect of the securitization ‘idea theory’. To explain this point further, 
Wæver chooses to follow a more Derridian post-structuralist conception of what should be 
the appropriate focus for analysis in the study of securitization processes (i.e. ‘texts’). This is 
in contrast to the approach of IR scholars, such as Adler, who focus on the individual motives 
and interests of actors.37 Wæver’s decision, then, reflects his own underlying philosophy, 
rather than a definitive aspect of the ‘idea theory’ of securitization. This means that the 
founding figure’s analytical framework cannot be understood as the ‘only’ way to understand 
the phenomenon of securitization. Indeed, there has been sustained criticism of the 
inadequacy of Wævers particular framework, especially from sociologists and constructivists 
(Williams 2003; Balzacq 2005). Rather than rehearsing these criticisms once again here, it is 
worth concluding with the point that the Wæver’s approach does not attempt to, and without 
                                                            
37
  For more on this issue in relation to constructivism more generally see Fierke (2001).  
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serious reformation,38 is unable to address questions of agency, which damages the approach 
irreparably with regard to addressing questions about histo-political context. Despite these 
shortcomings however, Wæver’s position on this issue continues to be an important reference 
point when securitization scholars address the question of why actors securitize in 
contemporary work. 
The final approach, typified by Balzacq (2005), emphasises micro-sociological accounts of 
how actors continually reproduce structures in the processes of securitization.39 The approach 
also emphasises the importance of studying agency and structure as mutually constitutive 
contexts. However, the issue of why actors securitize is not directly addressed by this 
framework. In this respect Balzacq exhibits a similar disposition Wæver, in that the 
motivations and intentions of actors are largely ignored. 
With the above discussion in mind, I now develop my own approach to addressing the 
question of why actors securitize. In the context of this research, I understand the question of 
‘why actors securitize’ to involve analysing the behaviours of actors in relation to the goal of 
developing policy, which usually involves the application or extension of existing policy 
practices. This could be understood to create an incremental/institutionalist bias within the 
analysis, as securitization moves are always understood in relation to the governance 
structures that they alter, rather than the unspoken intentions of the actor. However, the 
ultimate goal of most securitization is usually a sort of institutionalisation; therefore, it makes 
sense to focus on the relationship between securitization moves and existing institutionalised 
norms, values and practices in defining the political purposes of securitization. The focus of 
                                                            
38
  An attempt from a sociological perspective to reform the nature of the speech-act is made by Balzacq 
(2010a), for example, although the purpose of this, as alluded to in earlier in the thesis, was to develop 
a more sociological account of securitization. 
39
  An example is Salter, Mark B. 2008 ‘Securitization and Desecuritization: a Dramaturgical Analysis of 
the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority’ Journal of International Relations and Development 11 
(4) (December): 321–349. doi:10.1057/jird.2008.20. 
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analysis is the identification of which pre-existing policy objectives are embodied in actors’ 
engagements with the process of securitization. Below I identify two central focal points in 
the analysis of why actors engage in securitization processes.  
- Pragmatic actions and interests: This relates to the short-term goals and actual 
practices of individuals who are involved in the emergence of securitized policy. 
This is most obviously epitomised in the case of the ‘policy entrepreneur’, who 
may seek to get an issue on an institutional agenda or secure institutional support, 
for example, but it also relates to those actors who are central to the 
implementation of policy at later stages of its emergence. These actors may utilise 
security rhetoric in various ways in pursuit of pragmatic goals (i.e. convincing 
others to act, portraying favoured policies in a favourable light to others to favour 
the adoption of these policies, closing down debates and legitimating existing 
practices).  The pursuit of pragmatic interest in relation to securitization processes 
can be understood in the context of the overall policy model. Pragmatic acts of 
securitization can occur at various levels of the policy making process, and within 
different streams. The question of how these actors go about achieving these goals 
(i.e. coercion and argument) can also be addressed at this stage.  
- Institutionalised practices, interests, values and favoured policy responses: 
These activities depend largely on the values of ‘epistemic communities’ of policy 
makers in the identified domains, to include institutionalised norms of 
engagement within the securitization process. In essence, this reflects many of the 
‘default’ basic positions relating to a given issue area, such as being ‘pro-
regulation’ or ‘anti-regulation’.  
Under what facilitating/structuring conditions are dual-use issues securitized? 
 96 
 
In this work, the study of security politics primarily centres on the study of the political 
processes which led to the emergence of policy in relation to the dual-use issue. This has 
considerable impact on how the concept of ‘facilitating conditions’ are understood here, to 
the extent that the term ‘structuring conditions’ is utilised in place of Wæver’s term. In the 
following section I introduce how this analytical concept is defined within this thesis.  
There are essentially two key ways of understanding the impact of structuring conditions 
within the securitization literature. The first understanding is typified by the work of Wæver 
and Buzan in Security: A new framework for analysis. According to understanding, 
structuring conditions are crucial to the success or failure of a securitizing ‘speech-act’. The 
speech act consists of a rhetorical act in which something is agreed and achieved using words 
by an actor, for example, in the naming of a ship. For these scholars, the success of a speech-
act represents a watershed moment, the point at which an issue is lifted above the realm of 
‘normal politics’ and into the realm of ‘emergency security politics’. Within this 
conceptualisation, facilitating conditions are understood to be influential at the moment of a 
securitization ‘event, for example, at the point at which a state-department convinces the 
cabinet that an issue presents a threat in an official communication. A key issue with this 
approach is that it narrows the focus of analysis to the study of a series of symbolic watershed 
moments within broader the political process.  
The second approach to the study of security politics is to conceive it as a broader political 
process, embedded in the wider political context (McDonald 2008). This widens the attention 
of analysis beyond texts, accounting for the institutional and political processes through 
which texts are generated, as well as for other political activities which are not necessarily 
embodied in texts. It is this latter approach that is adopted within this work. A typology of 
structuring conditions identified within this research is laid out below; these structuring 
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conditions can each impact across the various stages of the policy making process, and within 
various streams of policy making.  
a) Institutional path dependencies:  These include historical explanations and possible 
policy implications of the existence or absence of the capacity to identify or respond to a 
given issue, or the prevalence of particular ideational values within an institution. An 
example would be the reasons for the prevalence of nuclear physicists in decision related to 
the misuse of biological research and technology making in the US immediately following 
the terrorist attacks of 2001. Another example would be the reasons for and extent to which 
there were pre-existing institutional relationships to build upon in the development of dual-
use policy.  
 b) Political fragmentation and polarisation in relation to an issue: This relates to the 
extent to which there is disjointedness within and amongst policy making communities which 
tend to be in agreement about the ends of policy, even if not the means. This disjointedness 
may be understood to manifest along ideational or institutional divides. Political 
fragmentation can lead to uncoordinated and seemingly paradoxical policy/decision making; 
that is to say, there may be a situation where the right hand does not know what the left hand 
is doing, or where there is open conflict over preferred approaches (Roberts and King 1991, 
119). An example of this would be disagreements within the public health community about 
either engaging in threat analysis research or limiting the biodefense imperative in the US. 
Political fragmentation may also in itself be a motivation for securitization moves at various 
levels – it can act as a means to discredit opposition or rally support, particularly in the 
absence of agreed criteria to quantify the immediate threat. Within this work, political 




c) Ideational and discursive factors: The final factor relates to the discourses that 
structure the deliberative process of governance in each of the cases. This is not only in 
regard to the central assumptions in the construction of dual-use issues, but also the way in 
which debates about dual-use issues are structured (i.e. as a dilemma, as a risk as a threat, 
etc.). In examining this aspect, it is useful to draw upon Hansen who suggests three concepts 
of value to the study securitization processes (Hansen 2011, 359):  
Structural incorporation: This refers to the use of signs (such as things that are 
generally held to be threatening) in the construction of problems. For example, the 
dual-use issue has been governed as the novel manifestation of an existing 
category of problem within the governance domains identified (i.e. terrorism, 
safety, societal backlash against science, infectious disease).  
Epistemic terrain: This refers to claims based on assertions or assumptions. That 
is to say, for example, what is ‘known’ about the dual-use issue, as well as what is 
‘known’ about the field of synthetic biology, and how this knowledge is 
synthesised in the generation of dual-use problems.   
Substational modality: This refers to claims about the set of norms, rules and 
values which should be used to evaluate and govern the threat. Within all domains 
of dual-use governance, it is either implicitly or explicitly asserted that the issue 
requires some sort of response which is in keeping with or an extension of the 
existing governance discourses within the domains identified. There are, however, 
perhaps disagreements about how the dual-use issue should be conceptualised, 
which may have served to frame debates in national contexts (i.e. whether the 
issue is a risk, an ethical dilemma or a threat). For example, claims about the 
ability to make scientifically sound risk/threat assessments may be central to the 
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deliberative process (Villumsen 2011; Van Munster 2005; Aradau and Van 
Munster 2007).  
In securitization processes, it is likely that there are many central assumptions shared 
amongst the various stakeholders who chose to engage with the dual-use issue. In 
understanding the structuring conditions of the securitization of dual-use governance, it is 
essential to map and characterise the nature of these agreements. Having addressed these 
analytical issues, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to outlining the methodology for 
this study. 
3.7 Methodologies and Study Design 
The scholars who have dedicated their studies to the dual-use issue represent a broad and 
quite transient church, which has included the fields of applied ethics, arms control, political 
science, sociology, anthropology, science and technology studies, and security and strategy 
and defence studies. There is now quite a substantial body of literature which directly 
addresses the concept of dual-use governance; however, there is a clear absence of discussion 
of socio-political epistemology and ontology within this area. Indeed, the absence of such 
theoretical considerations made the dual-use issue such an interesting topic for Rappert 
(2009; 2007), who was one of the first to highlight the constructed nature of the dual-use 
problem, and articulate the challenges it posed as a subject of research. However, such 
questions have often been second to more immediate questions facing policy communities 
and academics about what needed to be done, and how. To this end, much research has 
focused on the implementation of specific policies (such as education and awareness-raising 
within the scientific community) or the development shared definitions of the dual-use issue. 
For example, Miller, Selgelid and van der Bruggen (2011, 8) sought to ‘develop an 
acceptable, adequate and applicable definition of the dual use concept for researchers, 
 100 
 
universities, companies and policy makers [as]….a clarification of the dual use concept and 
its scope of application would greatly facilitate the work of policymakers…’. In addition to 
this, dual-use issues have increasingly appeared on the fringe of more long-standing 
academic and institutional agendas, particularly in relation to the BWC regime and 
increasingly in the context of ELSI agendas. This has resulted in a nebulous body of 
academic and policy literature addressing the topic area.  
It became apparent during the literature review that a thesis provided an appropriate 
opportunity to develop a more systematic approach to the study of the issue, which could 
synthesise existing research, together with my own findings, into a more coherent whole. A 
key part of this process was the development of an analytical framework for the study of the 
practice and politics dual-use governance, which involved consultation with literature on bio-
security politics and practice, as well as more general texts on the study of policy, risk and, in 
particular, securitization theory. In the approach described below, the methodology through 
which this framework was operationalized as a research project is outlined.   
Within this thesis, a theoretically structured comparative case study approach is adopted; this 
is well suited to the inductive aims of this research (George and Bennett 2005, 19–21). The 
cases have been chosen according to the divergent nature of governance processes and 
outcomes (i.e. policies, governance activities). This is because cases that diverge in relation to 
a variable of interest are especially likely to reveal important intervening variables (George 
and Bennett 2005, 21). In this case, the variables of interest are practices, politics and security 
rhetoric which are understood to be distinct in relation to dual-use issues in the US and the 
UK. Added to this, the political developments within the US and the UK in relation to 
synthetic biology are also likely to become archetypal in future debates about the governance 
of other techno-scientific fields.  
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Although the small-n case study approach is well suited to this research, it is worth briefly 
outlining the potential limitations of the methodology, and how these have been addressed in 
the study design. Selection bias can hinder the ability of a researcher to make generalizable 
claims about other cases of interest in this type of research. However, this study is the first 
major investigation into this area and is primarily aimed to be exploratory. The main focus is 
the identification of important factors within the policy development process in each case, 
and this may be of use to future researchers who study dual-use governance in relation 
comparable technologies, time periods or perhaps states. Another claim often made against 
small-n case studies is the ability of the researcher to assess the impact of the variables 
identified. While it is important to accept the limitation of findings, a process-tracing element 
in comparative research can certainly help the researcher to make tentative claims about 
which variables should be considered important, and those which should be discounted 
(George and Bennett 2005, 22). Careful process-tracing can also address the concern that the 
case studies are not independent. This is a concern within this research, as there are many 
inter-textual links between policy documents in US and the UK. Certain individuals and 
institutions have also impacted upon both case studies, and within ostensibly discreet political 
processes. Process-tracing can ensure that such relationships are uncovered and 
acknowledged within the research. During the literature review for example, it became clear 
that debates within the UK have been shaped by developments within the US and that it was 
likely that US experiences had discernible impacts on developments in the UK. Process-
tracing was utilized in order to delineate the political significance of these links.  
With regard to research methodologies, document analysis and elite interviews are utilised in 
this study. The approach to document analysis is informed primarily by theoretical and 
methodological texts within the field of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2002; Locke 
 102 
 
2004; Wodak and Meyer 2009). This work emphasises the need to examine the context of 
text production, the purposes these texts are intended to serve, and the significance that 
becomes attached to such texts during political processes. As has already been outlined within 
the theoretical chapter, in relation to the study of security, such texts can serve a variety of 
pragmatic purposes but are at the same time informed and structured be prevailing discourses. 
In the context of process-tracing, analysis involves making explicit these features of reports 
and other texts as part of a broader political process as conceived by the analyst.  
In addition to document and literature analysis, this research makes use of a series of semi-
structured interviews, carried out over the phone as well as in person, at scientific and policy 
conferences, as well as more informal discussions which took place in meetings and social 
events associated with these meetings. My experiences of carrying out interviews for this 
research are discussed below.  
Of particular significance within this thesis are the documents which reflect growing political 
consensus on problem definition and action, and also documents which seek to communicate 
such consensus to others. Likewise, internal inconsistencies, tensions or ‘problem narrowing’ 
within documents can at times also be linked to underlying political disagreements, or to 
prevailing understandings of the difference between those responses which would be ideal, 
and those which are understood to be politically feasible.  
On top of document analysis I conducted a series of recorded in-depth elite interviews. These 
elite interviews were also complimented with dozens of informal discussions, and email 
correspondence, with key individuals. Such informal discussions often occurred on the 
fringes of international when the opportunity arose.  I made a decision early within my 
project to protect not to identify all my interview subjects.  This reflected a desire to ensure 
that interview subjects could feel confident enough to engage in frank discussions about the 
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politically charged issue area, without fear of professional repercussions.  Within this thesis, 
such interview subjects are identified in such a way that does not make them immediately 
identifiable.40  Elite interviews are understood to complement literature and document 
reviews in several ways. First, the approach may be used to corroborate what has been 
established from other sources. Second, elite interviews can help with the reconstruction of 
key events in political processes. Third, elite interviews can establish or corroborate the 
underlying interests and/or assumptions of key actors. Finally, elite interviews can yield other 
sources of data, or provide an assessment of the relevance or impact of documents that have 
already been identified as important by the analyst and other researchers (Tansey 2007).  
Occasionally, potential interviewees flatly refused to be interviewed, did not interview after 
agreeing to interview, or did not respond to emails after initial face to face contact. In the 
main, however, both scientists and policy shapers seemed eager to discuss their perspectives 
and experiences. This was to a great extent facilitated by the use of a semi-structured 
interview approach, which allowed participants to focus on their own areas of knowledge. 
The semi-structured interview approach also gave responders the opportunity to query my 
line of questioning if they thought I was encouraging certain types of answers. 
Within the interviews, I ensured that I presented myself as an academic interested in the 
process of governance, rather than being interested in advocating a specific position, or 
criticising specific groups or viewpoints. I was particularly eager to do this given the 
contestation over the role that social scientists were already understood to be playing within 
the governance process (Calvert and Martin 2009). I was also aware that some interview 
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  Anonymised transcripts of these interviews discussion are available upon request. Such censorship, has 
placed extra pressure on me to validate claims and perspectives expressed in interviews, or ‘off the 





subjects may have perceived me as having a specific political agenda because of my 
association with the study of security, and particularly with the politically contested idea of 
bioterrorism. The main motivation for taking such care was a fear of antagonising 
interviewees and causing them to ‘close-up’;  as Rappert (2007) has highlighted, taking only 
modest positions to encourage conversation is a valuable interviewing technique. Generally 
speaking, however, most people interviewed were happy to offer a frank description of their 
own personal experiences and perspectives in relation to the issue.  
Interview subjects were identified in several ways. First, it was apparent that it was essential 
to identify key individuals within UK and US policy processes. This was primarily achieved 
by contacting authors of key reports, as well as individuals who represented institutions in the 
wide range of conferences that have addressed dual-use issues. From the outset, it was clear 
that there were likely to be divergent perspectives amongst policy shapers on these issues, 
and so the interview set represents contributions from as wide a range of institutions active in 
the process as possible. Interviews were also conducted after recommendations from other 
interviewees. The central themes of these interviews were individuals’ understandings of 
what constituted dual-use aspects of synthetic biology, as well as their experiences in relation 
to the governance of the dual-use issue. On top of interviews, numerous experts were also 
contacted directly via email in relation to specific questions.  
A commonality among the synthetic biologists interviewed was that they all had at least some 
awareness that there had been public, government and community concern about the dual-use 
potential of the field of synthetic biology. The term ‘dual-use’ did not always elicit 
immediate recollection of the issue among the respondents and other scientists I spoke to. 
However, the mention of terrorism was usually enough to prompt an opinion on the 
governance of or likelihood of misuse of aspects of the field. In the interviews and discussion 
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it also became clear that newcomers to the field were struck by the high levels of biosafety 
and biosecurity discussions in relation to the field of synthetic biology. Some scientists also 
raised the prospect of specific applied research based solutions to dual-use and broader 
biosecurity concerns without prompting.  
While many scientists were happy to discuss the dual-use issue, some were less willing to go 
‘on record’ or to discuss the issue in any real depth. Other scientists, while polite, also often 
seemed indifferent to the issue. One publicly funded scientist who had recently published a 
collaborative paper on the dual-use issue as part of project funding requirements, also 
claimed that the dual-use issue had ‘all been dealt with’ back in 2006, and then terminated an 
interview which had initially been agreed to. Another scientist, who is prominent in a private 
polynucleotide synthesis company, stated that the issue was ‘very important’ but was 
unwilling to be interviewed.  
Other interview subjects included: a research scientist who worked for a consultancy firm 
contracted by the DHS involved in dual-use assessment, two high-level policy shapers from 
the HHS and the NIH, an early advocate of polynucleotide synthesis biosecurity governance, 
a technologist who had been engaged with the field of synthetic biology from an early stage, 
individuals involved in report writing process at institutions such as the Royal Society and 
Royal Academy of Engineering, as well as individuals involved in international diplomacy 
related to biological and chemical weapons and public health.  
Each of these individuals felt much more confident in discussing the dual-use implications of 
fields such as synthetic biology than ‘scientists’. However, a key theme in responses from 
those involved with policy was that there were divisions in knowledge, particularly between 
scientific and security expertise that existed between front-line scientists and policy makers. 
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These silos also seemed to exist between institutions involved in the policy making process.41  
As a consequence, scientists and policy makers often only felt comfortable discussing or 
expressing opinions on specific aspects of the broader dual-use issue. This often meant that 
discussions focused on specific misuse scenarios (usually sub-state rather than state level 
terrorism) or a specific type of policy (such as education).  
Another issue faced during the search for interview subjects was the issue of secrecy. In 
relation to state secrecy, one leading academic synthetic biologist I interviewed went as far as 
stating that ‘I don’t think you will get an idea what’s going on…. anything in the US is 
classified, yeah, and I doubt you’ll get any idea at all.’ Such sentiments seem to be 
something of an exaggeration given the number of public collaborative biosecurity initiatives 
occurring within the US in particular. Commercial secrecy also occasionally caused 
problems; on one occasion a non-disclosure agreement was requested in order for me to visit 
a lab, which created a hindrance to all involved. Added to this, in the private sector, where 
there are defined channels for public engagement, scientists appeared cautious about 
discussing policy issues without permission. One prominent scientist associated with the 
Craig.J. Venter institute, while happy to discuss things ‘off the record’, was unwilling to be 
recorded as part of the interview process, stating in response to the request that, ‘he liked 
having his job!’. Generally speaking however, the process of engaging in interviews and 
discussions with key experts, emphasised for me the collaborative nature of the relationship 
between arms control and non-proliferation academics and policy makers in dual-use 
biosecurity. An idea which is certainly reflected in the number of collaborative projects and 
publications involving both academics and policy makers.  There was also familiarity 
between scientists and those scholars that study them present within the field of synthetic 
biology.  Such familiarity, was based part on the research occurring both scientists and social 
                                                            
41   This issue was first raised by the ICRC as early as 2004.  
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scientists within the major synthetic biology research networks and institutions. This 
familiarity was reflected not only in my interviews and discussions, but also in many of the 
meetings I attended which included input from scientists as well as social scientists and 
policy makers.  
It is also worth highlighting that many of the scientists I interviewed  or had discussions with 
had often  already discussed dual-use issues in the context of academic ELSI initiatives or as 
part of research conducted by other scholars looking at dual-use issues.   This suggests that 
research in other fields on dual-uses issues, which have not been subject to such media and 
social scientists attention, may present a more daunting task than synthetic biology for future 
research on dual-use issues.  
2.8 Conclusions 
Within this chapter an account has been provided of the analytical framework which has been 
developed to address and refine my research questions.  It has been argued that certain 
aspects of this framework may be of use to other scholars examining security politics, 
particularity in relation to issues involving complexity, contestation and uncertainly.  
Added to this, there was also an account of key challenges faced in identifying, collecting and 
analysing evidence within case study research in this issue area.  These discussions were not 
designed to be an in-depth step by step account of how the research was carried out.  This is 
primarily because this research does not reflect an attempt to trial an untested or controversial 
methodological approach to case study research.  That is to say, case study research involving 
document analysis and interviews are already well described in practical guides written for 
security theorists as well as social scientists more generally.  It is hoped however, that this 
 108 
 
section communicated to others some of the practical challenges which are specific to this 
area of academic research. 
This been said, potential shortcomings and biases of the approach adopted were still 
discussed at length within this chapter in the development of my analytical framework. In 
particular this discussion emphasised the need to validate and de-limit analytical findings 
with reference to available evidence. In the context of this thesis, this evidence took the form 
of recorded anonymous interviews (which remain on file with the Author) as well as publicly 
available policy documents. 
Now that these issues have been addressed, we now turn to analysis of the case studies in the 




Chapter Four: An Introduction to Synthetic Biology as a field of Dual-Use Concern 
 110 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter serves several purposes which are worth briefly outlining, before introducing the 
chapter structure. At its most basic level this chapter is intended to introduce the reader to the 
dual-use concerns that stakeholders have expressed in relation to the field of synthetic 
biology. Naturally, this requires some form of introduction to the science, practice, 
institutions and technologies of which the field of synthetic biology comprises - as well as the 
dual-use scenarios that have been associated with aspects of the field. The second aim of this 
chapter is to demonstrate that the construction of dual-use issues does not just involve the 
embedding of objective ‘scientific facts’ about the practices, methods and artefacts of a field 
within a constructed misuse scenario. Outside of the laboratory, scientists and other 
stakeholders actively seek to make sense of the emerging field and this is the point at which 
scientific knowledge, products and institutions are conceptualised in a social context. It is 
these ‘framings’ of the science that are utilised within dual-use constructs.  It is argued that 
these framings are based on the episteme (i.e. agendas and knowledge claims) of the 
stakeholders as well as the social norms which structure the framings of new and emerging 
techno-sciences within NEST assessment regimes. The concept of ‘hype’ is introduced as an 
example of this last point, which is particularly relevant when one considers that the 
discussions of techno-sciences are largely pre-emptive and take place in the context of the 
unknown and unknowable futures of emerging fields. There is also discussion of the political 
and institutional context in which these framings are produced, although naturally these 
themes are further developed in the analytical chapters. A final aim of the chapter is to begin 
the process of answering the questions set out in the theory and methods chapter. These 
questions relate to the actors, discourses and structuring conditions that are important in the 
examination of the process of securitization of techno-sciences. 
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The structure of this chapter is now outlined. In section 4.2 it is argued that emerging techno-
scientific fields are understood to defy existing categorisations within predominant 
governance frameworks, meaning that disagreements about the scope, definition and political 
significance of the field have emerged. Section 4.3 introduces the underlying ways in which 
the field of synthetic biology has been conceptualised in policy discourse, with an emphasis 
on introducing the reader to the broad scope, technical aspects, practice and institutions of 
synthetic biology. Section 4.4 and 4.5 outline the political significance of the various 
framings of the field as well as how norms, in the way in which institutions in NEST 
assessment regimes make predictions about the future potential and future governability of 
technologies, are highly relevant to the understanding of how dual-use issues are constructed. 
Finally, in the remainder of the chapter the emergence and scope of dual-use concerns related 
to the field of synthetic biology are introduced.   
4.2 The Challenge of Making Techno-Sciences ‘Governable’ 
The increased involvement of a wide-range of stakeholders in the governance of science and 
technology since the end of the Second World War has created a certain fluidity in the way in 
which new and emerging technologies are incorporated into existing governance frameworks.  
In ‘Designs on Nature’ Sheila Jasanoff refers to regulatory institutions’ engagement with 
biotechnologies as ‘boundary work’. Such institutions attempt to place human activity and its 
consequences, which are temporarily exposed by virtue of appearing novel, into finite and 
pragmatic conceptual categories (Jasanoff 2005, 28,230,287). Examples of these categories 
include: ‘safe’, ‘risky’, ‘immoral’, ‘patentable’ and ‘national security threat’. In modern 
democracies this labelling often happens in the context of disagreements amongst interested 
parties such as civil society organisations, industry and branches of government, despite high 
levels of pre-existing institutionalisation (Stemerding, Vriend, and Walhout 2009). 
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In a recent report produced by researchers at the London School of Economics, it is argued 
that the root cause of the governance challenge synthetic biology poses, emerges from the 
combination of ‘scientific uncertainty’ and institutional ‘cross-borderness ’(Zhang, Marris, 
and Rose 2011). However, it is not the intrinsic properties of the field that lead to such 
problems but rather the interaction of constructions of the field with existing governance 
discourses.  
The problem of ‘scientific uncertainty’ can be understood to relate to the difficulty that actors 
face who wish to make defensible claims about risks associated with new technologies in the 
absence of a legitimate risk assessment process.  To explain this point further, it is not the 
absence of ‘scientific-certainty’ per se that allows for disagreement, but rather an absence of 
an agreed authoritative account of the risks associated with new and emerging technologies. 
Currently there is also no available funding for or active projects dedicated to risk assessment 
of the field of synthetic biology, suggesting that these debates are likely to continue in the 
foreseeable future (Synthetic Biology Project 2010, 8).  
The idea of ‘cross-borderness’ relates to the way in which the field straddles institutional and 
disciplinary divides, which create difficulties for those wishing to utilise or incrementally 
develop upon existing governance frameworks.   
Such uncertainty has led to the emergence of a collaborative assessment regime associated 
with the field of synthetic biology. This multi stakeholder approach to the governance of 
synthetic biology has certainly generated a voluminous academic and policy literature on the 
nature, potentials, ethics and risks of the field, which serve various political purposes in the 
biosafety, national security, NEST and public health domains identified in chapter two. This 
literature is utilized here to provide an overview of the various ways in which the field can be 
understood and defined. This includes reference not only to more technical aspects of the 
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research, but also the institutional context in which the research takes place. This precedes a 
discussion of the political significance of various framings of the field within NEST 
governance more generally as well dual-use specific governance.  
4.3 Introducing the Cutting-Edge Field of Synthetic Biology 
The term ‘synthetic biology’ has a long history within the biological sciences. In the work of 
Keller (2003), the history of the term is traced back to the work of the French biologist 
Stéphane Leduc at the beginning of the 20th century. The term was originally associated with 
the construction of artificial organisms which looked and behaved like natural organisms. 
Today however the term is used in a much broader sense (Campos 2009).The term is used to 
refer to a wide range of research, involving different research goals, technologies and 
techniques. The term is also used by a much wider range of stakeholders, including industry, 
civil society actors and funding bodies.  
An important way of defining the field has been through comparison with more established 
fields of science technologies. These comparisons are made in relation to the nature of the 
products, the nature of the technologies and scientific techniques and approaches used as well 
as the institutional settings in which the research takes place. Comparisons with the field of 
molecular genetics and associated synthesis and screening technologies have been central to 
some understandings of the field, most recently demonstrated in the report on synthetic 
biology from the US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (PCBI 
2010). Within this is conception, synthetic biology is placed in the context of a heritage of 
genetic focused technologies (i.e. genetic engineering) which emerged in the early 1970s and 
continued to develop as the speed of DNA sequencing increased during the 1980s and 1990s.  
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However, it has also been argued that synthetic biology is not simply ‘the next step’ in gene 
focused biotechnologies. This is because of the integration of powerful computational and 
nanotechnology into the field as well as a broader set of conceptual tools. This has led to the 
claims that the field of synthetic biology operates in a different paradigm to that of earlier 
genetic based technologies. This is in the sense of the aims, approaches and applications of 
the field (Vriend 2006, 25).  
Other researchers have understood synthetic biology to involve the application of engineering 
principles to biology. This understanding is epitomised by work associated with the BIO-
bricks project and the scientist Drew Endy. Endy has argued that three ideas drawn from the 
field of engineering were essential if the field of synthetic biology was to reach its full 
potential (Endy 2005; Endy 2008). The first of these ideas is standardisation, which involves 
the development of a shared set of standards for the biological parts developed so that they 
can be utilised by other in the field. This essentially involved researchers providing detailed 
accounts, in a format recognisable by the rest of the community, about function, composition 
and environmental tolerances of given parts as they were published. The second of these 
ideas was abstraction. This involves the development of concepts and shared practices which 
allowed researchers to utilise and develop biological ‘tools’ as well as ‘parts’ without needing 
to fully understand the overall biological systems they were building or operating within. The 
final idea is decoupling which essentially involved the development of conceptual tools and 
practices that allowed complex biological-based engineering projects to be broken down into 
smaller problems which could be worked on independently and by those with the appropriate 
expertise (Endy 2005). Keller (2009, 35), an expert in the philosophy of biology, states in 
regard to Drew Endy ‘I don’t think I could have invented a purer exemplar, and advocate, of 
the engineering ideal [in the field of bioscience]’.  
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While the influx of engineers into the biosciences is certainly a novel development, this does 
not suggest that the synthetic biology can be understood purely as collective engineering 
project. What is clear from the work of those who have focused upon is that the field is also 
influenced by epistemologies in the life sciences. This for example includes the construction 
of artificial models to better ‘understand’ life, rather than ‘create’ or ‘mimic’ life processes in 
the generation of new commercial applications (O’Malley et al. 2008; Keller 2009). 
Such discussions of the comparability as well as the philosophical heritage of the field aside, 
some scholars have been inclined to take a more pragmatic approach to defining the field of 
synthetic biology and rather than focusing on unifying aspects, or unique qualities of the 
field, instead have identified various sub-fields which are operating under the label of 
synthetic biology. In the following section, this ‘sub-fields’ approach is introduced which 
also provides an opportunity to elaborate some slightly more ‘technical’ aspects of the field to 
the reader.  This is followed by an introduction to the institutions of the field. 
4.4 The Sub-Fields of Synthetic Biology 
There are various conceivable ways to distinguish the type of research currently occurring in 
the field of synthetic biology. They may include the type of technologies or knowledge that 
are foundational to a given branch or the nature of the primary intended products (such as 
new scientific knowledge or biotechnologies). Another approach may be the nature of the 
research the field involved- for example does it involve live cell cultures, does it involve bio- 
chemical experiments, does it occur on a computer, or does it involve macro-level 
manipulation of complex organisms?  Another approach could be to distinguish research 
branches based on the discreet teams of researchers and institutions who are operating within 
the field, who often at once seek to distinguish their own research and place it in the context 
of other work occurring within the field.  
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For the purposes of this chapter, the approach taken by Lam et al. (2011) is most useful in 
outlining the more technical aspects of synthetic biology to the reader. Within the Lam et al. 
approach the field is broken down into sub-fields distinguished by research approaches and 
purposes. This way of describing the field of synthetic biology also draws attention to the 
idea that work which has been referred to as ‘synthetic biology’ involves lines of research, 
technologies and institutions that pre-date the emergence of conceptions of the synthetic 
biology community.  
4.4.1 DNA Circuits 
The ‘DNA’ circuit approach within synthetic biology involves the development of 
standardised biological parts with predefined functions, as part of a broader project to 
generate numerous ‘parts’ that can be used together in biological-engineering projects. A key 
problem in this approach is overcoming biological complexity. The 'bottom-up' approach of 
Endy (2005, 450) tackles this complexity by breaking down tasks into a set of smaller 
discreet problems at different levels of biological complexity, the results of which can be 
combined to provide a foundational platform for the development of new applications. 
However the realisation of Endy’s engineering-style aspirations for the field has been 
hampered by a series of conceptual and practical issues associated with coordinating and 
synthesising the various types of knowledge and expertise that are required. 
To date, the field has produced technologies which have been compared to electronic 
components. These consist of biological, chemical and physical inputs into the biological 
circuits which result in predetermined outputs. This output usually involves the transcription 
of proteins, leading to the expression of a biological function being turned ‘off’ or ‘on’. The 
most recent successes of this approach have come from the MIT IGem (Internationally 
genetically engineered machine project)(Goodman 2008). This project involves 
 117 
 
undergraduate university teams developing novel organisms as part of annual competitions. 
Project success stories have included genetic switches that can be turned off and on by light, 
cell cultures that can be used to perform basic computation and addition, bio-sensors of toxic 
chemicals as well as biological cultures that react to light in a similar way to photographic 
film. Although such experiments generated one-off lab creations, they demonstrate the 
possibility of future wider applications of the technology. The bio-banks registry developed 
in this field also contains thousands of biological parts, however there is not complete or 
accurate information in the database for many of these parts, due partly to the WIKI style 
system of data entry which allows a large number of registered individuals to add parts to the 
system, which are in the main un-reviewed by others.42 Despite these shortcomings, this sub-
field demonstrates innovative thinking not only in its products and controversial 
conceptualisations of biological systems (from the perspective of traditional biologists), but 
also in way in which the practice of collective scientific research is conceived.  
4.4.2 Synthetic Metabolic Pathways and Cellular Chassis 
This approach involves artificial interference with the metabolic and genomic properties of 
cells. As in genetic modification, synthetic metabolic pathway research involves the ‘splicing 
in’ of novel DNA sequences, as well as those from other species into a cell genome. The 
contrast with genetic modification however is that advances in gene mapping and gene 
synthesis has the potential to allow for much larger metabolic pathways to be moved between 
cells, or designed (Lam, Godinho, and Martins 2011, 31). The most striking and popularised 
example of this approach has been the re-booting of cells. In these experiments an inserted 
genome causes the ‘host’ cell of a different species to express the genes of the inserted 
genome. In a recent experiment, the approach has led to a cell of the species Mycoplasma 
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  Registry is maintained online at http://partsregistry.org/Main_Page 
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curriculum being ‘changed’ into a cell of the species mycoplasma mycoide, following the 
insertion of the genome of the latter into the former. Most recently the same feat was 
achieved, only this time an entirely synthesised genome was used (which was based on a 
natural template). This sub-field has received by and far the most funding and has received 
public notoriety through its association with the US entrepreneur Craig Venter. Currently 
much of the ground-breaking research in this sub-field is occurring at the J. Craig Venter 
institute which has laboratories on both the East and West coast of the USA, in Rockville and 
San Diego respectively.43 
It is hoped that the knowledge and technologies generated by this approach can be utilized in 
the design of new metabolic pathways. These pathways can then be integrated into living 
organisms allowing for novel cell functions. It is also hoped that simple, reliable cellular 
‘chassis cells’ may be produced, which could be utilised as reliable and efficient ‘hosts’ for 
metabolic processes in industrial production. So far the applications of these techniques have 
been described as countless, specific research lines proposed include bio-fuels and the 
production of antibiotics.  
4.4.3 Proto-Cell Creation  
From the perspective of a scientific researcher examining the genomes and chemical 
reactions that take place within living cell, the complicated nature of living organisms can 
frustrate attempts to isolate, investigate and manipulate specific biological processes. In 
response, scientists have sought to engineer cells which exhibit only the most basic processes 
required to survive. This type of research has less immediate applications than the fields just 
described, but certainly offers the prospect of increased understanding of life processes, as 
well as the prospect of producing simple organisms which might even have the ability to 
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  For further background on the history of Venter and this institute see: (Solomon 2011, 31–149) 
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reproduce. This type of research is taking place in a number of university contexts. With the 
research that is probably best known taking place at the Szotazak Lab based at the Harvard 
Medical School (Lam, Godinho, and Martins 2009, 35–36). This lab focuses on the study of 
chemical and biological evolution. The potential industrial applications of this type of 
research are understood to be less immediate than the first two sub-fields, as the focus of 
much research is the development of more basic scientific knowledge.44 
4.4.4 Unnatural Components 
Within this field the aim is to create de novo artificial ’parts’ in living organisms by 
attempting to manipulate or supplement the natural biological systems that produce natural 
‘parts’ naturally within cells. The term ‘parts’ in essence refers to proteins, which are 
function-specific compounds comprising of folding the strings of amino-acids (the substances 
coded for in DNA). A well-known example of a protein is haemoglobin which chemically 
binds oxygen and carbon-dioxide in red-blood cells. Artificial proteins could be utilized 
within broader biochemical processes, in an industrial context, in the production of novel 
materials or provide more efficient ways to produce complex compounds such as those found 
in many pharmaceuticals. The potential utility of novel proteins has been demonstrated in 
theoretical computational as well as experimental research (Lam, Godinho, and Martins 2011, 
35–36) 
There are essentially two lines of research occurring within this sub-field which focus on 
different levels of the central microbiology dogma of cell function (.i.e. the causal chain of 
events that lie between the transcription of DNA in the cell nucleus and the production of 
proteins by the cell). In the first line of research, scientists are attempting to develop artificial 
gene-systems. This could foreseeably lead to the production of a broad range of new amino-
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  Laboratory  website available here: http://molbio.mgh.harvard.edu/szostakweb/people.html 
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acids and these in turn could lead to a vastly expanded range of proteins. An example project 
of this ilk is the ORTHOSOME45 project based in Belgium at the Catholic University of 
Leuven(Lam, Godinho, and Martins 2011, 36). The second line of research essentially 
focuses on the generation of novel proteins, and generates these by manipulating the amino-
acids found within the proteins, rather than the DNA which codes for the amino-acids. An 
example of this type of research is that of the Woolfson Lab, in the School Of Chemistry, 
Bristol. This group examines the way in which amino acid sequences effect the way in which 
proteins fold, which has involved manipulating and designing proteins which they claim may 
have applications in the broader field of synthetic biology.46 
4.4.5 Synthetic Microbial Consortia 
In the study of multi-cellular organisms, such as humans or mammals, bio-chemical cell-to-
cell communication is understood to be essential in the regulation of bio-chemical processes. 
Within bacterial cell colonies made up of a single species, scientists also investigate 
mechanisms of ‘communication’ between cells. For example, the communication systems 
which regulate colony size in some bacterial species. This regulation usually occurs as a 
result of cells experiencing environmental change, which leads to some form of biochemical 
communication with the rest of the group to encourage a given behaviour by each cell within 
the collective ( i.e. slow metabolism, speed up metabolism, reproduce, die).  
Another group of researchers are investigating the means to make collectives of engineered 
cells, each perhaps serving different functions to communicate with each other. This may 
enable the ability for collectives of specialised cells to perform co-ordinated collective 
activities that could not be performed by single cells, such as the degradation of stubborn 
                                                            
45
  Further Information on this project available at: 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nest/docs/pathfinder_projects_2003-2006.pdf 
46
  Project website: http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/org/woolfson/index.html 
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environmental pollutants (Lam, Godinho, and Martins 2011, 37). An example from this sub-
field of research is a project of Dr. Jingjing Sun at the Weisse Lab at MIT.47 This research 
involves manipulating the metabolic systems found within yeast that lead to cells 
commutating the messages that encourage cells within the colony to ‘commit suicide’ (which 
in nature is used when the colony needs to reduce its numbers because of environmental 
pressures).  
4.5 The Funding and Practice of Synthetic Biology Research 
While a generally agreed unifying definition of the field of synthetic biology have not been 
forthcoming, funding and institutional support of the diverse sub-fields of research have been 
provided under the label of synthetic biology since at least 2005. This financial incentive has 
motivated new forms of collaboration between discreet disciplines under this banner. The 
result is a patch-work of collaboration between research teams and institutions with 
overlapping, but often distinct interests and aspirations (Molyneux-Hodgson and Meyer 
2009). There are discreet funding environments for the field in the US and the UK which are 
now outlined.  
Within the US the main sources of investment have been the Department of Energy (DOE) as 
well as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and 
the Department of Agriculture (DoA), totalling around $430 million between 2005-2010 
(Zhang, Marris, and Rose 2011, 11).The Defence Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) also 
announced an investment of $30 million in 2011.48 This has also been supplemented with 
private investment mainly in applied projects (Synthetic Biology Project 2010), for example 
Synthetic Genomics Inc. have reportedly invested approximately £30 million since 2005 and 
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  Project website:  http://groups.csail.mit.edu/synbio/people/jingjing-sun/ 
48
  Grant details available at http://www.grants.gov/search/search.do?mode=VIEW&oppId=119953 
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have collaborated with Exxon Mobil, who have reportedly invested approximately $600 
million (Howell 2009). Another major contributor to the field has been Amyris who have 
reportedly raised around $224 million. Most private investment has focused on the 
development of biofuels (Fitzpatrick Dimond 2010).  
Collectively, US based synthetic biology is understood to involve over 180 institutions 
(Synthetic Biology Project 2010, 3).These institutions include universities, private research 
intuitions as well as National Laboratories. Within the US there is also over 24 gene synthesis 
companies, and the US has been described as initiating the industrialisation of the field 
(Synthetic Biology Project 2010, 4).   
In contrast, within the UK, state investment into the field lags behind the US with estimations 
ranging between £20 million and £53 million between 2005 and 2010. There has also been a 
recent collaborative investment of £2.4 million from DSTL, BBSRC, EPSRC and the MRC. 
In both the UK and the US up to 5% of public budgets were allocated for engagement with 
social and ethical issues in the field. Such activities also seemed to contribute to the 
emergence of critical attention from CSOs in the US. This has also been reflected in the 
involvement of a number of social and political scientists as well as the production of a range 
grey literature (Zhang, Marris, and Rose 2011, 12). 
A major aspect of the organisation in the UK of the field of synthetic biology has been seven 
UK networks which were funded over a three-year period between 2008 and 2011 by the 
BBSRC, EPSRC, ESRC, and AHRC.49 These have involved a number of national and 
international conferences. In the US, Drew Endy of the Bio-Bricks Foundation initiated a 
series of international conferences. The first, second and fifth of these conferences took place 
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  Funding call available at :http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/funding/opportunities/2007/synthetic-biology.aspx 
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in the US (2004 and 2006, 2011), the third took place in Europe (2007), the fourth in China 
(2008) and the sixth conference took place in the UK in 2013.  
The field of synthetic biology is also being institutionalised further with the emergence of 
post-graduate courses that focus in the field. In the UK, for example, LSE as well as the 
University of Edinburgh offer a Masters by Research in Systems and Synthetic Biology. 
Added to this, SyntheticBiology.org associated with the open wetware Bio-Bricks Project, 
identified over ten US institutions that supported graduate study in the field.50 
The growth of the amateur community 
Since 2003 there has been discussion of an emerging amateur community. This community 
consists primarily of a handful of small organisations (National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity 2011, 6). One of these organisations is DIYbio, an organisation which is 
‘dedicated to making biology an accessible pursuit for citizen scientists, amateur biologists 
and biological engineers…’51 a second is the glibly named Biocurious who state that ‘We 
believe that innovations in biology should be accessible, affordable, and open to everyone’ 52 
a third example is Genspace who define themselves as ‘a non-profit organization dedicated 
to promoting citizen science and access to biotechnology.’53 Another group which has 
emerged within the UK is Manchester DIYbio which has developed in collaboration with 
Manchester Metropolitan University - which is designed to encourage wider participation in 
biological research.54   
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The actual capabilities of these groups remain comparable to high school laboratories 
(Ledford 2010). However, pioneers such as Carlson have envisaged a future in which 
amateur communities play a role in replicating or generating technologies as well as 
producing products such as pharmaceuticals (Aldrich, Newcomb, and Carlson 2008). The 
relationship between the amateur community and regulatory institutions, as well as the 
relationship between the amateur community and the field of synthetic biology remains 
contested in both a UK and US context and the significance is examined in later chapters.  
4.6 The Politics of ‘Making Sense’ of Synthetic biology 
The way in which actors and publics make sense of emerging techno-scientific fields is a 
complex process. The various framings of synthetic biology available to actors, generated by 
think-tanks, horizon scanning exercises, public discussions and indeed science fiction, can be 
used to serve political purposes such as mobilising and coordinating action as well as 
legitimising activities. The most notable example in synthetic biology is the emotive 
depiction of the field of synthetic biology by civil society groups such as ‘Genetic 
Modification on Steroids’- a metaphor designed to elicit a revival of long-standing debates 
about risk comparable to that seen in relation to genetic modification technologies.55 In a 
situation where several actors are in a position to articulate a conception of the field’s future 
and significance, it is unsurprising that different conceptions of the field are prevalent. Added 
to this, the ‘cross-border’ and interdisciplinary nature of synthetic biology also make  this 
field particularly malleable within public discourse in contrast to ‘established’ fields, which 
are understood to have more clear-cut, institutional and technological heritages. This leads to 
the observation that despite the ‘revolutionary’ framing of synthetic biology, promissory 
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discussions are actually dependent on the identification of a wide range of analogous-
established and familiar technologies and scientific fields.  
Such analogies have certainly been forth-coming (in particular computing and electronics); 
however the explanatory and predictive strength of such analogies is always limited. One of 
the earliest comparisons to electronics was made by Carlson (2003; 2011) which focused on 
polynucleotide synthesis technologies as a primary enabler to the field. In his work he 
predicted that the cost of polynucleotide production per base could reduce exponentially, as 
had happened in the semi-conductor industry. Such reduction in cost, was also linked to 
increased speeds of production. This exponential change was understood to be a the result of 
a feedback cycle involving the decreasing cost of polynucleotide sequences and the 
increasing availability and distribution of ever more powerful gene focused technologies. 
The focus on polynucleotide synthesis as a key driving force in the development of the field 
risks over-emphasising the role of this enabling technology and ignoring other limiting 
factors such as computational capacities, financial resources and availability of the 
appropriate expertise and new techniques. Similar arguments are made in relation to 
computing technology analogies. These predictions for example seem to disagree about the 
role of amateurs in the emergence of the field. Advocates of higher contributions point to the 
amateur computer programmers of the 1970s (Schmidt 2008). Conversely, others have tended 
to point to the role of large well-funded projects and institutionalised expertise have played in 
the development of biotechnologies (Aldrich, Newcomb, and Carlson 2008) 
The take home lesson from such observations is that while actors may make claims about the 
development of the field and emergence of applications, such claims are based on a wide 
range of assumptions. There also seem to be motivations for those advocating fields to 
construct the field through comparisons with other fields despite the obvious limitations of 
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these approaches. This applies to both making claims about the potential for the field and 
contesting the governability and risks associated with the field.56 In essence, as a 
consequence of the anticipatory nature of debates within NEST-assessment regimes, the 
absence of agreed definitions of the field are both a cause and result of political disagreement 
about risks and potentials of the field. As Kaiser et al. have already highlighted, these debates 
make unknowable futures the subject of debates and reflect actors’ conceptions of the ideal 
role of science and technology in society (Kaiser, Maasen, and Kurath 2010a).  
4.7 The Politics of Science Hype: Implications for Dual-Use Scenario 
Construction 
It has just been argued that the risks and potentials of synthetic biology are essentially 
contested within the policy community, and that this is reflected in the way in which the field 
is conceptualised and communicated by various stakeholders. This highlights the way in 
which claims about science are not the same as scientific claims and are likely to be contested 
as freely as any other aspect of a potential dual-use scenario. This raises interesting questions 
about how science is understood and communicated in relation to the governance of the dual-
use issue and what effects this has on the securitisation potential of the field.  The concept of 
‘hype’ is now introduced as a means to show the way in which a general trend within NEST 
governance is highly applicable to understanding how aspects of science and technology of 
concern are identified in the dual-use pre-assessment regime.  
An interesting question is the policy impact of the period of hype that follows the initial 
identification of a trigger technology in the early phases of techno-science emergence 
(Mampuys and Brom 2010). This period of hype tends to involve very optimistic predictions 
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about the speed of new application emerging, as well as the societal impact of these 
applications. If the trigger within the field of synthetic biology is understood to be gene-
synthesis then this hype cycle began as early as 2002, with the identification of gene 
synthesis technologies as having a revolutionary impact by individuals such as Carlson. This 
‘hype’ reached its peak in the period between 2006-2010, at which point Mampuys and Brom 
(2010) have identified evidence of scientific articles which down-play the potential of the 
field, signifying the downturn in expectations of the field.  
Coincidently it the time period in which academics and commentators were likely to be 
‘over-valuing’ the revolutionary potential of synthetic biology and the speed at which 
applications would emerge, coincided with the elevated levels of bioterror concern in 2002, 
following the US Anthrax attacks.  The broader field of synthetic biology, already on many 
security institutions’ radars due to concerns about polynucleotide synthesis, may momentarily 
have provided a fertile field for the generation or dual-use issues in the minds of many of 
those conscious of the threat posed by bioterrorism. Vogel (2008a) has already identified the 
role of ‘group-see dynamics’ within intelligence communities who examine bioterrorism 
threats can lead to the ‘overvaluation’ of the likeliness and seriousness of potential threats, 
and uncritical acceptance of threat scenarios within that community. Such claims are also 
made by Koblentz (2010, 98) who argues that in such situations ‘extreme worst-case 
assumptions is the rule’. These claims are not made here in an evaluative sense, or meant to 
characterise these constructions as irrational or  as ungrounded in fact. This idea is instead 
raised to make the point that hype combined with an increased bioterror imagination seem to 
have allowed for the generation of dual-use issues related to the field of synthetic biology 
among security policy communities in a way that was unprecedented historically.  
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Such hype can potentially serve as a valuable rhetorical commodity as actors in the various 
domains of dual-use governance seek to mobilize and coordinate in pursuit of policy 
objective (such as pre-emptive science and technology regulation), or else in raising a 
specific issue on agendas (such as the absence of convincing science and technology review 
processes at the BTWC at international level).  
It currently remains unclear within the existing literature as to whether the same levels of 
technology hype have been experienced within the UK and US, as well as the way in which 
this has affected dual-use governance. However, this may be an important factor in 
explaining the emergence of more fantastical dual-use scenarios in the governance discourse.  
To sum up, the dual-use concerns involve assumptions about the current understandings and 
future visions of science and technology, as well as claims about the contexts and scenarios in 
which the field could be misuses.  
4.8 Overview of Dual-use Synthetic Biology Concerns 
Since at least 2004 (Tucker and Zilinskas 2006) dual-use discussions related to synthetic 
biology have referred to bioterrorist threats associated with synthetic genomics, military 
(including biodefensive) interest in the field as well as the potential diffusion of knowledge 
and technologies related to this field . The key concepts and arguments that have been central 
to discussion of dual-use aspects of synthetic biology over recent years are now introduced.  
4.8.1 Synthetic Biology and Bioterrorism  
Polynucleotide synthesis was the earliest and most prominent aspect of the field of synthetic 
biology to be problematised as a source as ‘dual-use’ concern (Kelle 2009a). The earliest 
document identified within the literature was produced in 2003 by a small network of 
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concerned scientists (known as the Sunshine Project). The document referred to the prospect 
of the synthesis of classic warfare agents, as well as novel agents, with a focus on the 
consequence of state investment in bio-defensive research for non-proliferation and inter-
state arms control (Sunshine Project 2003).  
This was followed in 2004 by the publication of a non-proliferation proposal by George 
Church (Church 2004), a leading scientists in gene sequencing, at the Harvard Medical 
School. This document considered the option ‘of setting up a clearing house with oversight 
assigned to one or more of Homeland Security or the FBI'. The document made two 
suggestions. First, it suggested that oligonucleotide (oligo) sequence57 orders should be 
screened for similarity to select-agent pathogens. The paper also suggested that all use of 
reagents and oligos 'could be automatically tracked and accountable (as is done for nuclear 
regulations) '. Church also discussed the potential for the de novo synthesis of select-agents 
by terrorists utilising current science and technology.  
Since the Church proposal,  attention has been given to the idea of licensing or monitoring of 
polynucleotide synthesisers as a means to reduce proliferation potential (Nouri and Chyba 
2009).  However, this approach is usually discussed in terms of the expense and hindrance 
such measures could cause (Garfinkel et al. 2007). There have also been proposals which 
have focused on engineering  monitoring or safeguards into new DNA synthesisers.(Nouri 
and Chyba 2009).   
In recent years, the most dual-use polynucleotide synthesis discussion has focused on the 
development of synthesis industry screening practices. These have been designed to prevent 
terrorists from being able to buy dangerous sequences from providers. Currently there are 
                                                            
57
  Oligos are short chains of single stranded DNA molecules ( or RNA) which are short ( less than 200bp) 
and have a range of applications within research.  
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understood to be three competing voluntary standards, two of which come from industry 
associations and the other from the US government. A concern on the horizon within this 
literature is the development of polynucleotide synthesis technologies  in states outside of  the 
Australia Group as well as the ability of scientific developments to undermine polynucleotide 
sequence focused screening (Schmidt and Giersch 2011). This for example includes the 
prospect that faster, cheaper and more user-friendly synthesis technologies will potentially 
mean that many companies will choose to have an in-house synthesis capacity, rather than 
being reliant on synthesis providers. 
4.8.2 Synthetic Biology and Bio-Warfare  
The recent interest of military research institutions such as DARPA and DSTL also seem 
likely to raise concerns within the arms control and national security communities about 
increasing perceived military utility of the field, which may undermine the norm against 
biological and indeed chemical weapons. Conversely, it has been argued by members of these 
communities as well as the scientific community, that pursuing research in this field is 
essential to developing bio-defensive and bio-security systems against potential threats 
(Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell 2006, 7). However these responsive in themselves, particularly 
research which would involve working with classic warfare agents, would potentially 
generate concerns about biodefensive research crossing the line into offensive research (as 
discussed in chapter two). This then suggests the need for oversight mechanisms beyond that 
of the synthetic biology community (See for example, Weir and Selgelid 2009) .  
Kelle (2009a) has argued that current debates focused on the threat of bioterrorism and 
community self-governance neglect the threat of state-level biological weapons. Within his 
work the issue is understood to be a problem that involves the threat posed by the possible 
acquisition of dangerous technologies and knowledge by terrorists, as well as the threat posed 
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by offensive weapon programmes. This is reflected in his call for a holistic approach to the 
governance of the field which includes sub-national, national and international approaches to 
the governance of biosecurity of the field. This looks beyond existing policy and proposals 
directed at the threat of terrorism; considering the future long-term international security 
implications of the field, including those related to state funded bio-defence research. He also 
argues that the dual-use issue involves a broader aspect of the field of synthetic biology than 
synthetic genomics (Kelle 2009b). Within this conception, the scientific community, national 
governments or gene synthesis industry are not in a position to develop and implement 
responses to the dual-use issue alone.  
Within the analytical chapters, the extent to which this challenge has been understood and 
taken up at national level is assessed.  
4.8.3 Synthetic Biology and the Threat of Diffusion 
Since at least the early 2000s (Carlson 2003), there has been attention given to the idea that 
the de-skilling agendas of both institutional biology, as well as the amateur community have 
implications for national security and international arms control. This has been in the sense 
that the field can be understood to facilitated those without biological training to deal with 
potentially dangerous organisms. This aspect of the issue has often been discussed in terms of 
biosafety practices (Schmidt 2008, 2). It has also been argued that the de-skilling agenda has 
the potential to undermine both national and international controls on biological weapons 
(Tucker 2011). As Schmidt also highlights in relation to the oversight of gene-synthesises, the 
development of polynucleotide synthesis facilitates in countries outside of the Australia group 
could be understood to challenge the existing regulatory system (Schmidt and Giersch 2011). 
 132 
 
Aspects of the amateur community have also been identified as a source of dual-use concern 
(Markus Schmidt 2008; Wolinsky 2009; Jefferson 2013). The focus of much discussion has 
been on the political motivations of groups involved in the amateur synthetic biology 
community which often exhibit anti-establishment characteristics (Delfanti 2011). There are 
fears that sub-cultures may develop within these groups that seek to develop weapons - as can 
be observed in some computer-hacking communities. So far, publicly known policy proposals 
have related to outreach and the development of responsibility within these communities, 
however amendments to the patent system have also been considered as a means to 
encourage the amateur community to maintain biosecurity compliance, as well as to monitor 
developments within the field (Gorman 2011).  
4.9 Conclusion: Securitization, Risk and the False Dichotomy of Promise and 
Peril   
In chapter one it became clear that while it is possible to study the dual-use issue as an 
‘ethical dilemma’ facing the scientific community, that this is a rather myopic approach if 
one wishes to fully appreciate the various ways in which the issue has been constructed as a 
governable problem by policy-making communities. Dual-use governance has involved a 
wider set of value judgements, as well the issues of ambiguity and complexity. Further to this 
it was argued that the broad range of governance activities that have emerged in response to 
the dual-use issue exist as part of a broader governance regime directed at the issue. What 
remained unclear however was the extent to which activities within the four domains 
reflected what one would expect to see in a systemic risk governance regime.  
In chapter two it was argued that security politics is still a suitable departure point in making 
sense of the politics and practices of dual-use governance. The UK and US are intriguing 
comparative studies as governance of dual-use issues within these states are still 
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conceptualised along security/ non-security axis by many academics and policy-makers. 
Following this, a theory of securitisation was introduced which could adequately incorporate 
agency, discursive and histo-political factors in the study of dual-use governance. However it 
became clear that there was a requirement to reflect on how to study the securitisation of 
techno-sciences in the absence of existing literature on this issue.   
In chapter 3, the techno-scientific field of synthetic biology was introduced as a source of 
dual-use concern. Within this chapter it became clear that scientific practices, technologies 
and knowledge, were not the focal point of analysis; but rather the framing of these social 
artefacts, which are essential components of dual-use misuse scenarios. This last point 
emphasises that dual-use issues are not simply constructions that emerge out of the existing 
national security episteme, but instead the result of the interactions of framings of (usually) 
civilian newly-emerging science and technology and pre-existing national security pre-
occupations, such as mass casualty terrorism.  Further to this, it was also argued that the 
emergence and ascribed significance of such scenarios may be affected by a wide range of 
histo-political factors. The concept of hype was used to emphasise this point.  
The observation that dual-use problems do not ‘appear’ but are made, inevitably leads to 
questions about the nature of the overall political process that has created dual-use problems 
and the associated governance regimes in the field of synthetic biology. This essentially 
involves addressing questions related to the ‘subject’ or ‘scope’ of governance ( i.e. which 
specific aspects of synthetic biology are subject to dual-use governance) as well as the 
‘politics’ and ‘practice’ of governance (i.e. how are policies generated, what nature of 
policies have been implemented?). This also leads to questions about emerging overall 
approaches to the governance of dual-use issues related to cutting-edge aspects of synthetic 
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biology in national contexts. In the following sections these questions are addressed in 
relation to two national case studies.  
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In this chapter there is analysis of the governance dual-use aspects of synthetic biology in a 
US context. The way in which analysis has been carved up reflects the discreet policy-
generating forums and processes which have given rise to dual-use governance activities 
directed at the field of synthetic biology. In the first section there is discussion of how the 
concept of dual-use techno-science emerged on US agendas. This involves introducing key 
institutions in the development of dual-use governance, specifically the NSABB and 
SynBERC. In the sections that follow, there is discussion of the governance of dual-use 
technology and dual-research in a US context (the discussion of technology rather than 
research first reflects the chronology of major developments in relation to these issue areas). 
In the final section, there is an analysis of the recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission for the study of Bioethical Issues (PCBI) (PCBI 2010), as well as the prospect of 
a new style of dual-use politics directed at the techno-science of synthetic biology, with 
reference to recent developments at SynBERC 
5.2 Early Biosecurity Initiatives in the Emerging Synthetic Biology Community 
2003-2005 
If aspects of the US government were ever going to react drastically to the threat posed by 
biotechnology, the biggest window of opportunity in the previous decade within the political 
stream was the period 2002-2005. This is for several reasons. First, as Maurer states during 
this period there was a  
‘… Crisis atmosphere [which] predictably led to various Executive Branch 
responses… Such concerns also occurred in the context of the recent tightening of 
biosafety and vetting measures on individuals working with select-agents’ (Maurer 
2011, 1395).  
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As Maurer has also pointed out the establishment of the NSABB in 2004 had also generated 
the expectation that the US government would take some form of action (Maurer 2011, 
1397). 
This suggests that there were appropriate facilitating conditions for the US executive to 
formulate and execute a primary securitisation move related to polynucleotide synthesis if the 
political will and capability had been there. Added to this, George Church, a publicly 
prominent and widely respected scientist58 had formulated and actively advocated a policy 
proposal (Church 2004) which discussed the prospect of national security style controls 
which would utilise systems analogous to drugs control and nuclear counter-proliferation.59 
The proposal also gave the US security institutions a prominent role (he suggested 
collaboration between the CDC, DHS, and FBI).60 Yet despite this, policy initiatives were not 
forthcoming from the US government. It wouldn’t be until 2007 that the US government 
would take any concrete action, when a task force was convened (under the auspices of the 
HHS, rather than the FBI or DHS) to begin the process of developing federal guidelines in 
relation gene-synthesis technology.  
George Church’s proposals were discussed at the first synthetic biology conference held in 
2004.  These discussions reflected the emergence of a political synthetic biology community 
which was not only discussing dual-use issues but aspiring to engage with governance 
(Carlson 2005; Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell 2006). In 2005, following discussions at SB.1, 
Church wrote an article in Nature which contributed to expectations that biosecurity actions 
would be taken at S.B2.0 (George Church 2005). With regard to synthesis technologies, his 
                                                            
58
  George Church was a pioneer in the emergence of DNA sequencing and synthesis technology and 
remains closely involved with the field of Synthetic biology today.  
59
  This proposal came after gene synthesis technologies were implicated in dual-use concerns in relation 
to the synthesis of viruses around 2003. 
60
  Aspect of the CIA were  interested in this issue at  around this time,  see (CIA 2003) 
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report focused on the possibility of surveillance and material controls. His suggested 
approach was in stark contrast to the perspectives of some aspects of the scientific 
community at the time. For example, following the SB.1 Robert Carlson stated that; 
‘Not for the first time in this circle did I hear suggestions of licensing for scientists 
and of strict controls on the distribution of technology and reagents. But such 
measures are not likely to be effective. Worse, they will instil a false sense of 
security.’(Carlson 2005) 
Such sentiments would ultimately motivate counter-proposals from within the academic 
community and gene-synthesis industry who would go as far as stating publicly in 2006 that 
Church’s initial proposals were ‘impractical’(Bugel et al. 2006). As time went on then, the 
implementation of the Church’s initial proposals looked increasingly unlikely as competing 
visions of dual-use governance, with a broader61 appeal in the emerging scientific 
community, began to take shape. 
As early as 2003, Drew Endy had raised the idea that academic scientists could place pressure 
upon industry to implement screening standards (Maurer 2011, 1426). Fresh impetus was 
given to his perspective in November 2005 when an alarming article in the New Scientist 
entitled ‘your bioweapon is in the post’ (Aldhous 2005) raised the prospect to the public that 
terrorists might order  from these service providers. This in itself was worrying for concerned 
aspects of the community, but also heralded mounting public pressure on the government to 
act for some observers. Just 3 days later, it was reported in the New Scientist that Endy’s Lab 
would: 
‘…only do business with companies that operate transparent procedures for 
screening gene-synthesis orders for potential bioweapons. If other researchers follow 
suit, rather than simply placing orders on the basis of cost or speed of delivery, the 
                                                            
61
  Church’s proposals would have likely to have created an extra set of responsibilities for the scientific 
community (probably biosafety officers or Primary investigator) to  implement tracking and monitoring 
systems within ( and probably during transportation to and from) their labs of relatively basic and 
common materials and technologies. Naturally,  some vocal aspects ot he scientific community were 
averse to such a burden.  
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whole industry would be forced into adopting tougher standards’(New Scientist 
2005). 
However, in the following year, politics conspired against leading members of the emerging 
synthetic biology vanguard who were seeking to develop and implement self-governance 
mechanisms. This resistance would not only stem from the anti-terrorism domain; if anything 
it would appear that institutions such as the FBI were supportive of industry and academic 
self-governance initiatives at this time.62 Instead, it was divisions within the policy stream as 
well as the political landscape of the US NEST domain which would frustrate community 
attempts in 2006 to implement policy directed at dual-use issues.  
Events in this early era are important understanding the politics of US dual-use governance; 
this is in four senses. First, George. W Bush-era homeland security politics is often 
characterised as involving knee-jerk and draconian responses – however the Federal response 
to biosecurity issues in this era were not in fact not that straightforward. While the state has 
taken drastic action and taken the lead on issues on biodefense - there has been less 
willingness to take action in relation to dual-use issues. If one were to assume that the 
government had indeed wanted to take urgent action in dealing with the threat posed by 
polynucleotide synthesis, it is likely that the Church proposal would have been used in a 
securitisation move for this purpose - perhaps resulting in a closed policy development 
process directed by the US executive. This action was not taken however. In fact what 
followed was that the US executive adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach in the period between 
2003-200663 as various state and non-state expert panels grappled with the issue. Second, the 
hunt for technical science-based solutions to dual-use issue - through either better screening 
                                                            
62
  This is reflected in the involvement of the FBI in the first major self-governance proposal which 
followed S.B 2.0  as  part of tripwire initiative FBI website http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/key-programs 
63
  During this time the NSABB, the primary source of such guidance, had been slow to get started.  
Evidence of this in (Gerald L Epstein 2012, 22) 
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or through engineering safeguards into technology would continue to be prominent within the 
US discourse. Church’s early efforts to launch policy initiative also reveal competing 
conceptions of what constitutes desirable dual-use governance within the synthetic biology 
community, as well as a  the willingness of this community to engage with such discussion 
and even action. Finally, the absence of  support for this early  initiative reveals the potential 
for mismatch between more forward-looking initiatives stemming from the immediate agora 
around the field and the more slow-moving and pragmatic federal institutions. These 
processes are now examined in further detail. 
5.3 Dual-Use on the NEST Agenda 
In the following two subsections, two institutions which are key to understanding the politics 
which surrounds the governance of dual-use synthetic biology are introduced. The first of 
these is SynBERC,64 a major federally funded synthetic biology research centre. This centre 
has a well-established tradition of collaboration between synthetic biologists and those 
concerned with governance issues. The second is the NSABB, which is a federally 
established advisory body tasked with examining dual-use issues, including those associated 
with the field of synthetic biology.  
5.3.1 SynBERC: Dual-Use Techno-Science on the Community Agenda 
After the first synthetic biology conference of 200465 a group of engineers and life scientists 
from US institutions proposed the establishment of a collaborative project (Synthetic biology 
Engineering Research Centre or SynBERC). It was intended that this centre would enable the 
coordination of research activities across these institutions. The goals and means, as well as 
some of the technical and conceptual hurdles of such collaboration had already been 
                                                            
64
   Website: http://synberc.org/ 
65
  Held in Cambridge MA 2004.  
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discussed by this time at S.B1.66 A funding application was made to the NSF, who financed 
the project from summer 2006, on the proviso that the project would include a social 
implication element, particularly in light of terrorism concerns related to the field. Since this 
time a series of scholar have served as leads of the ethical component of this project - which 
has been a turbulent institution for social scientists to work in.  For only a matter of weeks, 
the post was held by Stephen Maurer, a scholar based in the Berkley School of Public Policy, 
he was replaced at the end of summer 2006 by Paul Rabinow and Kenneth Oye. Rabinow 
was an anthropologist working at Berkley and Oye a political scientists working at MIT. At 
the End of 2010 Rabinow was removed as the head of the Human Practices thrust and 
replaced, by prominent synthetic biologist Drew Endy. This followed disagreements over the 
purpose and outputs of the thrust.  
Since at least 2006 the aspirational ‘up-stream’ policy initiatives within this institution have 
continually shown faith in the idea that security considerations could be engineered into the 
synthetic biology innovation processes. This was demonstrated as early as 2006, when 
Stephen Maurer secured funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and MacArthur 
Foundations for a collaborative project which was designed to ‘study and facilitate 
community action on issues of concern to the worldwide synthetic biology community’ 
(Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell 2006). The research project, involving interviews with experts; 
coordination with other institutions and working groups as well as two public meetings, was 
designed to be the basis for eventual community-based action. Initially, things started well as 
an exercise in the delineating self-governance policy options. A report produced a few 
months before S.B 2.0 suggested a set of policy options to be considered by the scientific 
community at the forthcoming conference. The report asserted that: 
                                                            
66
  For example, the first  SB conference (2004) included  tutorials that described how to establish and run 
a registry of standard biological parts as well as tutorials for educators who wished to teach integrated 
biological systems engineering.  http://openwetware.org/images/7/79/SB1.0_overview.pdf . 
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‘synthetic biologists share a deep understanding of the biosafety/biosecurity problem 
and – in some cases – emerging consensus about what can and should be done to 
manage it. Many options can be implemented through community self-governance 
without outside intervention’. (Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell, 1) 
The advocacy for self-governance was tempered with the statement that: 
‘Community self-governance provides a realistic and potentially powerful 
complement or alternative to regulation, legislation, treaties, and other interventions 
by outside entities.  (Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell 2006, 4)  
The report also confidently reassured to those looking on that policy proposals were the result 
of a consultation with the scientific communities through interviews which had set out to 
learn ‘what members believe, want, and are prepared to vote for’ and that the policy 
proposals were derived ‘from consent’ (Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell 2006, 5). 
It was intended that the vote would take place publicly at the SB 2.0 and involve scientists 
within the community. The resolutions within this document that directly addressed 
polynucleotide synthesis technologies included an insistence that the academic community 
only deal with gene-synthesis companies which had adopted best-practice screening 
procedures by a given date and the engagement of scientists in research on screening to 
further facilitate the implementation of these best practices.  The proposals also addressed 
research. This included the appropriation of the synthetic biology community as both experts 
in dual-use governance and implementers of security policy - the report states, for example, 
that 
‘Six years of almost continuous discussion have given synthetic biologists a solid 
understanding of biosafety/biosecurity risks and the available possible policy 
instruments for reducing them’ (Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell 2006, 25).  
The report also gave the scientific community a central role in the development of policies to 
prevent and mitigate the risk of the misuse of developments within the field. Other modest 
initiatives not in keeping with existing risk governance systems were also suggested, such as: 
the ‘biosecurity hotline’; education of students about dual-use issues; outreach to the 
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emerging amateur bio-hacking community as well as the incorporation of dual-use expertise 
into existing bioethics/ biosafety review was also suggested.  
Various factors would conspire to undermine this initial experiment. Some factors were 
internal to the SynBERC Project - members of the other research thrusts on the SynBERC 
projects began private discussions which resulted in Maurer’s proposal been pulled ‘at the 
very last moment by Keasling and his colleagues’(Rabinow and Bennett 2012, 18). Maurer 
suggests that there were several reasons that members of the organising group pulled the 
proposal for the agenda;  
‘Some needed more time to think about the ideas. Others were concerned that the 
conference needed a constitution before it could vote, or that a vote might be divisive. 
Some participants hesitated out of respect for the fierce opposition of 
activists’(Maurer and Zoloth 2007, 17).  
These activists, headed by the ETC group, publicly criticised the ‘Asilomar-style approach’ 
suggested by Maurer’s’ group on the basis that it was undemocratic and represented a pro-
science agenda.  A further reason given for the Berkley project not achieving its original aims 
was that the initiative was trumped by the announcement of a Sloan Foundation funded 
project involving the Craig. J .Venter Institute which would also discuss options for federal 
oversight. This was to be published after the SB2.0 (Maurer 2011, 1398–1399).  Regardless 
of the causes, SB2.0 did not include a community-wide vote on the implementation of 
biosecurity actions. Added to this, Maurer highlights the incorporation of Civil Society 
Groups such as the ETC at the SB3.0 and SB4.0 events would block the prospect of any such 
action in the future (S. Maurer 2011, 1429). However, despite the fact this project did not 
achieve its primary aims, other outputs from this project including draft reports and an online 
resolution were utilized in future reports and would influence future initiatives. The extent of 
this influence will be outlined in later sections of analysis. 
5.3.2 The NSABB: Dual-Use Techno-Science on the Federal Agenda 
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In order to understand federal policy on dual-aspect of synthetic biology it is essential to 
examine the role of the US federal advisory board on dual-use research which was 
established in 2004 following the recommendations of the Fink report (National Research 
Council and Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive 
Application of Biotechnology 2004) (see chapter one). The report recommended the 
establishment of an advisory board that would be located within the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS).  Since its establishment the board has produced a series of 
recommendations for government on specific dual-use issues and dual-use policies and has 
also provided advice on specific dual-use cases which have received public attention.  
 As a federal advisory body, the charge of the NSABB is codified in a charter. This charter 
also sets the terms on which NSABB provides advice to the government. Because this 
committee is a federal advisory body it is also required by law to keep public records of its 
finances and meeting. The large documentary footprint of the NSABB belies the fact that the 
institution actually operates on a modest budget of around $541,120 per year (Secretary of 
Health and Human Services 2012, 2). The NSABB has no independent full-time staff. Instead 
a designated federal officer assigned by the NIH is in charge of: approving and calling 
NSABB meetings, preparing and approving all meeting agendas, attending all committee and 
subcommittee meetings, adjourning any meetings when it is determined to be in the public 
interest and chairing meetings when directed by senior officials. The NSABB committee 
comprises of up to 25 voting members, plus other invited experts who meet intermittently. 
The work package of the NSABB was broken up between a series of working groups.67 One 
of these working groups (The Synthetic Genomics working group) focused specifically on the 
                                                            
67
  By the end 2006, there were six working groups; 
Dual Use Criteria Working Group,  Communications Working Group  
Codes of Conduct Working Group Synthetic Genomics Working Group 
International Working Group and the Dual-use research oversight working group. 
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issue of polynucleotide synthesis technology. The working group, under the aegis, produced 
an influential report (NSABB 2010a) which would serve to frame future federal responses.  
The role of the NSABB in dual-use governance has been subject of contestation among 
academics, commentators as well as policy-makers. During an interview, one senior 
individual closely involved with the Fink report drafting process stated that that the role of 
the NSABB ‘depend[ed] on who you ask.’68  The official role served by the NSABB is to: 
‘provide advice on and recommend specific strategies for the efficient and effective 
oversight of federally conducted or supported dual use biological research, taking 
into consideration both national security concerns and the needs of the research 
community to foster continued rapid progress in public health and agricultural 
research’. (Secretary of Health and Human Services 2012) 
In practice, the actual remit of the NSABB has been quite fluid, with alterations in the boards 
charges between 2005 and 2012. This may partly represent the completion of work 
programmes but also reflects changes in the understood role of the NSABB. A snap-shot of 
the understood role of the NSABB when Genomics work programme was established, is 
provided by the executive director of the NSABB who outlined 12 charges.69 This list 
demonstrates that there is a potent range of roles that the NSABB could have played in the 
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  Interview with senior National Academy of Science policy shaper: On file with Author 
69
  Develop criteria for identifying dual use research and research results; Develop guidelines for oversight 
of dual use research, including guidelines for risk/benefit analyses; advise on national policies 
governing local review and approval for dual use research, including guidelines for case-by-case 
review and approval by Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs);Advise on criteria and processes for 
referral of classes of research or specific experiments by IBCs to NSABB; Review/provide guidance on 
specific experiments that exemplify significant or complex permutation or represent a new category of 
dual use research; Respond to research institutions’ requests for interpretation and application of 
guidelines to specific proposals that have been denied by an IBC; Provide recommendations regarding 
the development of a code of conduct for scientists and laboratory workers for adoption by professional 
societies and institutions engaged in life sciences research; Provide recommendations on the 
development of mandatory programs for education and training in biosecurity for all scientists and 
laboratory workers at federally funded institutions; Advise on national policies for publication, 
communication, and dissemination of dual use research methodologies and results; Provide 
recommendations regarding strategies for coordinated international oversight of dual use biological 
research; Advise on national policies for conduct of dual use research, including strategies to address 
national security concerns while fostering rapid progress in life sciences research Address other issues 
as directed by the Secretary of HHS.  From a presentation given by Thomas Holohan (then  Exectutive 





governance of dual-use aspects of synthetic biology. It is worth briefly characterising these 
roles in the context of the analytical framework.  
The first set of roles relate to the impact of the NSABB in the life cycle of specific policies. 
In a meeting report from 2005, the executive director at the time indicates that the NSABB 
roles were to  
‘identify and analyse dual use research issues, facilitate coordination in the 
development of Federal policies on dual use research, participate in the 
implementation and interpretation of the Federal guidelines for dual use research, 
and develop training and education programs for IBCs’ (NSABB 2005a, 5–7).  
This suggests a broad remit in the linear policy development process, ranging from issue 
identification and policy development and selection, through to policy evaluation. The 
understood role of the NSABB at this time would also look to include many of the roles often 
ascribed to policy entrepreneurs including: advocating new ideas and developing proposals, 
defining and reframing problems and specifying policy alternatives. Added to this there is 
also evidence to support the argument that the NSABB at this time was involved in other 
roles typically ascribed to policy entrepreneurs. The first is the mobilization of public 
opinion, the importance of public opinion a common theme at the inaugural NSABB meeting, 
with references made to the NSABB can help maintain public trust in federally-funded 
science (NSABB 2005b, 8,11,164).  This was also reflected in concerns about public 
misperception of the dual-use issue, with some members of the NSABB claiming that the 
‘public must be educated on the complexity of dual use issues’ (NSABB 2005a, 7). Another 
role envisioned for the NSABB in 2005 was the idea of brokering ideas among the various 
communities and building collaborative relationships between stakeholders. This is reflected 
in an interview with an expert involved with the Fink report drafting process, as well as a 
regular attendee at early NSABB meetings: ‘Because we thought, the committee thought you 
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would really need a source of continuous engagement between the science community and 
the security community’. This was in as far as identifying and responding to dual-use issues.70 
Another role the NSABB could be expected to play is also setting the decision making 
agenda, which involves outlining decisions and agreements that need to be made in the 
process of developing and implementing policy. This is reflected in the work packages of the 
first NSABB working groups, which for example included groups tasked with identifying 
criteria for dual-use research. Finally, the NSABB also appeared to open policy windows (i.e. 
joining the problem, policy and political streams) by providing feasible responses to the dual-
use issue, developed by experts from the relevant policy communities to the US executive, 
which could choose to provide support for the implementation of these policies.  
The role played by the NSABB is also complicated because it potentially engages in the type 
of activities you would expect to see in risk pre-assessment (discussed in chapter two). This 
includes setting the scope of problem definition, the delineation and analysis of a wide range 
of policies in biosafety, public health and ant-terror domains as well as the selection of 
normative and scientific criteria for the identification and management of risks. Such a 
situation often places the NSABB in a precarious political position, making the institution 
prone to controversy. This point was highlighted most recently in the political fall-out 
surrounding the governance of two ‘dual-use’ pieces of research on Avian Influenza. With 
one detracting member of the NSABB arguing that the institution had found itself in 
‘uncharted scientific and public policy waters’ in a ‘leaked’ letter to other NSABB 
members.71 
                                                            
70
  Interview senior National Academies of Science policy maker on file with the Author.  
71
   The letter was written by Michael Osterholm (Director of Institute of Center for Infectious Disease 
Research and Policy) to Amy Patterson, to an official at the National Institute of Health. . Letter 




5.4 Dual-Use Technology and the Politics of Security 2006-2012 
As it currently stands, the majority of the gene synthesis industry72, which is based mainly in 
Europe and US is signed up to one of two competing industry standards, each include 
technical protocols for screening orders. In essence these industry standards are a promise to 
the public and other stakeholders that steps are been taken to prevent terrorists from receiving 
dangerous sequences from these suppliers. Recently, the US government also produced a 
voluntary ‘harmonized’ standard. There are some subtle differences between the three 
standards - this includes most notably divergence in the recommendations on the level of 
reliance on human expertise. As it currently stands there also remains uncertainty about how 
companies will modify their practices to incorporate the most recent government standards.73 
These vague policy outcomes, a result of several intertwined political process, are 
supplemented with other outcomes which involve untested working relationships between 
industry, scientists and security communities in a governance system, as well as concerns 
about the responsiveness of this system to the changing technological and security 
environment. For scholars such as Maurer, the current situation represents a moment of 
stagnation after a period in which more could have been done. In contrast, other 
commentators have also expressed optimism about the products of the previous decade as a 
good first step.74 Naturally, such perspectives are based on a range of assumptions about the 
threats posed by polynucleotide synthesis technology, the way in which this issue should be 
dealt with and the realities of generating security policies in this area. 
                                                            
72
  Estimated to be  around 80 % of global capacity as of 2009 (S. Maurer 2011, 1389) 
73
  However, to the author’s knowledge there have been no substantive and systematic independent public 
investigations into the current implementation of these standards within industry since the publication 
of the guidelines.  
74 
  An interview with George Church reported in Nature (Ledford 2010)  
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 In the following section there is an examination of the political processes of the which have 
underpinned the emergence of dual-use policy. Following Maurer, distinctions are made 
between three channels of dual-use governance related to synthetic biology; the academic, 
industry and federal tracks. This distinction makes sense, in that each of these tracks operated 
according to distinct time frames and distinct logics, and in relation to different problem 
definitions. However, it is worth noting explicitly that these channels were not operating in 
isolation to each other.75 As Maurer has already pointed out, individuals and organisations 
contributed to multiple tracks of policy development (Maurer 2011, 1426). The political 
significance of having multiple streams of policy development is a national context is also in 
itself an interesting line of enquiry which is developed within the following in-depth analysis.  
5.4.1 The NSABB and the Synthetic Genomics Working Group 2005-2007 
In late 2005, a synthetic Genomics working group for the NSABB was established to 
‘Examine the potential biosecurity concerns raised by the laboratory synthesis of 
Select-agents, and the broader field of synthetic biology; and recommend possible 
strategies to address these concern’ (Relman 2006)’.  
The working group broke this task down into a two phase project (Relman 2006). In phase 1, 
they were to address the issue of de novo synthesis of select-agents, they would then go on to 
address broader biosecurity concerns associated with the field of synthetic biology in phase 2. 
This appears to be in-keeping with sentiments of the Sloan funded Maurer et al. report,(2006) 
which identified synthetic genomics as an issue of more immediate concern than other 
                                                            
75
  This has at times been complicated by two trends within the grey material produced within this area.  
First, in some documents produced by the NSABB there has been a tendency not to ascribe comments 
to specific individuals and representatives in meeting reports. This means that ideas can simultaneously 
appear in two channels, and it is unclear where they were initially introduced, and by whom. Second, 
authors of policy proposal documents have often by ignorance of design been quite selective about 
which parallel initiatives in other tracks that they acknowledge. This can also complicate the 
reconstruction of events.  For example, the first major industry initiative did not acknowledge relevant 
NSABB activities in publicly available materials, despite the involvement of several of the authors with 
the NSABB process . The issue of  so called ‘Chatham house rules’ in research on biosecurity policy is 
addressed in (Rappert 2009) 
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technologies which could be eventually produced by the field. The work of this NSABB 
working group, as well as its implications in US dual-use politics, is now examined.  
Historically, the US had ensured against the misuse of select-agents via a containment 
strategy. It was understood that this system ensured that only responsible individuals had 
access to dangerous pathogens utilized in scientific research. Domestically, the system 
depended on select-agent agent biosecurity, in which only individuals granted permission by 
the NIH could possess dangerous pathogens. The system also depended on select-agent 
biosafety, which was implemented through NIH standards (the primary funder of US select-
agent research); to which researchers had to comply if they were to receive support. The 
emerging field of synthetic genomics was understood to challenge this existing strategy in 
fundamental ways in the report produced by this working group (NSABB 2006). First, the 
field of synthetic genomics was associated with the movement of increasing complex   
polynucleotide synthesis out of NIH funded labs and into the hands of an emerging industry. 
This industry was not necessarily covered by biosafety guidlines, which covered the safety 
practices and containment measures when dealing with select-agent pathogens. Added to this 
more general concerns in relation to recent changes of the select-agents programme were also 
raised in the synthetic genomics forum, leading the NSABB recommendations which were 
relevant to a much broader swathe of the life sciences than the field, and in particular 
biodefense activities. These recommendations focused on the existing legal characterisation 
of what constituted a select-agent, which appeared increasingly outdated as human 
understanding and ability to manipulate the agents had increased.76 
The Synthetic Genomics Working Group made two key recommendations to government 
which were relevant to the oversight of technology associated with the field of synthetic 
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biology. The first recommendation directed relevant agencies to engage with the scientific 
community and industry to raise awareness and give clarification in relation to existing legal 
requirements upon individuals working with and synthesising select-agent organisms77. The 
second recommendation directed the US government to charge the relevant agencies with the 
development of harmonised industry standards for handling polynucleotide synthesis 
orders.78 The group had also considered several other options for the oversight of synthetic 
genomics, which included:  
- restricting access to new sequence information about Select-agents;  
Monitoring the sale of chemicals and lab equipment used to synthesize DNA; 
- voluntary/involuntary surveillance/tracking of researchers/students using or trained 
to use synthetic genomics;  
- modifying the SAR so that all select-agent genomes are covered; and 
- Modifying the SAR or issuing new regulations defining Select-agents in terms of their 
sequence.(NSABB 2010a, 8–9) 
The working group stated that they: 
‘Chose not to adopt such recommendations because they are either not feasible, 
likely to be ineffective, and/or would unduly hinder scientific research. In certain 
instances, science has not advanced to the point that such recommendations could be 
implemented’(NSABB 2010a, 9).   
This decision however was not only informed by decisions on technical feasibility.  It was 
increasingly apparent at this time that federal regulations were not likely to be forthcoming in 
                                                            
77  Recommendation 1: The NSABB recommends that HHS and USDA collaboratively develop and 
disseminate harmonized guidance to investigators and nucleic acid/gene/genome providers concerning 
the SAR with respect to synthetically-derived DNA. Specifically, the Departments should provide 
clarification of what genetic elements or genomes are covered by 42 CFR 73.3c and 73.4c. Such 
clarification should include a list of the organisms whose genomes are explicitly covered and where the 
reference sequence can be found, and instructions for whom to contact if an investigator or provider 
has questions about covered genetic material. There is also a need for HHS and USDA to increase 
awareness among investigators and nucleic acid/gene/genome providers about their responsibilities to 
know what they possess, manufacture and/or transfer in order to comply with the SAR. 
78   Recommendation 2: The NSABB recommends that the USG should charge relevant federal agencies, 
in consultation with outside experts to 1) develop a process to be used by providers of synthetic DNA 
for determining the sequences for which to screen (Select Agents or otherwise); 2) develop and 
promote standards and preferred practices for screening orders and interpreting the results, and require 
that orders be screened by providers; 3) draft Points to Consider for determining whether genomic 
material that does not exactly match the genomes referenced in Recommendation 1 should be 
considered covered under the SAR; and 4) develop standards and practices to be used by providers for 
retaining records of orders for gene-length or genome-length nucleic acids, and require that orders be 
screened by providers. The NSABB also recommends that the USG require federal grantees and 
contractors to order from providers that screen and retain information about requests for Select Agent 
sequences following standards and practices developed by relevant federal agencies, and foster an 
international dialogue and collaboration with the goal of developing and implementing universal 
standards and preferred practices for screening sequences and related matters. 
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relation to this issue area. This suggests that while regulatory approaches were ‘considered’, 
it is unlikely that those involved took the prospect of drastically altering select-agent 
regulations, or else developing stringent regulatory material and researcher controls that 
seriously. 
The political context of the NSABB recommendations, in particular the extent to which 
government were willing to let industry and academia take a lead on this issue, are revealed 
in the minutes of a NSABB synthetic genomics working group meeting at the time.   During 
this meeting , a representative from the US Executive Office who had  been ‘playing a very 
important role …in helping shepherd [the NSABB] report into the system’ (David Relman 
NSABB 2007, 4) gave a presentation on how the report had been understood and responded 
to. First, he highlighted that the NSABB’s call for the US government to develop 
polynucleotide synthesis screening practices (comments of Ben Pietro, NSABB 2007, 22–
23), could be interpreted ( and indeed had been) as a call for the development of  regulatory 
framework.79 He noted, however, that there were alternative approaches to regulation and that 
regulation was not in line with thinking in the Executive Office. Furthermore, he outlined the 
extent to which the Executive Office was taking the lead from the Sloan Report process, 
stating that the inter-agency process to develop screening standards would draw on: 
‘policy option reports pertaining to screening that have been developed by folks out at 
UC Berkley, the Sloan Foundation funded study at MIT, JVI, CSUS, and also some 
other publicly forwarded options for consideration.’(Comments from Ben Pietro 
NSABB 2007, 23) 
It was in this context that governance initiatives would emerge in relation to polynucleotide 
synthesis technologies within the US. A context in which the US government were unwilling 
to take the lead, or develop regulation directed at the issue.  
                                                            
79
  The recommendations themselves are ambiguous in relation to this point.  Calling for the USG to work 
with others to develop screening practice standards- but not outlining how such a system should be 
enforced, or whether government departments should be legally mandated to develop and implement 
such standards.  
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4.4.2 Industry Stream Emergence and Initiatives 2006-2010 
By late 2006 a consensus had emerged in which industry was envisaged as central 
gatekeepers in a system designed to keep dangerous gene sequences out of the hands of 
terrorists.80 This had been reflected in discussion in both the academic and federal streams. 
The details of the role of industry in this system were yet to be worked out at a federal level; 
however it was clear at this early stage that it would take time for the USG to produce the 
guidance requested by the 2006 synthetic genomics report. Meanwhile, industry was 
beginning to organise into associations. The first of these was the International Consortium 
for Polynucleotide Synthesis (ICPS), an industry association which included Geneart, Codon 
Devices, Blue Heron, and Codagenomics Codon devises. Within this organisation there were 
three key individuals with an interest in biosecurity issues associated with synthetic 
genomics. Leading scientists George Church and Drew Endy had already been prominent in 
biosecurity discussions. The third individual was John Mulligan who was President and CEO 
of Blue Heron Biotechnology, an individual who had already been active in the federal policy 
stream. Blue Heron were also acting as a test bed for a software development and data 
analysis interested in developing sequence screening software (CRAIC computing).  
The ICPS published a policy proposal in 2007 in Nature (Bügl et al. 2007) . The purpose of 
this document was to cement the role of the ICPS in the development and implementation of 
biosecurity governance. This was reflected in the way the policy proposal was presented, as 
well as the content of the policy proposal. In the 2007 publication, it is apparent that those 
involved wished to present themselves as taking the lead in the development of policy in 
relation to the dual-use issue. In the document there is no mention of activities in the federal 
stream, specifically the synthetic genomics working group, which was advocating a similar 
                                                            
80
  This was also reflected in FBI outreach projects to Industry and the acamdemic community at this time.  
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approach to the one outlined in the document.81 In relation to the policy proposals 
themselves, it is worth noting that the only other policy option discussed is that of George 
Church which is categorized as ‘impractical’ without further justification.  
Reflection upon this early ICPS initiative is revealing in relation to the principles that would 
continue to shape industries engagement with the issue. The first question relates to the 
motivations of industry to engage with the governance of dual-use technology. One argument 
is that even engaged aspects of industry were still quite ignorant to existing responsibilities 
under existing US law, and this was worried them.  Those following the work of the NSABB 
working group would have been aware that aspects of the gene synthesis Industry may have 
unwittingly been contravening select-agent law by sending unknown biological substances by 
post, and second in the context of inadequate screening practices, may have also been 
unwittingly producing, handling and transporting materials covered under select-agent 
regulations without legal authorisation.82 This was perhaps enough in itself for leading 
aspects of industry to wish to get their houses in order. The second motivation was the need 
to represent industries’ interests in the development of the emerging governance system 
directed at polynucleotide synthesis which was under discussion at a federal level. A final 
incentive was that there were perhaps competitive advantage and financial reward to be 
gained by industry who engaged with the biosecurity issue early (Maurer 2011, 1431). This 
perspective was based on a reassurance from prominent aspects of the synthetic biology 
community that researchers would only deal with industries that screen, as well as the 
prospect that the USG (more specifically it’s scientific funding bodies) would ensure that that 
                                                            
81  Those involved in the drafting of this document had been actively involved in WG process.   
82  This is because DNA Synthesisers may have been producing sequences were in themselves infectious. 
….Such genomes include RNA viruses that are in message sense, DNA viruses that do not require a 
special viral enzyme to replicate and nucleic acids that, if inserted in the appropriate host system, can 
create a fully functional toxin (Attachment 2). Accordingly, synthesized genomes and toxin expression 




all publicly funded researchers follow suit in this regard.83  A further incentive was the 
prospect that leading aspects of the industry could secure biosecurity funding from 
government to development proprietary practices, which would also provide a source of 
revenue and a competitive edge. The second set of observations relate to how industry 
pursued interest in relation to the dual-use issue. There were two facets to industry 
engagement with this issue area.  
The first was through the federal track; industry certainly helped refine the scope of the 
problem definition and the closely related process of policy selection by providing technical 
expertise on the feasibility of policy responses.  However, a second facet of this approach 
was more of that or a primary securitizing actor- this is in the sense that industry established 
its own channel of policy development. Both sets of activities provided the context of the 
next major round of political activity directed at the polynucleotide synthesis sector.  
Despite these early successes however, when funds failed to materialise for the ICPS it 
appeared increasing likely that little would happen in a US context in relation the 
development and implementation of industry standards until the USG produced its guidance. 
However it would be developments outside of the US which would serve to motivate further 
development in policy discussion in late 2009. These developments would also have more 
fundamental impacts on the politics of the industry stream of policy development. In the 
following section there is an examination of the process by which the emergence of the 
ISAB, a European gene synthesis consortium, would impact on the US industry policy 
stream, as well as the consequences of this.  
                                                            
83   The NSABB report of 2006 (NSABB 2010a)  recommended that the government should require federal 
grantees and contractors to order from providers that screen and retain information about requests for 
Select Agent sequences following standards and practices developed by relevant federal agencies (See 
2.1.1 – 2.1.4). 
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5.4.2 The impact of the European Industry Association on the US Industry 
Stream 
In April 2008, representatives of the founding members of the ICPS were invited to a 
workshop run by the Industry Association of Synthetic Biology (IASB).84 The IASB had 
been established in 2007 by a handful of European synthesis companies,85 many of these 
individuals involved had also contributed to the Sloan funded report (Rabinow and Bennett 
2012, 144). The founding members of the institute had been considering the establishment of 
some form of industry association since early 2006, to help ensure the continued development 
of the field. Some of these members also had a particular interest in biosecurity issues, in the 
context of concerns in both the US and the EU.86 This concern extended not only to the 
requirement for responsibility within the industry, but also the requirement to ensure against 
public backlashes against the industry.87 The meeting resulted in the establishment of a work-
package of activities to be undertaken by the members. The IASB approach jarred with the 
thinking of some pioneering US companies in two senses. The first related to the way in 
which the IASB went about developing policy and engaged with other stakeholders. The 
second related to the nature of policy proposals. Added to these disagreements, growing 
support within key circles within the US for the ISAB approach threatened to undermine the 
control the pioneer US industry had to set the terms of industry stream governance. This 
resulted in a period characterised as a ‘standards war’, which is now examined.  
                                                            
84
  This would be one of the last publicly known activities of the ICPS, which quietly folded soon after 
IASB workshop 
85  ATG:Biosynthetics GmbH, Biomax Informatics AG, Entelechon GmbH, febit synbio GmbH, MWG 
Biotech AG and Sloning BioTechnology GmbH  (Bernauer et al.. 2008) 
86   In 2006, the Guardian conducted a similar piece of investigative journalism to the New Scientist which 
had brought to public attention the nature of industry screening practices my placing an order for part 
of the small pox genome, it found that  ‘one did not screen customers or sequences, one carried out 
checks on customers only and a third checked customers and had carried out a pilot study on screening 
DNA orders but is not currently doing so’. (Randerson 2006) 
87
  Interview with industry representative. On file with Author.  
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In the context of the failed ICPS initiative there was an awareness within engaged aspects of 
the synthesis industry that there was still the need for development of screening practices in 
both the US and Europe.88  However, it appeared at least for a short time post-2007 as if these 
companies would no longer pursue their interest in the industry stream of policy development 
and instead focus on impacting upon the slower moving federal stream when it was felt 
necessary.  However, following this false start, events in Europe would serve to motivate a 
restart of the US industry stream of policy development. The announcement of the ISAB 
work package had been well received by Nature in an editorial in September 2008, which 
made no reference to the work of the US based ICPS initiative (Nature 2008). Added to this 
the decision89 of the ISAB to attend the BTWC,90 had also contributed to the initiative being 
tracked by interested aspects of the US security community. Such a situation must have been 
troubling for engaged aspects of the industry that now faced the prospect of another 
organisation filling the vacuum in the US industry stream left by the petering out of the ICPS 
initiative. Importantly, the organisational structure and modus operandi was also different to 
that of the ICPS, being more inclusive of broader stakeholder input than the corporatist 
approach of the ICPS. Added to this, the ISAB’s support for the use of a human expert as part 
of the screening process was also disconcerting for some aspects of industry which felt that a 
human step in the screening process would unnecessarily slow orders and add extra expense. 
These factors were enough to motivate Gene-art91 in collaboration with the US firm DNA. 
2.0 to react with a counterproposal (Check Hayden 2009). This proposal was not well 
received, and was dead within a matter of weeks.  
                                                            
88
  Especially Blue Heron, and Integrated DNA Technologies who had been involved with the ICPS 
proposal.  
89  An action encouraged by  Professor Kathyrn Nixdorff at an IASB meeting  (Bernauer et al.. 2008, 18) 
90  At the 2008 MSP Germany submitted the ISAB code of conduct as a working paper 




  Gene-art, a German company, destined to be bought out by the international biotech firm ‘Life 
technologies’ which had been involved in the first ICPS biosecurity initiative 
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The reasons for the failure of the Gene-art/ DNA 2.0 proposal are revealing about the role of 
industry as a secondary securitising actor, and the constraining forces which acted upon it 
within the industry stream of policy making.  Since 2006, it had been apparent that the main 
role of industry in dual-use governance would be to implement some sort of screening. It was 
also apparent that industry could be expected to exert some influence in the development of 
this policy. However, between the 2007 ICPS proposals and the summer of 2009, there had 
been some fundamental changes in the politics of the US industry stream which were 
underpinned by work at the IASB and the appeal that the approach had to US policy-shapers. 
Essentially, the work of the IASB had become a type of gold-standard against which any 
proposals could now be evaluated. This gold standard included both technical criteria, such as 
the use of a human screening stage, as well as political criteria such as inclusivity and 
openness, which has been absent in the first US ICPS proposals. This then suggests a 
potential for a very real impact of European industry security practices and politics upon the 
politics of US biosecurity.  
As a consequence, in order for Gene-art/ DNA 2.0 to impact in this, they were forced to 
develop a second proposal, in collaboration with several other of the largest gene-synthesis 
providers, a collaboration undoubtedly galvanised by the pace of developments in Europe. 
This proposal closely resembled that of the ISAB with regard to the technical requirements it 
placed upon industry.  
So to sum up, prominent aspects of industry, in collaboration with leading aspects of the 
synthetic biology managed to establish a novel channel of policy development and 
implementation in the context of community action at S.B 2. In many ways this channel 
initially held the promise of escaping some of the political and procedural realities that 
frustrated the development of policy in both the academic and federal streams. This act was 
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‘primary’ in nature as it opened up a political channel of policy development that bypassed 
the understood political realities at the time in the name of security. However the act was also 
secondary as once the fissure had been conceived, the ICPS proposed specific policies to be 
implemented through this channel. Ultimately the ICPS would succeed as a primary 
securitizing actor as it established the industry channel of policy development, making such 
processes appear a feasible political reality. In the second sense however, as a secondary 
securitization actor the ICPS proposal failed to reach the implementation stage.  
Once established however, the industry channel did not exist in a static political domain and 
US perspectives on activities of the ISAB in Europe modified the expectations upon industry 
as an implementer of security policy within the US. It would be the drafting of the federal 
guidelines on screening which would be the next major event that impacted upon the politics 
within this channel.  
5.4.3 US Inter-Agency Process and Federal Guidance on Screening Practices 
2007-2010 
In this final section, the process, politics and outcomes of the US federal track of dual-use 
technology governance activities in the period 2006-2011 are examined. This period 
essentially involves studying the way in which recommendations from the 2006 NSABB 
report were translated into policy outcomes. The major part of this response came in the form 
of an NSC inter-agency process which led ultimately, after public consultation, to the 
publication of ‘Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded 
DNA’ (Department of Health and Human Services 2010).92  These guidelines are analytically 
                                                            
92
  The second part of the response involved a National academies report  entitled  ‘Sequence-Based 
Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line’.  The purpose of this report was to examine the 
scientific and technical developments required to develop a means to improve existing select-agent 
characterisation systems ( which rely largely on physiological characterises) which were being 
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interesting as they represent the culmination of US government activities directed at the 
immediate dual-use technology problem associated with the emerging gene-synthesis. This 
provides a moment upon which to reflect upon the role of the US government played in the 
overall process of policy development in relation to the issue.  
An interesting observation in that academic and press coverage on the emergence of federal 
guidelines has been divisive. Some placed a positive emphasis on collaboration between 
government and industry in the development of standards. However, others worried that the 
government had been cowed into action that was too lax (Bhattacharjee 2009). The arms 
control community in particular favoured the latter view suggesting that the government had 
adopted a moderate approach to defining and responding to the risk.  For example, it was 
suggested that the guidelines only covered double-stranded DNA (neglecting the threat posed 
by single stranded DNA viruses or the construction of viruses from multiple ssDNA orders 
(i.e. oligos)). It was also highlighted that the guidance was voluntary rather than legally 
binding, based on the assumption that NIH enforcement would be enough to ensure 
compliance. It was also claimed that the government’s screening protocol was weaker than 
the ones currently favoured by industry (See for example: Maurer 2011; Ledford 2010; 
Eisenstein 2010).  
Within the US context, since at least the NSABB report on synthetic genomics, there had 
been an expectation that more far ranging and enforceable controls will be developed at 
federal level in relation to gene-synthesis technology within some circles. However, the 
primary response at federal level has been voluntary guidelines which are narrow in scope. 
This raises some interesting questions. The first set relate to why it was assumed the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
undermined by the ability of scientists to genetically modify and hybridise  bacterium and select-
agents, blurring the line between what constituted a select-agent and what did not. 
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government would favour strong forward-looking regulation. The second relates to why the 
government have not adopted such an approach.  
In relation to the first point, the characterisation of the government as ‘pro-regulation’ 
stemmed from two primary areas. First, within the public health domain, the bio-defence 
community in particular had repeatedly pointed out the dangers of federal over-regulation of 
the biosciences (For example Franz et al. 2009). This created an environment in which 
discussion of dual-use research regulation had become polarised. Within the NEST domain 
the ETC’s involvement with the academic stream of policy development also led to the 
characterisation of the political situation as involving a dichotomy between technological 
innovators who were opposed to government regulation, and the state, which if pressed, 
would bring regulation to bear on safety and security issues.  Added to this the announcement 
that the US government would develop guidelines through the National Security Council 
Interagency Process further cemented outside perspectives that the US government was 
looking to implement strong policy informed by national security over the longer term - 
naturally such perspectives were informed by the draconian national security responses of the 
post-9/11 era.  In the context of the pro-regulation characterisation of the national security 
community at the time, it appeared likely that this process would become a gateway into 
stricter regulation of industry in the name of national security.   
 It is clear, however, that such perspectives do not reflect the current US approach to the 
regulation of cutting-edge dual-use technology and the fact that federal engagement with the 
interagency process has not become the basis for further federal initiatives to regulate the 
field, is testament to this. This then leads to questions about the actual nature of the federal 
track of policy development.  
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Upon further investigation into the interagency process, it becomes apparent why the federal 
track has favoured moderation, rather than more draconian measures. First, it was public 
health rather than homeland security institutions which took the lead on this issue. The 
interagency process was established by the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy and the National Security Council; however it would be the HHS93 which would be 
tasked with taking the lead on this issue. The reasons for this decision were not made 
explicitly in public, but the decision reflected the prevailing wisdom at the time which 
prioritised the role of the HHS for three reasons. First, the HHS, through the work of the 
NSABB, had been key to the emergence of the issue of gene-synthesis oversight on federal 
agendas. Second, the HHS already had substantial governance competencies and expertise in 
biosafety and select-agent oversight through its sub-departments. These two areas of 
governance were understood to be of central importance to the oversight of dual-use 
technology following activities in both the academic, federal and industry tracks. Added to 
this, the HHS had already been identified as a key institution in ensuring compliance within 
industry and the scientific community. The department were and continue to be the main 
funder of scientific research in the fields of public health and bio-defence within the US.   
With the HHS in charge, the development within the federal track would continue to reflect 
the consensus and technical episteme that had emerged within leading aspects of the 
academic and industrial community, which had repeatedly asserted itself against a regulatory 
approach, and so limited the definition of the dual-use issue to those risks which could be 
addressed by screening focused approaches. The public health community were, after all, 
keen to ensure that vital public health and biodefense research could take place in a way that 
was not unduly fettered by novel regulation; there was also a faith within leading aspects of 
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  Specifically, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) at the US Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) 
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the public health and biodefense community that community based approaches (as seen in 
biosafety) preferable to the implementation of new, untested and possibly cumbersome 
regulations.   
5.4.4 Conclusion: Gene Synthesis Technologies and the Politics of Security 
The analysis above has highlighted in some detail the answers to the questions of who 
securitises how, and with what effects in the US context. Before moving on to the discussion 
of the securitisation of dual-use research it is worth making a few remarks to sum up this 
process.  
In relation to the question of who generates security policy with relation to the issue, the 
answer appears to be that consensus between the scientific community, industry and the 
government has meant the securitization should be understood as a collective activity 
between these actors. The construction of consensus however relied on a dynamic in which 
the threat of government enabled coalitions to form between industry and academia which 
lead to the development of a model of oversight, embedded in assumptions about science and 
technology drawn from an episteme developed during the major ELSI initiatives within the 
field. Later on, developments in Europe would also motivate industry to re-assert its role as 
the predominant secondary securitizer within the field. This role would be cemented by 
activities in the federal stream which resulted in the release federal guidance. This left future 
policy develop in this area reliant on the actions of industry in the foreseeable future.  
In relation to the question of ‘how’ actors securitized, there were attempts at both primary as 
well as secondary securitization. The initial attempt by Maurer to create a channel of primary 
securitization failed on its own terms, however it would serve to facilitate securitization in 
other channels that emerged. The activities of the ICPS represent an example of successful 
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primary securitization, as it resulted in an industrial channel of policy development emerging, 
however these early actions failed as an act of secondary securitization.   
In relation to the question of what was securitized it is apparent the emergence as well as 
scope of dual-use technology, securitization was dependent on a focus on industry as a 
central gate-keep in biosecurity. This focus meant that later discussions focused the 
development of scientific conventions for risk assessment as well as screening practices once 
this framing became dominant. The dominance of this model led to the externalisation of 
broader and more forward-looking concerns from politics in relation to this issue.  
5.5 Dual-Use Research and the Politics of Security  
The academic field of synthetic biology has received a disproportionate level of attention as a 
source of dual-use concern within the US, compared to other contemporary emerging techno-
scientific fields. This raises the question: why do concerns about the dual-use nature of gene-
synthesis technologies and more general concerns about biomedical research come to focus 
on the broader field of synthetic biology? For example, the field of nanobiotechnology is 
contemporary to synthetic biology and is very similar in organisation as well the 
technological and epistemic aims of researchers involved. Added to this, some branches of 
the field are also dependent on foundational gene-synthesis technologies in a comparable way 
to some sub-fields of synthetic biology.  
The reasons for this discrepancy stem from institutional links between emerging gene-
synthesis technologies and the emerging academic field of synthetic biology in the early to 
mid-2000s.  In the early 2000s George Church, Craig Venter and Drew Endy (who would 
become fundamental to the emergence of the field of synthetic biology) had already been 
involved in high-level dual-use discussions about viral synthesis technologies and techniques. 
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This in itself could have been enough to provide a ‘bleed’ of dual-use concerns from 
polynucleotide synthesis technologies to the broader field of synthetic biology. However, this 
in of itself did not provide a forum for such discussions to take hold. Instead, it was initiatives 
within the NEST domain94 which would prove fundamental to cementing broader dual-use 
concerns on the US ELSI agendas as early as 2004. This, it must also be noted, represented 
the first ever major engagement of ELSI researchers with dual-use issues. The announcement 
that NSABB Synthetic Genomics Working Group would also be turning its attention to 
broader aspects of the field of synthetic biology once it completed its work on polynucleotide 
synthesis technologies also undoubtedly provided an extra incentive to keep the issue on the 
ELSI agenda in the US context in this early period.  
This institutionalisation contributed to initiatives which discussed the broader dual-use 
potentials of synthetic biology. These discussions would go far beyond immediate concerns 
about the misuse of polynucleotide synthesis technologies by terrorists. They would also 
inspire academic analysis which was more anticipatory, and reflect on a broader range of 
misuse scenarios - including importantly the misuse of the field by states. However, as now 
should be clear, secondary securitization does not equate simply to the rhetorical labelling of 
an aspect of a field as being as a security concern by certain actors. It also involves the 
development of policy directed at that aspect, which makes that aspect subject to a risk 
governance regime.  
Rabinow and Bennet argue that there have been no standards developed to allow for the dual-
use issue to be converted into a mangle risk which is the assumed aim of the institutions and 
actors they study (2012, 158). To this end, they argue that current dual-use policies, 
particularly those of scientific self-governance are actually pre-emptive of further 
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  Primary in the form of meetings and commissioned research which led to a series of reports and other 
documents Including: (Garfinkel et al. 2007; S. M. Maurer, Lucas, and Terrell 2006) 
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intervention that may redress the broader issue of the requirement for regulator to engage 
‘upstream’ with the innovation process. To place this idea in terms of arguments developed in 
chapters two and three, this essentially equates to the claim that in the absence of the political 
and institutional tools to redress broader dual-use issues, the only issues currently being 
turned into risks requiring a response are those that are already been addressed under existing 
governance frameworks, or can be addressed in the immediate future through the incremental 
(and modest) changes to these systems. This cordons off a large range of dual-use concerns 
that cannot be dealt with through existing knowledge, material and technology containment 
systems.  
For two reasons however, it is likely that ELSI assessment activities will have been of some 
political consequence in the study of the securitization of dual-use research. First, such 
activities have encouraged the engagement of other actors through raising the profile of the 
field and bringing different assessment rationales to bear which may challenge the dominant 
discourse. Second, there have been political developments outside of the field of synthetic 
biology that ELSI activities (and associated capacities) seem to have fed into95. In the 
following section questions about the role of such engagement is of central importance in the 
study of the political process that has given rise to the securitization of specific dual-use 
aspects of synthetic biology research.  
5.5.1 The NSABB and the Governance of Dual-use Synthetic Biology Research 
In 2007, the NSABB published a report on the ‘Proposed Framework for the Oversight of 
Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research 
Information’ The report essentially called for existing Institutional Biosafety Committees, in 
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  Referring back a point made at the beginning of the chapter,  when looking out from synthetic biology 
community as an analysis, there is likely a  tendency to underplay the political reconfigurations that 
occur outside a field as it develops 
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state funded institutions, to address dual-use concerns as part of the normal internal review 
process which ensured that the institution was in-keeping with relevant guidelines related to 
biosafety. These recommendations were deemed inadequate within some non-proliferation 
and civil society circles. These concerns were, in part, based on a general mistrust of the 
transparency and legitimacy of biosafety oversight, but also concerns that this approach 
would act to placate broader concerns about state-level bio-defence research on dangerous 
pathogens, or focused too narrowly on single experiments rather than trends in biotechnology 
innovation (see for example Sunshine Project 2006) . In the context of the emerging field of 
synthetic biology however such critiques would matter little. As the NSABB model would 
have substantial impact on the evaluation of scope of misuse risks in the coming years. 
5.5.2 The Sloan Report  
The Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance report (often referred to as the Sloan 
Report) (Garfinkel et al. 2007), represents the most substantial publicly available 
investigation into the broader dual-use implications of the emerging field of synthetic 
biology. The ninety-six page document emerged out of a twenty month process, and involved 
a central panel of twelve experts, six commissioned academic papers and three invitation-
only meetings. The Sloan Report adopted a framing of identifying dual-use risks associated 
with synthetic biology research which closely followed that of the 2006 NSABB report. 
Specifically in relation to the issue of research oversight, the starting assumption of the Sloan 
Report is that the principle investigator of a scientific project is best placed to identify and 
address risks associated with his work in the context of appropriate institutional support and 
oversight (specifically institutional biosafety bodies). On the basis of this assumption, the 
Synthetic Genomics report externalised broader aspects of the dual-use issue which could not 
be identified and dealt with at this intervention point. Specifically, this excluded the issue of 
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the contribution of the field to state-level weapon development or, more long term 
contributions of single experiments to misuse scenarios which were not likely to be 
foreseeable during the IBC process.  
As the Sloan research group had utilised the same starting assumptions about the nature of 
the dual-use issue proffered by the NSABB, when examining the field for dual-use potential, 
it is then unsurprising that this investigation did not reveal any scientific development that 
generated challenges significant enough to bring into question the NSABB’s proposed model.  
Added to this, as the Synthetic Genomics Working Group would draw heavily on the 
expertise and framing of dual-use synthetic biology developed during the Sloan report 
process, this inevitably lead to a bias which precluded the NSABB group from identifying 
broader dual-use concerns which could not feasibly be dealt with under its proposed 
oversight framework.   
The experiences of the working group led to two substantial conclusions relevant to the 
continuing governance of the field of synthetic biology and the governance of emerging 
biotechnologies more generally, which were communicated in a 2010 report. First, the group 
found that the oversight framework the NSABB had proposed back in 2006 could adequately 
address the current biosecurity concerns raised by the field of synthetic biology.  This also 
served to validate the framework in terms of its ability to handle the challenges presented by 
emerging scientific fields, to this end the NSABB also reasserted the requirement for the 
government to implement its recommended framework. 
Indeed, since 2006 whenever developments in either politics96 or science and technology 
appeared to challenge the suitability of the proposed NSABB model, the assigned working 
                                                            




groups focussed on clarifying or amending and supplementing their favoured approach, rather 
than question it. The field of synthetic biology, as the first major test case for the NSABB, 
raised several issues which the NSABB understood should be addressed in order to sustain 
the viability of its proposed framework which focuses on the responsibility of the scientific 
community; specifically the issues of:  
1) non-life scientists entering the field,  
2) the emergence of the amateur community, the  
3) international spread of the field as well as the  
4)Rapid pace of the development of scientific and technical capabilities.  
The way in which the NSABB working group chose to address these issues is now discussed. 
I argue that these recommendations have limited impacts on the scope of synthetic biology 
which is likely to be the subject of dual-use review at institutional level in the near term in the 
US context, despite the appearance of the NSABB to be engaging with broader more 
forward-looking concerns. It is worth reiterating is even in respect to a relatively narrow 
range of the broader dual-use problem that the NSABB has concerned itself with, which by 
and large relate to terrorist misuse scenarios.  
5.5.3 The Impacts of the “Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic 
Biology” Report 
Over a period of several years, the Synthetic Genomics Working Group had been examining 
the nascent field of synthetic biology as a source of dual-use concern. In-keeping with the 
trend set by  the Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance Report the primary focus of 
the investigation was the approaches currently being championed at leading US institutions, 
specific top-down and bottom-up approaches to engineering biotechnologies (NSABB 2010b, 
8). This scope was actually quite narrow, neglecting broader aspects of the field including 
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research lines directed at proto-cell creation, the development of unnatural components as 
well as research on synthetic microbial consortia, which were in part ignored due to the 
infancy of these approaches and the absence of immediately foreseeable misuse scenarios 
(NSABB 2010b, 16). A trend that had been set in the Sloan Report and would be repeated in 
the 2010 presidential report on bioethical issues.  
The 2010 report highlighted several challenges raised by the field of synthetic biology. First, 
was the idea synthetic biology innovation was occurring outside of federally funded life 
science labs. This potentially challenged the existing approach to biosafety oversight which 
focused primarily on NIH guidelines for laboratories. Second, the convergent nature of the 
field meant that researchers from non-biological backgrounds, and importantly without NIH 
association or biosafety training, may potentially become PI’s in synthetic biology research. 
Added to this the field appeared to be moving not only out of the labs into industry, but also 
into the hands of amateurs. This meant that the main institutional infrastructure that the 
NSABB model was dependent on was absent. The response of the NSABB was to call for 
outreach to these communities, and the requirement to make industry and the amateur 
community subject to some form of local-level institutional review.  Substantial federal 
support will be needed to aid and ensure the implementation of this across these contexts- 
which will not only involve educational impacts but other forms of intervention to ensure 
these communities are given appropriate levels of support to discharge these responsibilities. 
Currently, while there are examples of more substantial initiatives, such as  those developed 
by the FBI - these are largely proof of concept-type initiatives.  
The second major issue, related to the ability of the oversight system to respond to; trends in 
the practice of scientific research, as well as, the augmenting qualities of emerging 
foundation technologies and scientific discoveries on researcher capabilities. A case in point, 
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was the ability of institutions to identify, monitor and respond to trends in synthetic biology 
which may cause a dual-use concern. The 2010 report on synthetic biology identified such 
trends; specifically the emerging amateur community as well as emerging foundational 
technologies. However, the recommendations of the working group had been greatly 
facilitated by evidence and working relationships developed during the the Sloan Report 
process.  In this context, the call for a federal tech-watch initiatives within the 2010 report is 
not unsurprising and reflects an appreciation of the absence of federal attention and support to 
examine to more forward-looking issues.  
5.5.4 Conclusions: Dual-Use Research 2006-2010  
So far it has been argued that the NSABB and ELSI projects which have assessed the 
emerging fields have adopted a specific framing of dual-use issues. This has been as a result 
of the NSABB’s pragmatic approach to defining the scope of the dual-use research problem. 
While the NSABB approach has yet to be implemented97 in relation to state-funded research 
institutions dealing with non-classified research, the assumption remains that this model can 
be rolled out across industry and the emerging amateur community. As a result the NSABB 
approach can only respond to a limited range of dual-use concerns. This specifically involves 
scenarios in which single pieces of research raise ‘obvious’ dual-use concerns when dutifully 
assessed against the NSABB’s recommended rubrics. This approach is designed to keep the 
results of dangerous research (both biological materials as well as information) out of the 
hands of terrorist groups. Even if the approach was to be implemented in the ways most 
optimally envisaged, the approach can still only a dress a narrow range of scenarios of 
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  It is of course possible to argue that the activities of the NSABB and the patchwork of education 
projects that emerged have insured that is already a de-facto system of screening within the field of 
synthetic biology- in keeping with arguments made by Maurer back in 2006, in relation the engaged 
and informed nature of the biosecurity community.  However such arguments seem rather misleading 
as even if generous assumption are made about the levels of awareness of dual-use issues, this does not 
constitute the institutional capacity to identify and respond to issues. 
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terrorist misuse. This is because it involves a screening system which adopts a case by case 
approach with no formal requirements for institutions to report research of dual-use concern 
to higher institutions. This suggests that it is unlikely that challenges beyond the immediate 
foresight of local institutions will be identified and brought under the scope of dual-use 
governance. As has already been highlighted however, the adoption of the limited NSABB 
heuristic by the Sloan Report, suggests that it is unlikely that other institutions with the 
potential capacity to construct dual-use risks, will generate concerns beyond those which can 
be addressed by the existing system (for example the proposed tech-watch schemes). The 
work of the NSABB then represents the establishment of a pre-dominant episteme of dual-
use governance within the US context - which appropriates biosafety modes of risk framing 
and management in the name of nation security. Undoubtedly then, the work of the NSABB 
has shifted the focus of dual-use politics firmly away from state-level regulatory intervention 
and instead diffused responsibility for the issue within the scientific community and 
increasing industry and the amateur community.  
5.6 The Prospect of Reinvigorating Techno-Science Governance 2009-2012  
So far, discussion has emphasised the way in which narrow- and pragmatic-guided problem 
framings have emerged within community and government level political process. In this 
final section there is a more cross-cutting analysis based upon recent developments which 
potentially suggest a revival in interest of broader range of concerns, as discussed in the early 
Maurer report in relation to the techno-science of Synthetic biology within the US.  These 
developments do not only stem from the NEST domain, where the concept of a dual-use 
techno-science first entered the political discourse, but also the involvement new actors with 
the funding and governance of the field. In the following section two types of development 
are discussed. The first relates to the promise of a new form of politics in relation to 
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governance of dual-use synthetic biology and is a direct response to the 2010 President’s 
Council on Bioethical Issues (PCBI) report on synthetic biology. The second relates to more 
incremental developments in dual-use governance in recent years which reflect the 
predominance of existing dual-use problem framings.  
The PCBI report was optimistic about the role it could perform in changing the prevailing 
approach to US governance of the field of synthetic biology. The report states that:  
‘President Obama gave the Commission a rare and exceptional opportunity in the 
world of presidential bioethics commissions to be forward looking instead of reactive. 
We are ahead of the emerging science, and this unique opportunity underscores the 
need for the government to act now to ensure a regular, ongoing process of review as 
the science develops’ (Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
2010, 3).  
To this end the report made several recommendations which were designed to ensure that the 
emerging field of synthetic biology was governed in order to be in keeping with 5 ethi-
political principles: (1) Public beneficence, (2) responsible stewardship, (3) intellectual 
freedom and responsibility, (4) democratic deliberation, and (5) justice and fairness.  In 
relation to dual-use issues the report found no need for new regulations or institutions, it did 
however, argue that there was a need for wholesale re-evaluation of existing federal 
approaches to risk assessment because of the ‘difficulty of risk analysis in the face of 
uncertainty—particularly for low-probability, potentially high-impact events in an emerging 
field’. The report also called for specific attention to be paid to developments in the practice 
of science which may impact upon the suitability of existing oversight systems. In particular, 
the movement of life science research out of state-funded laboratories and into the hands of 
industry and amateur scientists. Such recommendations suggest the possibility of broader 
framing of the dual-use issue emerging within the US discourse, in which the government 
plays a greater role in facilitating, developing and implementing more anticipatory 
approaches to governance. Indeed, this has been epitomised most clearly by the work of 
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scholars at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, who have produced an online ‘score-card’ to assess 
federal activities in relation to the 18 recommendations made by the PCBI.98 The 
recommendations also repeatedly refer to the prospect of engineering biosafety and 
biosecurity into emerging technologies, as well as the prospect that synthetic biology can 
provide novel technologies to manage safety and security risks - an important driver in 
motivating interest, particularity within the scientific community, in dual-use issues within 
the US in previous decade. The report also alludes to the new synergies that have emerged 
between security and law enforcement communities with academic, industry and the amateur 
community. This has involved a handful of proof of concept initiatives, such as FBI 
involvement in IGEM, amateur community outreach as well as a biosecurity hotline.  Added 
to this, developments at SynBERC could also be interpreted as move towards improved bio-
risk identification and management. In 2010, Rabinow was asked to step down as head of the 
ELSI thrust of SynBERC, the reason given by the NSF was that the thrust had paid 
insufficient attention to ‘biorisks’ (Stavrianakis 2012, 163). 
However, there is certainly cause for some pessimism in relation to the prospect of a new era 
of dual-use governance. First, there has been an absence of federal action in response to the 
recommendations made by the PCBI report. The Woodrow Wilson centre have reported 
minimal federal activities, with many of these activities pre-dating the PCBI report (Wadman 
2012).  Second, research conducted by Rabinow and others at SynBERC has drawn attention 
to the challenges of anticipatory governance within this institution. In particular it has drawn 
attention to the entrenched values within the scientific community and research institutions 
which prevent the transformation of innovation practices in order to identify and address 
misuse concerns (Rabinow and Bennett 2012; Stavrianakis 2012).  For example they have 
reasserted the idea that concerns about misuse and broader societal effects are currently 
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externalised from the innovation process (Rabinow and Bennett 2012, 153).  Stavrianakis has 
gone even further than this, warning that the growth of attention to the idea of bio-risk 
management in recent years is in fact tantamount to a retreat within the SynBERC institution 
towards public engagement and reassurance within its ELSI thrust (Stavrianakis 2012, 155).  
These observations raise some interesting questions about the relationship between such risk-
assessment and the prospect of anticipatory dual-use governance - an idea discussed in the 
final chapters.  
A second cause for pessimism has been the narrow range of misuse scenarios currently 
addressed within the US discourse. For example, the PCBI report only discusses the issue of 
bioterrorism, and did not reflect on broader aspects of the field than the NSABB did in its 
2010 report. This narrow problemisation is also reflected in the way in which the BTWC is 
not referred to as an appropriate international forum for the US to pursue discussions about 
the misuse potential of the field of synthetic biology. This suggests the continued pre-
dominance of the NSABB conceptualisation of the dual-use problem within US politics in the 
foreseeable future. As was argued in the previous section, the consequence of this will be a 
continued narrow experiment by experiment and technology by technology focus of dual-use 
risk assessment which is not designed to identify or respond to the broader trends in techno-
science. This, for example, includes the proliferation of powerful technologies and the growth 
of the biodefense imperative. In the context of military investment into the field,99 such 
investment will potentially lead to exclusionary technologies in which security controls are 
‘engineering in’ as well research which pushes up against the norms against biological and 
chemical weapons. Such concerns are as pertinent as they were in 2006 and yet remain 
marginalised from US discussion.   
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These observations reveal that the PCBI report may provide a politically useful endorsement 
for actors who are seeking to encourage a more systematic implementation of systemic risk 
assessment rationale in relation to anticipatory biosafety and biosecurity concerns. However 
it has also revealed the challenges of such an endeavour within the existing US institutional 
landscape.  It has also revealed the extent to which rhetoric of transformation in relation to 
innovation processes thorough ‘risk-management’ may actually be understood as a means of 
deferring and externalising many dual-use concerns. 
5.7 Conclusions 
In the study of securitization a key focus has been upon the questions of who securitizes, 
how, under what conditions and with what effects.  Within this chapter each of these 
questions has been attended to and it is worth taking each of these questions in turn before 
further discussion in the comparative and conclusive chapters.  
In relation to the question of who securitizes, it has become clear that several different actors 
have emerged in relation to distinct dual-use aspects of synthetic biology. Not only have 
these actors sought to develop and implement security policies (secondary securitization), but 
they have also sought to alter the political conditions under which policies are developed. It 
has become clear that a coalition of industry and academia have become central to setting the 
agenda and selecting policy options over the previous decade. The NSABB has impacted 
upon the episteme within these communities, particularly with regard to its definition of dual-
use research, but has struggled to pass initiatives which are not supported by industry, 
academia, and ipso facto, the state.  This observation points to the idea that the question of 
‘what’ becomes securitized is closely intertwined with questions of political feasibility, rather 
than being dependent on intrinsic qualities of specific aspects of innovation - a point that will 
become clearer still during comparative analysis.  
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In relation to the question of ‘how’ actors have made issues subject to security governance, 
several trends are evident. The first is that actions have tended to be solution rather than 
problem led. That is to say, in the absence of state intervention, only narrow aspects of the 
dual-use issue which could be addressed with minimum disruption and at minimum cost have 
been considered feasible. Polynucleotide screening is a case in point, as this policy option 
presented a narrowly focused, neat and relatively inexpensive policy option. In contrast, in 
relation to the issue of dual-use research, broad and forward-looking concerns have been 
marginalized as addressing these concerns would require much more developed national 
capacities to identify, respond to and where necessary restrict issues of dual-use concern. 
This means that for now, US discussions remain focused on reactive case by case analysis of 
problem experiments.  A second observation has been that the primary audience of 
securitization activities in a US context has been the government itself. This is in the sense 
that in order to implement preferred security policy options, the engaged aspects of the 
academic and policy community have had to provide government with a feasible policy 
options. An interesting question which remains, however, is the extent to which it would have 
been politically feasible for the US executive to develop or implement regulatory alternatives 
in 2006 without the pre-emptive actions of industry and academia.  There was, after all, 
decreasing public attention to bioterror concerns as well as constant pressure on government 
from the public health domain not to stifle public health and defensive research.  This 
observation points to the idea that policy development and implementation in a US context 
was, by necessity, much more collaborative than polarised. It is this collaborative 
environment which has constituted the conditions under which specific favoured policy 
options have risen to prominence.  
This is not to argue however, that there have not been technical disagreements over the 
implementation of such policy options. In the case of polynucleotide synthesis, these 
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disagreements have manifested in the development of competing standards of screening. 
Such disagreements have not always been of immediate consequence for policy however.   
For example, the NSABB had repeatedly called for the implementation of a federal review 
process for dual-use research of concern. However, during the period analysed within this 
research, the government chose not to implement such recommendations. This observation 
points to the idea that the political landscape of securitization is not just dependent on 
consensus within key policy communities within the policy stream, but also developments 
within the political stream. In this case, it would be events outside of the field of synthetic 
biology specifically concerns over H5N1 gain of function research, which would provide the 
political moment for the implementation of federal review policy in 2012.  This observation 
reminds us that the promises of transformations of the relationships between innovation and 
regulatory systems periodically espoused within the US NEST domain cannot be initiated by 
activities within the field of synthetic biology alone.  
In relation to the question of ‘effects’,  a key idea is that it is possible to distinguish between 
consequences of securitization for the field of synthetic biology , as well as for future 
discussions of dual-use research and technology more generally. For example, it is clear that 
in relation to oligonucleotide synthetises, industry emerged as the pre-eminent actor in the 
development and implementation of security policy. It seems likely, such actions not only 
reflect  the political environment in which they  occurred, but may also in themselves set a 
precedent for industry engagement with dual-use governance in the future.   
In the final two chapters each of these ideas is addressed as more cross-cutting themes are 
developed and analysed.  
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Chapter Six: The Politics and Practice of Dual-Use Governance in the UK 
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6.1 Introduction  
In the UK context, the politics of dual-use governance has been of a sporadic and nebulous 
nature. This, in the sense that there is no central political process, institution or discourse, 
which explicitly ties together activities in the various domains of dual-use governance. As a 
result, the dual-use issue constitutes a vague and uneasy political issue. Within the scientific 
community for example, when the issue is attended to, it tends to be understood as an add-on 
to ethics review activities, or as part of scientists’ ELSI engagement responsibilities. This 
means that many scientists within the synthetic biology community see the dual-use issue 
purely in terms of public engagement, whereas others understand the issue to potentially 
require the development of extra risk management responses.100 That being said, in practical 
terms there exists a real absence of clarity among key stakeholders about the role they can or 
are expected to play in response to a poorly defined issue. As one UK Synthetic biology PI 
stated during an interview when pressed on how to identify and manage the risks presented 
by the field: ‘How do you find it? I find it very very hard to couch these questions’.101  
Likewise in a recent House of Lords meeting, ten years after the emergence of dual-use life 
science issues emerging on agendas it was stated that: 
‘Given the boundaries between pure and applied research, defensive and offensive, 
civilian and military uses are unavoidably blurred. It is also important to better 
integrate biosecurity considerations into current public policy on biotechnology, 
nanotechnology and synthetic biology. I suspect that this is largely missing from 
current policy initiatives in these areas, not least within the European Union 
framework’ (Falkner 2013).   
These initial themes serve to introduce an examination of political processes which have 
generated dual-use governance in the UK. This is in order to address the question of the 
extent to which conceptions, practices and the politics of national security are relevant to 
understanding dual-use governance in the UK. 
                                                            
100  Interview with two leading UK synthetic biologists, On file with Author.  
101   Interview with UK synthetic biology PI, On file with Author.  
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In remainder of this chapter, analysis proceeds in four parts, which reflects the discreet 
policy-generating forums and process which have given rise to dual-use governance activities 
directed at the field of synthetic biology. In the first section there is an examination of how 
synthetic biology was identified as a dual-use techno-science by European and UK funding 
Organisations, as early as 2005. In the following two sections governance activities directed 
specifically at the issues of dual-use technology and dual-use research are individually 
addressed in the period between 2006-2010. Finally, there is an analysis of the governance of 
dual-use techno-science in the period 2010-2012.   
6.2 Dual-use Concerns on the European NEST Agenda (2004-2007) 
 As early as 2003, the major EU funding body of NEST identified the field of synthetic 
biology as area of investment (European Commission 2003). Misuse issues were raised in a 
2005 EU high-level report - and received the lion’s share of commentary in the section of the 
document on potential risks associated with the field. The document would prove to be 
indicative of an emerging problem framing of dual-use issues which was informed by EU 
experiences with genetic modification research and technology.  It was argued within the 
document that synthetic biology research and technology was comparable to, or an extension 
of, existing genetic modification practices. This claim extended to assertions about the way 
the field would be made subject to existing governance regimes. The report states: 
‘In terms of risks, abuses and safety measures, it is not obvious that there is any 
aspect of synthetic biology that is qualitatively different from the way such issues 
apply to biotechnology and genetic modification, aside from the far greater capacity 
for manipulation and control that synthetic biology will afford’(European 
Commission 2005, 18).  
Even at this early stage, however, it was becoming apparent within the NEST domain that 
there might be a need for novel governance interventions (such as industry screening), which 
would create extra responsibilities for emerging industries which provided increasingly 
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complex and tailored biological products. Added to this, the document reveals an assumption 
that discussions of issues, such as dual-use, were likely to be polarised, reflecting a more 
agonistic type of politics. To this end, the document provides ‘for and against’ type 
arguments in relation to potential risks. It also portrays science and technology as both a 
cause and solution to misuse concerns. The document also reveals a concern about knee-jerk 
public opposition to the field by stating that: 
‘Any discussion of the potential risks of a technology as powerful as synthetic biology 
must inevitably sound rather alarming. But it is also important with a new technology 
of this sort to consider also the risks, and indeed the ethics, of not developing 
it’(European Commission 2005, 19). 
Analysis of the document reveals two key issues grounded in tensions found within EU 
NEST politics which continue to be reflected at both European and national level. The first is 
the understood need to reassure the public in relation to concerns which are yet to manifest as 
manageable risks. The second is the absence of capacity to pre-emptively address, rather than 
just discuss, dual-use issues, in a mandated political process - despite increasing pressures on 
relevant industry, funders and scientific community to engage in such processes.  
In relation to the latter point, it is worth noting that dual-use issues entered European NEST 
ethical discourse on the back of US discussions of the field of synthetic biology. In 2004, the 
misuse scenarios circulating in policy circles and the press were American rather than 
European- as were potential models of oversight. The 2005 European Commission report 
identified the issue of bio-warfare, bio-terrorism as well as bio-hacking as relevant dual-use 
scenarios. However, there had been little indication that the UK security community were 
taking such issues seriously enough to warrant significant state intervention in the name of 
national security in the near term at this time;102 nor were there organic community initiatives 
                                                            
102  Instead emphasis had been placed on moderate expansions of Law enforcement responsibilities to 
engage with CBRN misuse concerns against labs, and the need for the scientific community to 
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within the emerging synthetic biology community in relation to the dual-use issue. Indeed the 
European synthetic biology community was yet to materialise (Molyneux-Hodgson and 
Meyer 2009) and there were no publicly known EU based amateur bio-hacking communities.  
This meant dual-use issues existed as a potential societal anxiety, but it seemed unlikely that 
the issue could be converted into a quantifiable and manageable risk in the near term.  In this 
respect, the 2005 NEST document demonstrates that in a European context there existed a 
type of over-hang in which security concerns, along with other risk and ethical concerns 
associated with synthetic biology, were being foreseen, which appeared to outpace the 
emergence of institutional capacity to assess and address these issues.  
The first major European investigation which considered dual-use issues associated with the 
field of synthetic biology was a 2 year EU-FP6 funded project called ‘SynbioSafe’. The 
primary purpose of the SynbioSafe project was to ‘stimulate a debate’103 on the safety and 
ethical aspects of synthetic biology. The project included engagement with the scientific 
community at the S.B3 event, public discussion, consultation with synthetic biology experts 
as well as the production of a series of academic materials on the subject - some of which 
were published in leading science journals such as Nature. This then suggests the early 
incorporation of dual-use concerns into the European ELSI agenda. In the following section 
there is an examination of the extent to which these activities at European level contributed to 
the generation of UK ELSI initiatives directed at dual-use issues.  
6.3 From Europe to the UK: Dual-Use Techno-Science on the ELSI Agenda 
(2006-2008) 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
demonstrate the development of infrastructures of self-governance in relation to the dual-use issue from 
as early as 2003 to prevent the politicisation of the issue 
103
  http://www.synbiosafe.eu/ 
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Shortly after the announcement that the BBSRC were to invest into the field of synthetic 
biology the BBRSC commissioned research into ELSI issues entitled ‘Synthetic Biology: 
Social and Ethical Challenges’ (Balmer and Martin 2008). The report was drafted by scholars 
based at the University of Nottingham. Martin already had an interest in engaging in 
bioweapon and biosecurity issues and also contacts with other UK based scholars who had 
been following the US dual-use biosecurity discussions.104 The report identified three major 
misuse scenarios under discussion within the US, specifically bio hacking, the development 
of new weapons by states, and bioterrorism. The report found that there was a: 
‘require[ment for] a thorough review of existing controls and regulations, and the 
development of new measures, particularly relating to biosafety, environmental 
release and biosecurity’ and further to this that ‘A robust governance framework must 
be in place before the applications of synthetic biology are realised’ (Balmer and 
Martin 2008)  
These sentiments certainly chimed with the 2005 EU NEST report. However, the report also 
reveals emerging tensions within the UK ELSI politics relevant to understanding scope, 
nature and feasibility of dual-use governance within the UK. In the following section there is 
an examination of how US dual-use concerns were imported onto the UK ELSI agenda. 
The first impact that the US governance discourse had in Europe was to raise the dual-use 
issue on the ELSI agenda. Within the US, concerns about the prospect of terrorist use of 
gene-synthesis technology had spread to the broader field of synthetic biology. This spread 
was due, in part, to the US institution relationships between emerging gene-synthesis 
capabilities and the emerging synthetic biology community which was galvanised by the 
involvement of social scientists associated with SynBERC. This situation had resulted in the 
field of synthetic biology being subject to dual-use concerns to a greater extent than any other 
contemporary techno-scientific field. The UK discourse inherited these concerns. This was 
                                                            
104
  Including Filippa  Lentzos, and Paul Nightingale, who had both been following biosecurity issues since 
at least the mid 2000’s, and had ties to the Science Policy Research Unity at the University of Sussex.  
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despite the fact that the UK lagged behind with regard to national gene-synthesis capabilities 
and that the European synthetic biology community and gene-synthesis industries were both 
in their embryonic stages. This, added to the fact that synthetic biology was the first techno-
field to be the subject of European dual-use discussion, suggests it would have been unlikely 
that these issues would have emerged in Europe without influence from developments within 
the US.  
These discussions certainly created fresh impetus within some institutions as well as external 
political pressures for research councils and funding bodies to engage pre-emptively with 
discussions about the dual-use issue despite the absence of the manifestation of ‘problematic’ 
research in a UK context. US experiences also had another more subtle, but equally important 
impact on dual-use discussions in the UK. This relates to how the issue was framed and 
expectations about how the issue would be governed. In a UK context, dual-use concerns 
were a new addition to the type of concerns raised by publics and stakeholders in relation to 
new and emerging technologies. Traditionally (non-medical) ELSI biotechnology issues fall 
into two general categories. The first are related to defining, agreeing and managing risks 
(here referred to as ‘risk’ issues). These issues involve activities by institutions such as the 
HSE or other secondary regulators. The second set involves more ethical reflections about the 
relationships between novel science and technologies and ‘humanness’ or ‘society’. These 
latter societal concerns such as ‘playing god’ are usually understood to require a 
philosophical rather than physical remedy. Risk discussions, on the other hand, tend to result 
in the generation of concrete societal problems which are understood to require immediate 
risk assessment activities of some kind.  
It is conceivable that dual-use issues could have been discussed as an ‘ethical’ rather than a 
‘risk’ issue within this document and the UK ELSI discussions which followed.  Such an 
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assertion is supported, when one considers attitudes of some leading scientists in the field,  
who make  the claim that any science and technology can be considered ‘dual-use’, and so 
does not constitute a risk that can actually be addressed through governance105. As it 
transpired, dual-use issues were understood to fall into the former category in early European 
and UK reports.  
The fact that US discussions had adopted this risk framing, and that communities were in 
policy focused political processes, certainly contributed to this ‘risk’ framing emerging in the 
UK. However, in contrast to the US, there was at this point no synthetic biology community 
and no major initiatives underway to assess or co-ordinate a response to dual-use concerns 
associated with the field.  
The BBRSC report then signalled the establishment of a dominant dual-use governance logic, 
which was forward-looking in the sense that new institutions discussed potential dual-use 
issues which were yet to materialise. However, in the absence of any substantive promises of 
financial and institutional support for new political processes of collaborative policy 
development, it was also deeply ad hoc and incremental. This was in the sense that it was 
assumed that response would take the form of a ‘patch-work’ (Kelle 2012b), which reflected 
discreet institutional rationales, rather than involving new forms of collaboration politics as 
part of a co-ordinated policy response. With these assumed political realities in mind, it is 
unsurprising that Balmer and Martin pragmatically called for engagement with education as a 
first step in the development of dual-use governance regime, which at the time appeared both 
dimly conceived and politically contentious. Such recommendations chimed in with 
educational and awareness-raising initiatives that were been favoured at this time within the 
UK by intuitions such as the FCO and aspects of the scientific community. This was in the 
                                                            
105  Interview. UK scientist, on file with author.  
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context of the growing significance of education and awareness raising within the context of 
the BTWC.  
This situation reminds us that developments within the ELSI discourse were tightly inter-
wound with the assumed realities in other domains. In the following sections the nature of 
this relationship, as well as the role of the rhetoric and politics of security are put under 
scrutiny. Specifically there is a need to consider how developments within each of the four 
domains of dual-use governance can be understood to have contributed to, or else impacted 
upon, the process by which initiatives have emerged and how this relates to theoretical 
questions about the politics of security.  
6.4 Dual-Use Technology and the Politics of Security (2006-2010) 
So far it has been demonstrated that between 2005 and 2008 broad aspects of the techno-
science of synthetic biology were being discussed with reference to dual-use potential in 
European ESLI forums. This ranged from bio-terror to bio-warfare concerns relating to a 
broad swathe of foreseen developments in synthetic biology.  The potential need for controls 
in response to such developments had also been raised. This was understood to extend 
beyond genetic material, conceivably including proteins involved in biochemical expression 
systems. At this time, it was also suggested that ‘controls and regulations [could] be imposed 
on ‘parts suppliers’(European Commission 2005, 18). Likewise in 2009, the European Group 
on Ethics expressed concerns related to the potential of state as well as sub-state misuse of 
synthetic biology technologies and called for systems of oversight that could address both of 
these issues, under obligations laid under the BTWC (European Group on Ethics 2009, 52). 
Added to this, various bioweapon experts and committees, largely from the US, had 
suggested that the foreseeable proliferation of synthetic biology technologies could aid the 
development and use of novel weapons in the foreseeable future (Tucker 2012).  
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However, the only specific technology, which was subject of policy discussions at 
government level within the UK during this period, was gene-synthesis technology. This 
raises questions about why this specific field of technology has been subject to action and 
why broader aspects have not. In the following section this issue is examined. 
6.4.1 Early Government Responses to Dual-use Gene-synthesis Technology 
(2006-2009) 
In 2006, the first significant biosecurity concern to emerge in a UK context were raised by an 
article that appeared in the Guardian. The article outlined how a journalist had ordered a 
segment of smallpox Variola DNA from a UK biotechnology company. (Randerson 2006). 
The segment, which encoded for part of the protein coat of the Variola virus, 106 was duly 
dispatched to a private address in London.  
It was argued in the article that the order should have raised alarms at the company. The 
article also connected its findings with trends in science and technology which were making 
the synthesis of genome-length sequences from short oligonucleotide sequences more 
commonplace.  This then, for a while at least, suggested the prospect of public pressure on 
government to toughen up on the regulation of the gene-synthesises industry. However, in the 
absence of political and public interest, the Guardian-orchestrated ‘scandal’ did not become a 
means to instigate a broader review of the dual-use biotech issue or indeed bleed into 
concerns about the misuse of scientific research, in relation to pathogens or contemporary 
poster-boy fields such as synthetic biology.  
                                                            
106
  The DNA code had actually been modified slightly before it was ordered, as to avoid breaking laws 
covering select-agents. However the modification would not have been significant enough for the 
company to argue that the modification undermined their screening processes (if such processes had 
been in place). 
 189 
 
The primary publicly-known response from government came in the form of an 
interdepartmental meeting held by the Department of Business Innovation and Skills which 
addressed ‘The potential for misuse of DNA sequences (oligonucleotides) and the 
implications for regulation’ (Department of Business Innovation and Skills 2006). The focus 
of the meeting and the report that followed was upon the immediate feasibility of misuse by 
small terrorist groups. This pragmatism meant that the problem framing was very restricted in 
comparison with discussions occurring in some aspects of the European NEST domain at this 
time, which, although largely constrained to the threat of bioterrorism, were still looking 
beyond immediate industry capabilities. The meeting focused on risks which were understood 
to be ‘immediate’ rather than feasible in the long-term based on hypothetical developments 
within national biotechnology capacity or scientific research. Such perspectives were also 
informed by assumptions about the central role of existing biosafety and biosecurity 
paradigms in preventing misuse. Within this understanding, existing governance systems 
were expected to maintain vigilance and respond to novel risks at the point at which they 
appeared more immediate. This idea was also supported by the claim that standard operating 
practices within research institutions and industry and similar ethical systems ‘can be used to 
respond quickly to changes in technology’ (Department of Business Innovation and Skills 
2006).  
Such framing impacted on the aspects of the gene-synthesis technologies which were made 
subject to dual-use governance at this point in time. First, it was more established practices of 
shorter oligonucleotide sequence synthesis, rather than the emerging gene-length sequence 
industry that was the focus of attention. This meant that concerns about terrorists ordering 
gene- or genome-length sequences from specialist firms were not attended to. This issue 
would spark a European industry response only two years later as the European gene-
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synthesis continued to develop. Second, while there was an appreciation ‘technologies will 
advance such that pathogenic organisms could be constructed or (more likely) be modified 
more easily’ (Department of Business Innovation and Skills 2006), no specific developments 
were identified, nor was there discussion of the need to identify these developments. This 
meant that no specific political process was put in place to respond to such issues, instead it 
was stated that ‘key organisations [were] to alert Government if they become aware of any 
significant advances which might lead to major technological changes and thus to increases 
in risk’ (Department of Business Innovation and Skills 2006).  In the period between 2006-
2008 there were minimal activities within the HSE, FCO, Home Office and National 
Counterterrorism security office directed at dual-use synthetic biology or dual-use technology 
more generally which was, in the main, confined to organising and attending seminars and 
keeping a watching brief on fields such as synthetic biology.107 However, this did not 
translated into policy initiatives on the part of these institutions. For example, the HSE 
produced a small horizon scanning piece on the broader field of synthetic biology in 2007, 
but this did not address misuse issues. Added to this FCO, Home Office and National 
counter-terrorism security office policy initiatives were also slow to emerge. For example, it 
was not until 2012 that the National counter-terrorism security office began seriously 
considering the development and implementation of dual-use awareness-raising and 
educational programmes outside of military research facilities in relation to life-science 
research.108 
                                                            
107
  In relation to the HSE  see  Memorandum submitted to the  House of Lords Select Committee on 
Intergovernmental Organisations (Health and Safety Executive 2008). In relation to the FCO  see 
evidence submitted to House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 2009) also were keeping a watching brief on synthetic biology through attendance to the 
Synthetic Biology Policy Co-ordination Group from 2007 to 2009 (on file with Author) 
108
  Presentation from NACTSO representative at Responsible Conduct of Research for Scientists and 
Engineers: Twin International Meeting, The Norcroft Conference Centre, University of Bradford, 
Bradford, UK July 2012. On file with Author. 
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 This is particularly surprising as education had been a favoured response to other ‘dual-use’ 
technology issues (i.e. firearms and chemicals) within that organisation (Home Office 2009, 
2:2 at 12.19 ). There was also minimal interest from the Ministry of Defence, who delayed an 
investigation into potential threats and opportunities associated with the field which had been 
agreed in 2006.109 This lack of engagement was also reflected at parliamentary level, with 
minimal discussion of the dual-use issue more generally in this period, with the issue only 
raised on the periphery of international non-proliferation, laboratory biosafety and public 
health issues in debates within various parliamentary committees, often by aspects of the 
scientific and academic arms control communities.110  
In this period, there is little evidence of systematic searches for new risks, as well as an 
absence of investment into the development of scientific criteria for the identification and 
evaluation of novel dual-use risks in relation synthetic biology technologies. The absence of 
engagement, as well as clear direction, would be revealed most clearly in coming years, as 
the gene-synthesis industry emerged.  
6.4.2 The rise of International Industry Associations in Dual-use Technology 
Politics (2007-2010) 
In 2007, several industry scientists and technologists with an interest in the emerging 
European gene-synthesis sector met in Heidelberg, Germany in order to discuss the potential 
for the establishment of some form of synthetic biology industry association. The foundation 
of the ISAB in early 2007 was underpinned by a number of political drivers. First, there was 
                                                            
109
  Plans for this investigation were picked up and reported publicly in a Parliamentary Briefing Paper  
(POST 2008, 3) However, the plans were shelved and that particular enquiry never took place. 
(Confirmed by Email correspondence with the intended author report, on file with Author).   
110
   For example (Health and Safety Executive 2008)  at an Inter-governmental organisations committee 
meeting, House of Lords.  (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2009) at Foreign affairs committee 




a growing interest within European industry in the field, which created a need for novel 
forums for pioneering biotech companies to collaborate. Second, there was an apparent need 
for industry to pre-emptively engage with risk issues associated with the technology in the 
context of growing European and funder interest in the field of synthetic biology. This need 
stemmed from historical, European experiences of societal resistance to GM technologies, as 
well as more recent US experiences in relation to biosecurity issues. Third, the novelty of the 
field meant that the government was only in the early stages of assessing its potential 
regulatory implications of increasing gene-synthesis capacities, creating uncertainty for the 
industry. While indications had been given that the existing regulatory framework was 
adequate, it seemed increasingly likely that these frameworks would require review and 
amendment in response to the emergence of the gene-synthesis industry at national and 
European level.111 In response, a decision was made to engage in some form of activity to 
which would pre-emptively address the risk issues associated with the field, this activity from 
the outset was understood to involve public engagement, risk management activities and 
advocacy in relation to regulators. The politics surrounding the emergence of the policies are 
significant for understanding the politics of security surrounding dual-use technology issues, 
and are now addressed.  
The IASB held a workshop in April 2008 in Munich. The workshop brought together 
industry representatives, social scientists, as well as European public health and biosecurity 
experts. An important addition to this group was also Steven Maurer, who had already had 
first-hand experience of the development of biosecurity initiatives in the US in relation to the 
field of synthetic biology. The workshop agreed a work-plan which was published on the 
ISAB website and has since been widely cited in European policy material on synthetic 
                                                            
111  Interview, with ISAB representative. In a UK context, while there has been a re-assertion that non-
infective genetic material was not subject to Biosafety and Anti-terror laws, there was no guarantee that 
this position would be maintained, genetic material was also covered under  Export Control regulation.  
 193 
 
biology. This work package included six sets of activities these were: the harmonization of 
screening practices, utilizing closed online industry information forums; co-operation with 
the Goldman School of Public Policy in the Building or a virulence factor database;112 the 
publication of an article on the ‘status quo’ of synthetic biology; the establishment of a policy 
steering group; Publication of IASB member screening practices; as well as engagement with 
other stakeholders internationally.  Since this time, however, there have been modest 
activities in relation to these aims, constrained in the main by the absence of resources.113 
This has meant that much of the focus of the ISAB has been raising its profile in industry and 
biosecurity forums, as well as courting government investment. For example, work on the 
development of new screening databases and software has been very slow (in both a 
European and US context). Added to this, there has been little, if any, publicly known work 
on the harmonization of practices among members since 2009.  
This being said, the ISAB has certainly punched above its weight when one considers its 
political impact in Europe. Not only has the this actor behaved as a successful securitization 
actor in relation to the issue of gene synthesis, it is also likely that this may set a broader 
precedent in European politics in relation to other industrialising aspects of synthetic biology. 
Largely insulated from the antagonistic politics of the NEST domain, the IASB instigated a 
political process which allowed industry to rise as the predominant developer and 
implementer of security policy directed at the gene-synthesis issue in relation to the scenario 
of terrorist misuse.  This helped secured ‘industry screening’, rather than other forms of 
intervention, as a central part of the response the scenario of terrorist misuse of synthetic 
                                                            
112
  The idea behind this data-base is can used to screen against dangerous ‘genes’ encoding for virulence 
factor proteins, as opposed to screening from whole viral genomes.  This was in order to make 
sequencing more focused on dangerous aspects of viral genomes.  
113  The ISAB composes or a core ‘staff’ or around 5 or 6 individuals who work on the project in their 
spare time, They have a very modest annual spend of up to approximately 10,000 Euro a year. 
(interview with ISAB founding member, on file with Author).  
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DNA. However, the existence of the ISAB in its own political niche has come with a cost, 
which, for the foreseeable future, will likely limit the institution’s ability to further develop 
and implement policy. Specifically, the ability of the IASB to be more reactive to the dual-
use challenge presented by gene-synthesis technologies has meant that for several years ‘it 
has ran beyond’ the interests of the European institutions from which it needed support. If 
anything this group’s activities have, at times, been used as a ‘public bolster’ by departments 
against the need to take action as the work of this group was often referenced within 
European NEST forums without the suggestion of government support or viable policy 
alternatives at this time (House of Commons: 2010, 55).  
This being said, in the following section it becomes clear that the ISAB has likely cemented 
the position of similar institutions in European politics in the coming years. This, in essence, 
means that even if the IASB were to quietly fold in coming years - taking the existing policy 
channel with it - the absence of state activity in this area, coupled with the activities of this 
group, has resulted in the emergence of political space for such organisations within the 
NEST, anti-terror and biosafety domains. This looks likely to facilitate the emergence of 
similar actors within industry who would likely mirror the approach of this group.  
6.4.3 Conclusions: The Securitization of Dual-Use Synthesis Technology in the 
UK (2007-2010) 
In the UK, the domestic gene-synthesis industry is small, with a handful of companies 
providing tailored gene-synthesis products,114 there is no data publicly available about how 
many of these companies there are; how many are signed up a screening standard or how 
many implement biosecurity policies.  Added to this, the nature of the market is also unclear. 
It is likely, for example, that many UK-based researchers also rely on imports from the US, 
                                                            
114
  For example, http://www.bioscience.co.uk/products/gene-synthesis-service-genemaker 
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Germany and, increasingly, China.115 In the UK there are no clear channels of policy 
development in relation to the gene-synthesis issue at a national level, with no institution 
having a clearly defined remit in this regard.  
During this period, the UK government, the HSE and FCO, as well as the Department of 
Innovation of Skills who grant dual-use export licences, adopted a wait and see approach in 
relation to scientific and technological development. Existing biosafety and ethical 
governance structures were appropriated or ear-marked as de facto biosecurity systems - 
however there is little evidence that they were ever actually utilized for the development of 
secondary securitization.  
The process of organising the interdepartmental meeting is an example of successful primary 
securitization as the meeting constituted a contrived political process which allowed an issue 
to be made ‘governable’ in the name of security. This meeting also reflected the 
predominance of a framing of the dual-use technology issue which was constrained to those 
issues which could conceivably by addressed existing biosafety and export control systems. 
Thus while the dual-use issue was making it on to agendas, there was no pre-emptive policy 
development, such as in-depth risk-assessment type activities, or the development of 
capacities to implement such assessment. Instead the dual-use issue continued to exist in the 
main as an under-addressed ‘ethical’ issue on NEST agenda, rather than a risk issue requiring 
action in the biosafety or anti-terror domains. It is clear that this creates an environment 
which is unfavourable for the emergence of pre-emptive policies directed at identifying a 
responding to potential dual-use concerns. It is also worth reiterating at this point that the 
majority of initiatives discussed in this were not designed to address the prospect of state-
                                                            
115
  The tendency for scientists to choose cheap, and reliable products regardless of where they are 
produced, or the bio-security policies that the companies adhere to, was a re-occurring theme in my 
discussions with UK scientists. 
 196 
 
level misuse and tend to ignore more forward-looking concerns about broader trends within 
emerging biotechnology. This issue is returned to towards the end of the chapter. In the next 
section the emergence of activities directed at dual-use research within the field of synthetic 
biology in this period are now addressed.  
6.5 The Security Politics of Dual-Use Research (2007-2010) 
By 2007, growing interest at US an EU level in synthetic biology had motivated a BBRSC 
led funding initiative. The initiative involved the establishment of seven new research 
networks in synthetic biology designed to foster an interdisciplinary synthetic biology 
community within the UK. From the outset, the was a requirement for scientists to engage 
with ethical, legal and social issues when designing and carrying out research (BBSRC 
2008a). There was also a level of optimism expressed in relation to the ability of the synthetic 
biology community to engage pre-emptively and responsibly in managing the societal 
impacts of the field. In the public announcement of the Network Initiative, it was stated that:  
‘We think it is important that scientists and research funders are aware of the wider 
social and ethical issues surrounding synthetic biology. From events that we and 
others have held recently, we are confident that UK scientists will address such issues 
when planning and carrying out research involving synthetic biology’(BBSRC 
2008a).  
Such optimism was unsurprising for several reasons.  First, there was a pre-existing faith in 
the capacity of the existing regulatory framework to address any risks that emerged related to 
the field of synthetic biology. This suggested that the scope of the community responsibilities 
were limited to public engagement or helping to facilitate the response of existing regulatory 
institutions such as the HSE to the issue.116 It was also assumed that ELSI researchers 
(mainly social scientists and ethicists) could contribute to the evaluation of ethical concerns 
                                                            
116   As was stated at a regulators meeting organised by the BBSRC  at the time ‘The overriding message 
from advisory committee members was that none of the questions and hypothetical scenarios suggested 
a paradigm shift that would necessitate amending the UK’s regulatory framework. However, some 
issues may require particular attention within the framework’. (BBSRC 2008b, 2) 
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as well as risks in the context existing regulatory, funding and research ethics review 
processes.117 This was in the context of rise of synthetic biology as a ‘hot topic’ within policy 
and ethics research centres following US debates. The BBSRC Network model held the 
promise that the interest of these scholars could be channelled in the related tasks of 
integrating societal demands and concerns into the practice of research and reassuring the 
public in relation to the fledgling field. The research councils and regulators were also keen 
to emphasise the role of the synthetic biology community and ELSI researchers for another 
reason. This was because there were concerns at this time among the funding institutions that 
there was a risk that security, and particularly safety concerns, about emerging fields would 
lead to a public back-lash before novel applications could even be developed. In a publicly 
available report on a meeting between the research councils and regulators, violent imagery 
was used to describe the threat posed by public and regulatory backlash against the field, 
stating that: 
‘There was agreement [among those that the meeting] on the importance of ensuring 
that unnecessary regulation does not ‘strangle at birth’ the potential benefits of 
synthetic biology products; and that regulatory procedures should be realistic and 
proportionate, not burdensome.’(BBSRC 2008b, 4) 
During this period, research funding institutions mobilised to ensure a central role (for 
themselves) as well as the emerging synthetic biology community in the political process of 
policy development directed at ELSI issues associated with the field. This involved 
collaboration with institutions such as the HSE, the Department of Innovation and Skills and 
law enforcement agencies in the context of existing regulatory structures. The question 
remains, however, in relation to the extent to which these activities constituted primary 
securitization, or fostered secondary securitization. In relation to the first question, there was 
                                                            
117 
  At the BBRSC regulators meeting it was also stated that ‘Research applications go through local ethics 
committees and research council ethical review processes in addition to their review through 
regulatory committee reviews. A view was expressed that constitution of these committees should be 
considered to ensure their capacity to manage this risk. Consideration of Ethical Legal Societal Issues 
(ELSI) is also an important part of the new synthetic biology networks’. (BBSRC 2008b, 3) 
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early consensus between the scientific community and other regulatory institutions that the 
scientific community would take the lead in relation to governing dual-use research. This was 
based on consensus which had emerged as early as the  Parliamentary ‘Scientific Response to 
Terrorism’ report writing process (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
2003). Therefore, this was an attempt to encourage secondary securitization within relevant 
communities, who were expected to play a role in the identification and governance of dual-
use issues as part of a system of identifying and responding to dual-use risks. This idea was 
not challenged nor were there moves to develop security policy beyond these earlier vague 
agreements. This, essentially, meant that the there was still a space for the synthetic biology 
community to behave as a secondary securitization actor, within the remit of the vague 
agreements made in 2003. In the following section there is an examination of the extent to 
which the scientific community (including associated ELSI scholars) took on this role in 
relation to the field of synthetic biology.  
6.5.1 Community Self-Governance (2008-2010) 
UK scientific institutions can be understood to have responded to dual-use concerns in two 
ways. The first is through the development and implementation of policies to enable the 
identification and management of certain types of dual-use risk, particularly in relation to 
theft and diversion, in collaboration with law enforcement (which primarily involved 
education and awareness raising initiatives within the community). The second set of 
activities, were intended to frame and communicate the dual-use issue to wider society.  Most 
of the activities of the scientific community are easily separated into these two categories. For 
example, the Report from the Royal Academy of Engineering (Royal Academy of 
Engineering 2009), is obviously primarily designed to frame and communicate risks to the 
public. Likewise, educational and awareness design activities engaged with by the Royal 
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Society and under the aegis of the Wellcome Trust project ‘Building a sustainable capacity 
for dual-use bioethics’ are primarily, designed to contribute to a system of identify and 
responding to dual-use risks. In contrast, it is unclear which of these categories ELSI 
activities conducted under the auspices of the BBRSC funded networks fall into. This is 
because at different points in time various roles have been ascribed to both the scientists and 
social scientists that make up this community (See for Example Calvert and Martin 2009). 
Such confusion stems from long-standing tensions in UK ELSI politics, as well as the need 
for social scientists involved in ELSI governance to justify their own role in the innovation 
process- to publics, funding institutions as well as the public. In the following section 
activities of ELSI researchers in these communities is further examined. 
Dual-use synthetic biology in the seven synthetic biology research networks….. 
As should now be clear, in the early years of the field of synthetic biology there were very 
limited risk-governance activities taking place within government departments and Royal 
Society, as well as at community-level in response to dual-use concerns that directly 
contributed to the emergence of dual-use governance capacity. This reflected a broader trend 
reflected in recent dual-use discussions about gain of function H5N1 research, which have 
moved on little from discussion about dual-use research which began nearly a decade ago in a 
UK context. This is in the sense that there remains an emphasis on the importance of 
education of publics and scientists, as well as the centrality of review at funding stage. 
However, there were no substantial technical reviews of the development, implementation 
and evaluation of these policies during this period by parliament or key departments.   
Despite the fact that dual-use issues had emerged on anti-terrorism and biosafety agenda, the 
prevailing logic was that the dual-use issue did not currently raise problems that required a 
response, and that institutions could respond to any issues that did manifest ad hoc. This 
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produced a dead policy space between the societal concerns imagined in the BBRSC report as 
well as the public in the mid-2000s and projected developments in the field over the coming 
decades. As a consequence, governance responses to the challenges raised by synthetic 
biology would involve incremental responses within discreet institutions, rather than more 
forward-looking policy and capacity-building. They would also involve the externalisation of 
broader societal issues which could not feasibly be addressed through existing regulatory 
systems, or modest modifications of these systems. Within in the NEST domain, in reaction 
to this type of approach to science governance more generally, several social scientists active 
in the BBRSC networks have expressed an interest in more ‘up-stream’ engagement with the 
scientific process. In the remainder of this section there is a critical assessment of the aims of 
these researchers in the networks between 2007 and 2010, the extent to which these aims 
have been achieved as well as the discernible impact on the governance of dual-use issues. 
Writing in 2009, two social researchers central to the UK synthetic biology ELSI community, 
outlined their preferred model of engagement with scientists, which was held in contrast to 
more traditional forms of ELSI engagement (Calvert and Martin 2009). They argued that 
such an approach to engagement required ‘collaboration’ between social researchers and the 
synthetic biology community. They argued that such collaboration could involve: 
‘Scrutinizing the assumptions underlying the research of both natural and social 
scientists, and challenging habitual ways of thinking among both groups…. Which 
could help ‘create a more ethically acceptable and socially useful field of study and 
application’ (Calvert and Martin 2009, 202).  
These researchers were seeking to engage up-stream in the process of innovation and address 
potential risks before they emerged. Conceivably, such activities include the instigation of 
policy initiatives and political processes designed at generating and responding to foreseeable 
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risks; including those raised by the dual-use issue. Such sentiments reflected the approach to 
ELSI engagement which was being attempted at Synberc at this time.118   
There were, however, from the outset, two limitations on the potential scope of impact of 
these activities in relation to the development, implementation and politics of dual-use 
governance. 
The first related to the primary focus upon engagement with the scientific community, based 
on the view that this would have knock-on effects later in the innovation process. This then 
meant that activities primarily focused upon engineering ethics (or reflexivity) into scientific 
research, as an exemplary field, rather than directly at changing prevailing norms and 
practices within institutions involved in the funding of translational research; the 
implementation of risk governance directed at industry such as the HSE; or within biotech 
industry. This essentially meant that while there was some engagement ‘up’ the innovation 
process, there were less activities directed at impacting upon the politics of risk governance 
‘down’ the research translation process. For example, in scenarios where scientific research is 
utilised by industry to generate novel technologies by investors from outside of academia. 
Such a position was not unreasonable, bearing in mind the absence of interest from key 
regulators during the early period of the field’s development. Instead, the researchers were 
forced to adopt pragmatic aims – which combined their pre-existing sociological interests in 
the formation of techno-scientific fields and the availability of the growing synthetic biology 
community as a more accessible (if limited) agent of change. 
                                                            
118
  Indeed, scholars from Synberc were asked to present on their experiences at a meeting which launched 
a UK ELSI manifesto document for discussion at a meeting held at King’s College on the 19th June 
2012.It is worth noting that this meeting provided a public froum for Gaymonn Bennett to express his 
explanation of why social scientists had not being successful in achieving their goals at Synberc; as 
well as why his boss Paul Rabinow had to step-down as leader of the Synberc ELSI thrust.  
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The final issue related more specifically to the framing of the dual-use issue adopted by 
prominent members within this community who have stated publicly that, the forward-
looking dual-use concerns do not constitute an immediate risk and are a distraction from 
other, more pressing, issues which require attention, such as the democratic deficit within the 
innovation process. For example, Marris and Rose (2012) argue that most discussion of dual-
use and other risk issues is based on technical ignorance about the current capabilities and 
practice of the field of synthetic biology and that ‘Commentators instead focus on potential 
reckless use or misuse, overestimate the pathogenic possibilities….’. They argue that this is 
an: 
 ‘Example of speculative ethics that distracts us from less exciting but more pressing 
questions. What are synthetic biologists actually doing? How easy, or difficult, is it 
proving? What applications are they realistically going to develop in the short to 
medium term? What is their intended purpose, and to what extent could these 
contribute to the public good?’’. (Marris and Rose 2012, 28–29) 
This then suggests a mismatch between the optimism expressed by social scientists within 
this community as well as the research councils about the role of ELSI activities in risk 
governance and the realties within the research networks. Indeed this discrepancy motivated 
Edwards and Kelle to examine the relevance of ELSI activities within the UK synthetic 
biology networks to the prospect of dual-use education. They found minimal attention to the 
dual-use issue and minimal activities with a discernible impact on the emergence of  
education initiatives (a widely favoured strategy for improving risk management) (Edwards 
and Kelle 2012). Further investigation into the online record of network activities reveals that 
the conceivable impact of social scientists within this network on the emergence of a dual-use 
governance regime directed at synthetic biology research was, in the main, limited to raising 
awareness within the synthetic biology community about the work of social scientists as well 
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as societal concerns and relevant governance frameworks.119 Interviews with PIs also 
revealed that awareness and substantive knowledge in relation to the dual-use issue also 
varied greatly, reflecting the absence of systematic education and awareness-raising in this 
field. However, there is also some evidence of increasing interaction between the broader 
synthetic biology community and the broader BTWC arms control regime.120 This suggests 
that the support provided by the network ELSI funding has helped foster some tentative novel 
collaboration between the UK synthetic biology community and those with an interest in 
dual-use issue.  
6.5.2 Conclusions: Governance of Dual-Use Aspects of Synthetic Biology 
Research (2008-2012) 
In relation to the question of who securitizes on the issue of dual-use research within a UK 
context, the situation remains largely up in the air. While the UK synthetic biology 
community had a remit (albeit vaguely defined) to implement and develop policy responses 
to the dual-use issue, such developments were both modest and tentative in this period.  This 
was underpinned by the absence of institutional support and engagement, specifically the 
FCO and HSE. However, this was also underpinned by the pre-dominance of a norm within 
the broader UK synthetic biology community, which downplayed the significance of dual-use 
issues as they were understood to constitute more long-term, or far-fetched concerns, in the 
pursuit of more pragmatic aims in relation to the field. This then demonstrates the absence of 
secondary securitization processes within this field. Analysis has also demonstrated that it is 
                                                            
119
  Based on examination of network website and publicly available meeting material, discussions and 
interviews with prominent members of the ELSI community as well as project reports.  On file with 
Author 
120  See for example: (Dando 2010) Jane Calvert ( A social Scientist involved with the synthetic biology 
networks) was a speaker at a side event at the 2011 review conference, along with other prominent 
members of the European and US synthetic biology ELSI community.  Several other events addressing 




unlikely that the dual-use issue will stimulate significant anticipatory risk governance 
activities in relation to synthetic biology in the foreseeable future.  This situation has also 
been underpinned by an absence of support and initiatives within the anti-terror and biosafety 
domains in relation this issue. As a consequence, the politics of security surrounding research 
within the UK remains one that is dominated by institutions in which the issue is 
marginalized. These findings, along with developments in relation to gene-synthesis 
technologies provide the context of the final political process which is now examined. 
6.6 The Prospect of Re- invigorating Techno-Science Governance (2009-2012) 
In the period between 2009 and 2012, a coalition of representatives from UK biotech 
industry, leading scientists, as well social as scientists associated with key synthetic biology 
research centre (in particular those from the Centre for Synthetic Biology and Innovation 
based at Imperial) advocated greater support for the domestic gene-synthesis capability as 
part of improving UK research and translation capabilities,121 as well as basic and 
translational research within field.122 In 2010, the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee held a meeting on the topic of bioengineering and were convinced 
that there was: 
‘a widespread consensus that developing a national DNA synthesis capability would 
put the UK at the forefront of synthetic biology translation and what some consider to 
be the next industrial revolution’ (House of Commons: 2010, 44).  
Further to this, it stated that: 
‘Such is the current, and future, value of DNA synthesis that the UK cannot be found 
to be in a position where this capacity is sub-contracted. A national initiative to 
develop cheaper, faster, longer, high-fidelity DNA synthesis would put the UK firmly 
at the front of this new industrial revolution. [...] We should not be put in a position 
                                                            
121
  This perspective was supported with reference to  recent industry investment in UK gene-synthesis 
translational research to the value of  £2.5 millon 
122
  This built in part on coalitions built through the Synthetic Biology Policy Co-ordination Group, based 
at the Royal Society, which functioned from around 2008-2011.  
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where we try to build a new industry on top of out-sourced foundations.’(House of 
Commons: 2010, 26)  
To this end, the report suggested that the Technology Strategy Board should manage a 
national initiative to develop the field. Within the following 2 years, UK institutions received 
approximately £25 million in investment, the majority of this funding focused on the 
development of foundational technologies, as well as the translation of synthetic biology 
research (BBSRC 2012).   
Scientists and social science researchers from the Centre for Synthetic Biology and 
Innovation gave evidence as part of the bioengineering drafting process and referred to the 
issue of dual-use technology. Their comments in evidence, as well as a report from the 
Synthetic Biology Co-ordination group that followed, demonstrated continued optimism: 
‘Overall our view is that further research and continuing discussions are needed 
between SB practitioners and national and international regulators to develop an 
effective governance framework that will mitigate risks without imposing an undue 
burden of regulation that hampers the innovation pipeline, yet which ensures justified 
public confidence in the safety and security issues. Some of this work will be 
conducted by BIOS researchers within CSynBI, working with the Royal 
Society.(House of Commons: 2010, 4) 
Such sentiments were also expressed in a report produced by the Synthetic Biology 
Technology Strategy Board: 
‘It will be crucial, as synthetic biology progresses, to continue developing a robust 
regulatory and enforcement regime involving scrutiny, evaluation and modification of 
existing regulations to address issues such as indirect, delayed, and cumulative long-
term effects, including accumulated effects of approvals for different organisms; and 
appraisal of risks which consider how the technology will be used in practice, in real-
world conditions. The latter includes the potential for ‘dual use’ at a time of 
increasing global uncertainty’(UK Synthetic Biology Roadmap Coordination group 
2012, 21) 
Such rhetoric certainly suggests a continuing support for the development of anticipatory 
systemic risk governance systems. However, bearing in mind the recent history of the field of 
synthetic biology, specifically with the slow and pragmatic response of regulatory bodies, the 
government, as well as the synthetic biology community, one must question the current 
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feasibility of such an endeavour even in relation to existing gene-synthesis technology and 
practices of innovation. In relation to the dual-use issue in particular, the recent 
characterisation of the dual-use issue as an ‘ethical’ rather than ‘risk’ issue  by prominent 
scholars at LSE, suggests that the dual-use issue is likely to receive much less attention 
within this institutional context as a target of  new secondary securitization initiatives within 
the NEST domain.  
6.7 Conclusions 
Within securitization theory, a key focus has been upon the questions of who securitizes, 
how, what, and under what conditions and with what effects.  Within this chapter each of 
these questions has been attended to, and it is worth recapitulating some key points before 
further discussion in the comparative and conclusive chapters.  
With regard to the question of who securitizes in relation to dual-use issues, it is apparent that 
institutions such as research funders as well as those in charge of laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity are widely understood to be of central importance in the oversight of dual-use 
issues. This role has been secured through two forms of activity. First, institutions such as the 
HSE as well as member of the ELSI community have asserted the role of existing biosafety 
regulatory systems, education and awareness-raising initiatives as central to the governance 
of existing dual-use concerns as part of parliamentary reviews of the area.  Second, in relation 
to oligonucleotide synthesis, these institutions have collaborated in the generation of political 
process in which these existing systems were ear-marked as key aspects of biosecurity 
responses. Another key actor has been the ISAB, which has taken a pro-active approach in 
defining policy options and implementing policy initiatives directed at the synthesis industry.   
Generally speaking, however, government departments have adopted a wait and see approach 
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with regard to dual-use concerns and have placed faith in the idea that scientific institutions 
and industry are in a position to identify and respond to dual-use concerns.  
In relation to the question of what has been securitized, it is clear that, apart from initiatives 
within the gene-synthesis industry, those aspects of synthetic biology which have been made 
subject to security governance are those which can conceivably be addressed through existing 
systems of biosafety and biosecurity governance. With regard to the consequences of these 
activities, the extent to which dual-use issues have actually, or are likely to be made subject 
to risk management within these systems, remains unclear. This is because there is absence of 
a designated institutional capacity to resolve dual-use dilemmas should they emerge in a UK 
context, as well as an absence of specific and national wide conventions to identify and 
respond to dual-use research of concern. Specifically, with relation to the synthetic biology 
NEST domain, there has also been no significant attempts to identify dual-use concerns 
specific to the UK field. This, again, reveals an absence of institutional interest in pre-
emptively engaging with dual-use concerns which cannot be addressed through the 
application of existing biosafety and biosecurity risk management systems.  
In the final two chapters each of these ideas is addressed, as more cross-cutting themes are 
developed and analysed.  
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Chapter Seven: Comparing the Scope, Practice and Politics of Dual-Use Governance 




Analysis has revealed key historical moments, institutions, ideational factors and practices 
which have constituted dual-use governance within the case studies. In the following section 
these findings are held in relief against each other in order to develop key lines of argument 
about the scope, politics and practice of dual-use governance. This involves a structured 
comparison utilising analytical concepts developed throughout this thesis in order to address 
key research themes outlined in chapter two. A brief overview of these themes, as well as the 
analytical framework developed to address these themes, is now given.  
At the outset of this thesis, it was claimed that the emergence of the dual-use issue on US and 
European agendas was underpinned by: 
a) The emergence of fears about terrorism, in particular bioterrorism, both in 
public and policy circles, specifically the threat from non-state actors; 
b) The dominant assumption about the fast pace of scientific and technological 
development associated with the life sciences; 
 c) Changes in the relationship between science and democratic societies. Over 
the past decade much of the academic literature on the dual-use issue has 
focused on the question of how to address a conception of the problem of 
dual-use.  
In chapter two it was argued that in order to study the practice and politics of dual-use 
techno-science governance, it is important to distinguish between four discreet domains of 
politics. It was suggested that it would be myopic to analyse the manifestation of the dual-use 
issue within a specific domain which were each understood to comprise of different styles of 
politics and reasoning. However, carving up of the idea of ‘dual-use governance’ into four 
largely discreet domains challenged the stability and self-evidence of the concept dual-use 
governance. That is to say, while most scholars and policy-makers identified comparable 
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histo-political context and responses in their description of dual-use governance as part of a 
web or responses, the question of how these activities relate to each other in the formation of 
an emerging regime remains largely unanswered. It was suggested at the end of chapter two, 
that in conceptualising dual-use governance as an emerging systemic risk in governance 
regime was the first step in addressing this question. The second step required the 
development of an analytical framework which could incorporate agency, ideational and 
structural factors into a coherent overview of the political processes that have generated dual-
use governance.  
This task was addressed in chapter three. The analytical framework that was developed built 
upon insights from securitization theory. Scholars in this field have been reflecting on the 
politics and practice of security for over decade and a range of analytical concepts were 
identified for use in the task in hand. The analytical framework focused on the interaction 
between agency and structure in the process by which policies emerge, utilising analytical 
concepts drawn from policy process theory as well as critical discourse analysis to help 
structure the study of this interaction. This involved the analysis of how actors engage with 
security politics (including the policy-making process) why and with what effects.  
In chapter four, the field of synthetic biology was introduced as an example of an emerging 
techno-scientific field which has been the subject of dual-use governance. A focal field was 
required for two main reasons. First, there has been no in-depth study of new and emerging 
scientific practice and artefacts as the subjects of securitization. Therefore it was necessary to 
conceptually unpack the process by which framings of scientific fields are generated. Second, 
as there was an absence of dual-use governance theory within the literature, a narrow and 
deep focused approach (i.e. a single field) was chosen to enable the development of new 
theory and hypotheses related to dual-use governance. The field of synthetic biology was 
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chosen as a focus because it was the field that had been associated most prominently with 
dual-use concerns. This was important as dual-use governance norms developed in relation to 
this field may be reproduced in relation to other fields that become embroiled in dual–use 
politics. Investigation into this field may also go some way to revealing which factors 
contribute to scientific practices and artefacts being labelled as dual-use concerns. It was 
demonstrated in chapter five that claims about dual-use problems involve assumptions about 
governance but also about science and technology. Further to this, it was suggested that the 
emergence of shared assumptions in relation to a given techno-scientific field are be 
underpinned by trends in the way in which new and emerging technologies are assessed in 
modern societies.  
In the following sections, concepts, hypothesis and lines of argument (developed in earlier 
chapters) are used in order to examine the three central focal points identified in chapter two 
specifically: 
- The subject and scope of dual-use governance 
- The politics and practice of dual-use governance 
- The nature and prospect of national styles of dual-use governance 
These central lines of inquiry are now addressed through a structured thematic comparison of 
the US and the UK. Each of these sections, to varying extents, emphasise the role of ideas, 
practices and political processes in the emergence of dual-use governance. 
7.2 The Subject and Scope of Dual-Use Governance within the UK and the US 
This focal point of analysis involves identifying which aspects of synthetic biology have been 
constructed as presenting a dual-use threat and the relationships between these threat 
constructions and pre-existing discourses and practices. It is worth briefly distinguishing 
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between the ideas of ‘subject’ and ‘scope’ here, as this distinction is of some consequence. 
‘Subject’ refers to the delineation of those specific scientific and technological artefacts and 
practices which, though political processes, have been framed as part of governable 
problems. In contrast, questions of ‘scope’ place greater emphasis on the idea that certain 
lines of research, materials, technologies and practices have been made subject to dual-use 
governance and others have not. This distinction leads to questions about the nature of the 
frames which have been applied to scientific practice and artefacts in dual-use discussions 
within both cases. This later discussion emphasises the extent to which the identification of 
dual-use problems is heavily dependent on histo-poltical context. This dovetails into 
questions about the political processes which have impacted upon questions of ‘subject’ and 
‘scope’ of dual-use discussions in national contexts. 
A key finding within this thesis has been that comparable scenarios have been discussed in a 
UK and US context (see table below). However, the identification of such scenarios by actors 
are not, in themselves, an indication that these scenarios are been taken seriously as policy 
challenges. For example, one individual interviewed involved in the DIY bio-movement, 
tongue firmly in cheek, suggested a scenario in which research into the effect of chicken soup 
on the immune system could breed ‘dual-use’ findings.123 Likewise, a leading scientist, part 
of the UK synthetic biology community, who also alluded to common misuse scenarios in his 
interview, expressed the view that ‘anything could be dual-use’124 in the context of 
frustrations with public discussions of the dual-use issue. Indeed several scientists 
interviewed commented on the seemingly arbitrary way in which dual-use scenarios appeared 
within the governance and public discourse. Two scientists interviewed also referred to the 
way in which scenarios were maintained through discussions on ELSI agendas. One even 
                                                            
123  Interview on file with Author: Foundational Amateur Biologist.  
124  Interview on file with Author: Foundation scientist in the UK synthetic biology community  
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went as far as to argue the ELSI and public discourse also generated implausible scenarios 
which were based on misunderstandings of the state of the science and informed by spurious 
claims within the press.125  
However, certain scenarios, such as the misuse of synthesised select-agent viral-genomes by 
terrorists, have been taken seriously enough to warrant some form of response and have even 
become key conceptual factors shaping the design of policy. A case in point being industry 
screening in order to prevent terrorists from ordering ‘dangerous’ genetic material from 
select-agent organisms. Many of these scenarios have also been reproduced by non-
proliferation and national security circles as accessible exemplars, by academics and 
institutions involved with dual-use governance. The table on the next page characterises some 
prevalent misuse scenarios which have been discussed within policy documents, as well as 
raised in my own interviews with policy experts and scientists (many of whom have 
transatlantic institutional links) in both the US and the UK.  
                                                            





Terrorist misuse  Terrorist group use technologies and scientific 
knowledge to synthesis select-agent.  
Bad scientific practice A scientist, through bad biosafety practice, 
allows dangerous pathogen to escape lab.  
Criminal misuse of technology 
 
The use of new techniques for the development 
of illegal drugs such as LSD.  
Prank by student 
 
Student releases modified organism which 
cause harm or public panic.  
State-level misuse Scientists directly/ indirectly contribute to a 
covert bioweapons programme.  
 Table 5 An overview of the key scenarios of synthetic biology misuse in the US and the UK 
 
An interesting observation which emerged within this thesis is that in both the US and the UK 
is that the NEST domain has had fundamental impacts of the scope of synthetic biology 
which has been discussed as dual-use issues in public forums as well as within the scientific 
community.  However, the US and UK differ in some important ways in relation to the extent 
to which such concerns have translated into policy responses. These responses have involved 
changes in national legislation, stakeholder policy as well as novel voluntary governance 
initiatives. Below, the scope of policy responses within the US and the UK are outlined and 
compared.  
 Controlling Foundational Synthetic Biology Technologies  
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There have been two key ways in which emerging polynucleotide synthesis capacities have 
been understood to challenge national regulatory systems by policy makers.  First, this 
development has been understood as a potential challenge to biosafety systems addressing 
Genetically Modified Organisms. In a US, following recommendations from the NSABB, 
NIH guidelines were updated to explicitly include synthetic as well as recombinant nucleic 
acid molecules, as well as organisms which contain these molecules. This was in order to 
close a loop-hole in the existing guidelines which covered modified genetic material and 
organisms which had been produced recombinant methods, but did not explicitly address 
those produced by synthetic means. In contrast within the UK, this development was not 
understood to challenge existing UK and EU level biosafety oversight systems. A second 
development has been the emergence of screening-standards within the polynucleotide 
industry. In the US, the government established an inter-agency process to develop screening 
standards following the lead of industry. The screening standards, which the government 
developed, addressed double-stranded polynucleotide sequences only meaning that the 
standards did not address shorter, single stranded sequences (i.e. less than 200 nucleotides) 
despite concerns that it was possible to synthesis pathogens using these sequences and that 
developments in synthetic genomics would make this process simpler and cheaper in the 
future.126  In contrast, within the UK, the government has only held a publicly known cross-
departmental meeting on the issue of short, single-stranded sequences. This came in response 
to the Guardian article which reported on how a journalist had ordered a fragment of Variola 
genetic material from a polynucleotide synthesis company. Such distinctions are rather 
academic, however, when one considers final outcomes. In both the UK and US, longer 
double-stranded DNA segments which are only produced subject to screening in those 
                                                            
126
  It is worth noting however, that under the screening guidelines fragments as small as 200bp within 
larger strands are still subject to screening.  
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companies which have adopted screening practices - whereas the shorter strands, which are 
currently primarily used in research, are not.   
It is also worth reiterating that while polynucleotide synthesis technology has been discussed 
in terms of control, other technologies associated with the field of synthetic biology have as 
of yet received little societal attention as sources of dual-use concern but have been discussed 
by experts.  This includes technologies and associated techniques which underpin; advanced 
genetic manipulation, such as DNA shuffling,  (Epstein 2012); protein engineering (Jefferson 
2012); as well as projects which aim to develop libraries of categorised biological parts 
(Kelle 2012a). Such technologies could also foreseeably lead to the development of new 
means to synthesise toxins, as well as to the generation of new toxins, or pathogens.   
Designing safeguards into technology 
Another type of policy response to dealing with the challenges raised by synthetic biology, is 
to engineer safeguards into biotechnologies and  products (Moe-Behrens, Davis, and Haynes 
2013). At SynBERC in particular, this approach to managing risks has become very 
prominent, however there is much less attention to the idea in the UK.  In relation to dual-use 
issues, there has been no discussion of the viability of this approach for addressing dual-use 
risks. Although it appears likely that such approaches may be considered in security and 
proprietary terms in the future. It is worth noting however, that these potential governance 
initiatives will have comparable scope to that of laboratory biosecurity and biosafety.  This is 
in the sense that it will potentially discourage against the theft and diversion of genetically 
engineered life forms for hostile purposes, but will not address the prospect of state level 
programmes. There has also been limited discussion of the potential for regulating and 
licencing polynucleotide synthesis technologies within the US in particular, although no such 
action has been forthcoming.   
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In both the US and UK, local-level biosafety and ethics review has been the dominant way in 
which research has been assessed for dual-use concern. Added to this, within the US there is 
evidence of higher level dual-use review occurring within the NIH, as well as of local level 
community driven biosecurity initiatives, which have involved collaboration with security 
experts and regulators. Within the UK, this latter form of engagement has been more limited. 
In both the US and UK the focus of dual-use concerns remains upon the misuse potential of 
single experiments. However there remains an absence of agreed risk assessment criteria for 
identifying dual-use research. 
It is also apparent that there is a higher level of awareness of many biosecurity concerns 
within the field of synthetic biology as compared to other fields, as a result of awareness-
raising and education activities at national level (which includes those within the amateur 
biology community). Such awareness is of central importance if the prospect of self-
governance is to be taken seriously. However, in both cases there is a requirement for 
institutional developments outside of the field of synthetic biology if review processes are to 
be more comprehensive and have an impact on the practice and direction of research. There is 
evidence in both the US as well as Europe127 of the institutionalisation systems of dual-use 
use research review; this incudes, for example, review by funding organisations.  However, 
there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis of how these review processes actually function 
across institutions in national contexts.  
Added to this, synthetic biology innovation presents challenges which go beyond the scope of 
these review systems. For example industrialisation will lead to a host of ‘technical’ 
challenges at national level, related to safety and security.  It is also likely that R&D with be 
carried out in an increasing range of intuitional contexts as private investment increases - 
                                                            
127
  In the Netherlands in particular. 
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such R&D may be subject to different ethical and regulatory environments. Such 
developments will also create challenges at international level as new types of biological and 
chemical development and production facilitates within states (which may potentially be 
utilised for hostile purposes) emerge.  
7.3 The Politics and Practice of Dual-Use Governance 
A key narrative of dual-use governance within both the US and the UK is that of optimism, 
under performance and renewal in the faith of the prospect of up-stream, participatory and 
anticipatory governance. The primary and immediate responsibility has fallen to ELSI thrusts 
of synthetic biology institutions. However, the ELSI community has faced severe political 
obstacles, from within, and external to, the scientific community. This created a type of 
political over-hang, where dual-use scenarios as well as solutions could be imagined, but 
implementation of such responses was unfeasible without broader support from government 
and other stakeholders. During analysis the NSABB working groups on synthetic genomics 
and synthetic biology were also identified as key components of the US NEST domain; an 
institution which is without counterpart within UK dual-use politics. To some extent this 
institution has both reflected and has facilitated the emergence of US political capacity to 
address dual-use issues associated with synthetic biology. However, this institution has also 
operated in a similar political environment to those within the ELSI community. This is in the 
sense that the implementation of NSABB recommendations is dependent on other actors, in 
particular at federal level. 
This being said, within both the US and the UK there is evidence of local ELSI initiatives 
targeted at the emerging synthetic biology community, as well as the associated amateur 
community, which have sort to impact upon innovation practices in the name of biosafety and 
biosecurity. Primarily, this has been constrained to educational and awareness-raising 
 219 
 
initiatives targeted at participants of the international IGem competition, as well as the 
amateur community. This has been the case in both the US and the UK. Within the US, this 
has also been supplemented by the development of collaboration between the FBI WMD 
directorate and the amateur and synthetic biology communities. Added to this, within the US 
there has also been the addition of ‘hotline’ initiatives. In neither the US nor the UK however, 
is there evidence that these activities have constituted broader transformations in the 
relationship between the field of synthetic biology and regulatory institutions in the name of 
security.  
7.3.1 The Prospect and Significance of ‘Top-Down’ Regulation of 
Scientific Practices in the Name of National Security 
There were stark contrasts between the US and the UK in relation to the significance of the 
prospect that the government may engage in an expansion of its activities directed at the 
governance of new and emerging life science, beyond that of improving existing enforcement 
of laboratory biosecurity. This would involve tighter controls on the dissemination of both 
information about cutting-edge research and technologies. Within US the sweeping changes 
under new homeland security meant a co-ordinated federal response to dual-use has been a 
prominent spectre on the horizon, particularly within the scientific community. This has been 
reflected each time dual-use concerns have come to public attention. However, as of yet, this 
response has not materialised. In contrast, within the UK, the prospect of such response is the 
name of security is taken less seriously. Instead, backlashes in the name of safety have been 
more significant, but have had little direct relevance to the politics of dual-use issues within 
the UK.  
Comparison of UK and US experiences reveals that the prospect of government regulatory 
intervention has had two effects on the discourse. First, it has tended to lead to the 
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presentation of a ‘top-down’ verse ‘bottom–up’ presentation of oversight options. In reality, 
of course, most systems of oversight advocated would include at least an element of both. 
This dichotomy has been particularly prevalent within the US, as a result of the antagonistic 
state of ELSI politics surrounding the field of synthetic biology, but also because of the pre-
existing politicisation related to biosafety and biosecurity regulation. This is in contrast to the 
UK, where, in the absence of the prospect of state level response, there has been substantially 
less debate about the issue and less polarisation.  
The second consequence of the prospect of federal intervention within the US has been to 
motivate and galvanise responses from the polynucleotide synthesis providers and the 
scientific community. Within the US, it was in the context of a potential federal response that 
aspects of the synthetic biology community began to consider and develop technical solutions 
to security challenges posed by the emerging synthesis industry. Secondly, the prospect of 
federal oversight was also utilised rhetorically to help motivate early community involvement 
with other biosecurity policy initiatives. This also had knock-on effects within the European 
and UK discourse, as it meant that the dual-use use issue was initially framed as a poorly 
defined risk requiring a practical solution, rather than an issue which primarily required 
public education initiatives to downplay concerns.  
7.3.2 The Impact of Systems of Anti-Terrorism Oversight on the Practice of 
Innovation within the Field of Synthetic Biology 
There is little evidence that anti-terrorism policy has had immediate impacts upon innovative 
practices in response to concerns about synthetic biology. In both the US and the UK, 
outreach and education have been the main means through which national security 
institutions have engaged with the dual-use issue. In the US this has been through the FBI 
WMD directorate. In the UK, there is some evidence that NaCTSO is also considering 
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pursing educational initiative, although there has been no specific intuitive directed at the 
field of the field of synthetic biology.  
This is not to suggest however that aspects of the emerging field of synthetic biology will not 
be made subject of anti-terror regulation in the future, or else be used as further evidence for 
the need to develop existing systems of oversight. In relation to the first point, in both the UK 
and the US, bioterror scenarios have already motivated cross-departmental discussions of the 
emerging polynucleotide synthesis industry. In the UK, these discussions have primarily 
resulted in the appropriation of existing biosafety regulation in the name of security, as well 
as the adoption of a wait and see stance. Since this time, developments within the European 
gene-synthesis industry have not motivated further publicly known responses from 
government. These developments include the growth of support for increasing UK industry 
capabilities to synthesise much longer polynucleotide sequences as well as the emergence of 
a European industry channel of policy development. It seems likely that any future discussion 
which could be sparked by a press scare for example, would need to take these developments 
into account. Within the US, the prospect of terrorist misuse of gene-synthesis capabilities 
was enough to motivate a more substantive federal response, in the form of detailed federal 
guidelines for industry. However, this response followed largely in the wake of pre-emptive 
industry engagement misuse of the issue. Once again, it seems likely that tougher or broader  
action from government may be called for if further press scares, or expert concerns emerge 
in relation to this or associated industries.  
7.3.3 The Externalisation of Concerns about Biodefense and the Arms Racing 
Dynamic  
In chapter two, it was argued that developments at national level within public health and 
biodefense policy were potentially important to understanding the governance of techno-
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scientific fields such as synthetic biology.  This was for two primary reasons. The first was 
that there had been higher levels of investment into DURC of concern within the US under 
biodefense initiatives. This suggested that DURC may have been a greater priority within the 
US and had knock-on effects for the field of synthetic biology. The second reason was that 
that some biodefense research was politically contentious, especially in the US. In particular, 
there had been debate about the militarisation of research agendas, the issue of threat 
characterisation research, as well as concerns about the safety of US biodefense labs- in 
public, scientific, non-proliferation as well as government circles. These concerns had been 
accompanied by a broader set of debates about necessity and effectiveness of the US 
biodefense programme (Kelle, Nixdorff, and Dando 2012, chap. 5). This situation could be 
contrasted to the UK public health domain, where such issues had been absent, primarily 
because of the absence of a politicised relationship between the public health and security 
community, as well as the absence of a significant biodefense research imperative.  
In analysis, it became clear that there were no significant differences between the US and the 
UK with regard to the emergence of policies directed at the identification and management of 
dual-use risks associated with state-level misuse of the field of synthetic biology at domestic-
level, that were publicly known. In fact, in neither case were there significant activities or 
channels of policy development in place to deal with this issue. This was quite surprising 
considering the amount of attention received by the field of synthetic biology in US and UK 
submissions to the main international body that deals with these issues (the BTWC) since 
2006 as part of working papers and confidence building measures. Indeed, in many ways 
synthetic biology has become an exemplar of de-skilling and globalising dynamics in the 
context of the BTWC regime.  
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The absence of attention to state misuse scenarios was also surprising considering the 
increasing military interest in the field with both the US and the UK.128 This is not to argue 
that current work crosses the line into offensive research, purely by virtue of military 
involvement, or because of the nature of the research. Indeed the majority of this work would 
not be considered to be of misuse potential by most if not all of those actors who have been 
involved with dual-use politics over the previous decade. This because the publicly known 
investment into the field has not been directed at grey area bio-defensive work - instead 
projects have tended to focus on more efficient production of conventional military materials 
and biomedical interventions, or else been used to fund more foundational technologies. 
Instead, what should be considered surprising is the absence of discussion of the potential of 
state-level misuse raised by the prospect of the militarisation of aspects of the field in the 
long term.129 Specifically, that early military investment could potentially become the preface 
to more aggressive investment which pushes up against current bans on the development of 
biological weapons, or else undermines the BTWC regime by reducing states’ faith in the 
idea that other states are not willing or able to pursue biological weapons as part of a viable 
defence strategy. It is possible to argue that this is a more systemic issue related to the 
absence of an international compliance verification systems in the BTWC, and it will be 
interesting to see whether Synthetic Biology receives more attention in this respect as the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (which does have a verification 
system) begins to grapple with the field.  
7.4 Towards National Styles of Dual-Use Governance? 
                                                            
128  Within the US this has been reflected in investments by DARPA, DTRA as well as Office of Naval 
research.  Within the UK this has also been reflected in investment by DSTL 
129  A point made  for example by In an interview with a BWC official( Dr Piers Millet) (Newswire 2012) 
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In both the US and the UK the continued prominence of anticipatory and up-stream framings 
of dual-use techno-science were dependent on constant reproduction on the NEST agenda. 
Within the UK dual-use concerns about the techno-science of synthetic biology actually 
largely pre-dated substantial investment into the field. It is worth remembering that the first 
major UK investment into establishing a synthetic biology community occurred after a 
conception of dual-use techno-science had already been established within the US. An 
important consequence of this was that early framings of the dual-use issue articulated within 
early EU and UK reports on synthetic biology were influenced by US framings of the issue. 
In particular, they placed the emphasis on the need for concrete risk evaluation and 
management response to the problem. However, this belied low levels of interest within the 
UK synthetic biology NEST domain in relation to dual-use issues, as well as the government. 
In contrast to the US, these early articulations did not occur alongside political efforts within 
and outside the community to engage in anticipatory policy-focused discussions. This meant 
that dual-use discussions, when they did take place in ELSI forums, tended to be speculative 
rather than tied to specific dual-use concerns raised by the field in a UK context. As a result, 
there would be less discussion of need to develop political and technical capacity to address 
the dual-use challenges posed by the techno-science, as compared to the US. 
In the absence of root and branch changes to the practice and governance of techno-science 
biosafety governance rationalities have been fundamental within the US and UK. Specifically 
these frames were essential in delineating the scope of the innovation practices and artefacts 
of the techno-scientific field of synthetic biology which were discussed as governable 
problems. For example within the UK, faith in the existing biosafety system meant that 
agreements on the scope of the dual-use problem was closely linked to the range of dual-use 
scenarios that existing biosafety systems could foreseeably address. Within the US, this was 
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also the case with the identification of institutional biosafety review as a centrepiece in the 
US response to dual-use issues by the FINK report. The NSABB also explicitly supported the 
adoption of this model for state funded aspects of the synthetic biology community. In both 
cases this has placed the emphasis of dual-use governance upon the review of single projects 
and experiments at institutional-level as a key approach in dealing with dual-use issues. This 
has had fundamental impacts upon how the ‘problem’ of dual-use research has been 
conceived in national contexts. Specifically, it has led to the predominance of a framing 
which places local-level scientific and ethical review as central to defining which type of 
research constitutes a reasonable dual-use concern (Edwards, Revill, and Bezuidenhout 
2013). This externalises those aspects of the dual-use issue, including trends in the practice of 
science, or broader questions about the trajectory of research from assessment as well as 
broader transformations in innovation practices. 
Such a situation has not seriously dampened the optimism of the emerging coalitions of social 
scientists, scientists and industry embarking on the next stage of the field’s development 
within the UK and US about the prospect of pre-emptively engaging with the dual-use issue 
through the application of existing national governance practices.  However, it is likely that in 
relation to the field in both the US and the UK, policy will continue to be made reactively and 
on the hoof, driven largely by press scares, scandals and disasters, with waxing and waning 
levels of attention from government departments reflecting this.130 As has already become 
clear, attempts to transform the relationships between innovation and governance in the UK 
at SynBERC, as well as the more modest attempts within the UK synthetic biology networks, 
represent failures to establish institutionalised support of anticipatory policy-making.  
                                                            
130  
As one prominent policy shaper in the US stated, with regard to the engagement of the security 
community, after the establishment of the NSABB in response to concerns about bioterrorism 
between 2001-2004 ‘over time most of the security people became much less engaged in the 
process’.  On file with Author. 
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To date, only a very narrow range of scenarios and artefacts are currently subject to the type 
of politics and practices expected within a risk governance regime. Specifically, this has 
involved a focus on securing physical controls over certain biological materials in order to 
ensure against terrorist diversion as well as curtailing the circulation of specific experimental 
findings with obvious and immediate dual-use applications. This has meant that dual-use 
concerns about broader trends in innovation and scenarios involving state-level misuse which 
have been raised in the ELSI and arms control community remain excluded from such 
discussions and processes.   
A key contrast between the US and the UK has been that there has been greater attention to 
the issue of polynucleotide synthesis at national-level from the government within the US. 
However in the US, UK and Europe more generally, industry has taken the lead in the 
development and implementation of governance through the development of harmonised 
screening standards. Within the US, attention within the academic research community 
resulted in the emergence of a public consensus within the Sloan Report and NSABB report, 
which emphasised the role of industry and the scientific community in the development of 
oversight of polynucleotide synthesis. Within the UK there has been less evidence of 
processes of consensus-building in relation to the issue of polynucleotide synthesis at 
national-level involving government institutions. There is evidence, however, that through its 
actions, the ISAB has ensured industry-led policy development and implementation in this 
issue area at a European level, if and when government departments review this area.  In the 
coming years it will also be interesting to see the extent to which other comparable service 
providers (such as those which provide tailored biochemical systems or even organisms) also 




The process of analysis and comparison has led to a series of conclusions about the nature of 
the prospect of dual-use governance at national level within both the US and the UK. Most 
significantly, the work has highlighted the extent to which rhetoric of risk management belie 
low-levels of engagement by key regulators in the cases analysed, and has outlined the 
factors which have driven and frustrated such engagement. Comparison has also 
demonstrated the extent to which national capacities to imagine dual-use issues out run the 
ability of institutions to comprehend, and, where necessary, respond to such fears. This work 
has mapped out, in detail, the discursive and political mechanisms through which this has 
manifested in national contexts. Secondly, analysis has led to a clearer understanding of the 
significance of the various domains of governance in the politics of dual-use governance at a 
national level.  In particular, it has highlighted the significance of the NEST domain in 
articulating dual-use concerns and the prominence of the biosafety domains in the 
identification of which aspects of these broader concerns require a response at national-level. 
Analysis has also revealed that the anti-terrorism and public health domain has actually 
played a less significant role than expected in relation to the governance of the techno-science 
of synthetic biology, in both cases. This finding was particularly surprising in relation to the 
US, as there had been an expectation that the politics and practices of US anti-terrorism and 
bio-preparedness would have had a much larger impact on the politics and governance of 
dual-use techno-sciences in the US as compared to the UK. It was argued that this outcome 
primarily reflected the externalisation of more forward-looking concerns about trends in 
innovation as well as concerns about development of biological weapons by states, from the 
dual-use discourse in both the US and the UK. The externalisation of such concerns reflected 
a trend among key regulators within both the US and the UK to only address dual-use issues 
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ad hoc and only then in the face of significant public and stakeholder attention to a given 
issue.  
In both the US and the UK, this style of politics has resulted in the in the situation that Kelle 
(2012b) refers to as ‘patch-work precaution’; this is in the sense that only a narrow range of 
possible interventions (effective against a narrow range of possible misuse scenarios), are in-
place along the pipeline of innovation. Potential interventions range from international 
treaties at the level of the state, down to laws and standards for individuals. Currently these 
safe-guards, where they are present, are primarily directed at controlling specific pieces of 
technology and laboratory biosafety. Politically speaking however, the patch-work of 
precautionary activities has also been associated with a patchwork of reassurance and deferral 
activities. These activities have sought to reassure the public that dual-use issues are already 
being dealt with by existing systems, are else will be manageable in the future.   
 In the following chapter, there is a recapitulation of these findings in the context of the 








At the outset of this thesis, the following question was asked: 
To what extent are the conceptions, practices and politics of security relevant to 
understanding the governance of dual-use aspects of new and emerging science and 
technology at national level in the UK and in the US? 
The motivation for asking this question stemmed from a desire to develop a clearer 
understanding of the political processes which have underpinned the emergence of dual-use 
governance within the US and the UK. This interest was largely driven by the observation 
that claims about security politics, security thinking and the value of security were central to 
the way in which dual-issues had been conceptualised in both academic and policy literature. 
One example of this dynamic is the presentation of the dual-use issue as an ‘ethical dilemma’, 
involving a balance of principles relating to the imperatives of security with principles related 
to innovation, such as the freedom of intellectual enquiry and the right for society to benefit 
from scientific progress. Another example is the dichotomous presentation of dual-use 
governance options which pit restrictive models of oversight driven by national security 
actors against governance approaches driven by the scientific community. Within the context 
of this thesis, it has been demonstrated that such dichotomies represent a relatively crude 
understanding of the politics of dual-use issues. They therefore became focal points of this 
thesis, which led to findings which are relevant to both dual-use governance theory and 
securitization theory. 
8.2 The Significance of Findings for Dual-Use Governance Theory 
In chapter two, a set of underlying drivers were identified which could go some way to 
explain the modern manifestation of dual-use issues, specifically: 
a) The emergence of fears about terrorism, in particular bioterrorism, in both 




b) The dominant assumption about the fast pace of scientific and technological 
development associated with the life sciences. 
  c) Changes in the relationship between science and democratic societies. 
 
However, it was argued that identifying such drivers did not constitute a complete 
explanation for how issues are governed in national contexts, and why. In chapter two, it was 
stated that such an explanation required the identification of important factors within the 
policy development process in each case. 
In chapter three, securitization theory was taken up as suitable departure point for the 
development of an analytical framework which could help to identify such factors.  Security 
was an interesting departure point, not only because of the terms prevalence in in discussion 
of the ethics and politics of dual-use issue, but also because the US and UK reflected 
different approaches to addressing the dual-use challenge, and this distinction was often made 
in relation to the involvement of national security institutions.  
In the chapters that followed, specific factors were identified, and a thematic overview of 
these findings was provided. In the following sections the implications of these findings are 
considered.  
8.2.1 Misuse Scenarios and Dual-Use Governance 
Within this research, emphasis has been placed on the processes through which misuse 
scenarios have been imagined, gained policy significance and informed policy responses.  
Publicly accessible misuse scenarios have been associated within rallying calls to transform 
and amend existing regulatory systems. This has been reflected in the US in particular, where 
dissatisfaction about the US system of laboratory biosafety oversight voiced within some 
aspects of civil society has been a key driving force behind the continued discussion of the 
risks posed by select-agent research. At times, dissatisfaction with international regulatory 
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frameworks, specifically the BWC, have also led to concerns about biodefense research 
crossing the line into offensive research, or else stimulating arms racing dynamics within 
national dual-use discourses. 
However, it is not only imagined scenarios which inform the scope of dual-use issues under 
discussion. Understandings of existing regulatory structures, such as laboratory biosafety and 
laboratory biosecurity have also been key in enabling actors to distinguish between dual-use 
concerns which can be conceivably addressed as risks, and those which cannot. The NSABB 
understanding of the scope of dual-use issue in particular, with its focus on local level review, 
has become central not only in how dual-use  issues are governed, but also in how new dual-
use issues are being identified. 
Taken together, these findings point to the idea that while it is the actors rather than the 
analyst which define dual-use concerns, analysts can help to explain why some dual-use 
concerns attract attention as governable problems and others do not. In addressing this 
question, the analyst can not only discern which issues actors take seriously and why, but also 
which key factors set the limits of political feasibility of responses to dual-use concerns at 
national level.  
8.2.2 Dual-Use, Security and the State 
While it is important for analysts to escape the false dichotomies of ‘top-down’ verses 
‘bottom-up’ governance when thinking about the governance of dual-use issues, it is worth 
remembering that this distinction still has significance in dual-use politics.  During analysis it 
became clear that the prospect of top-down governance maintained a significant role in how 
publics and even many scientists and policy makers understood the politics of dual-use 
issues, primarily in the name of security in the US and of safety in the UK. Nonetheless, it 
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has been demonstrated within this thesis that there are various reasons that the prospect of 
top-down governance may be overplayed in the context of dual-use discussions. First, there 
may be incentives for actors wishing to stimulate some sort of response to dual-use issues 
within the scientific community to emphasise and perhaps even exaggerate the prospect of 
top-down regulation.  Second, certain scientific institutions have a tendency to react to the 
prospect of state involvement by demonizing the prospect of further regulation.  
However, for various reasons it is unlikely that the state will engage in the pre-emptive 
regulation of dual-use life science research and technology. First, such issues are rarely 
conceivably addressed through the application of existing technologies of control. In the US, 
for example, the discussions of ‘nuclear style dual-use controls’ reveal the extent to which 
traditional controls on materials and technologies were widely understood to be unsuitable for 
the oversight of life science research. In the absence of an acceptable transferable model, it is 
understandable that there is sometimes little political interest in a complex and politically 
charged issue area.  In this context, it is unsurprising that the Executive look to industry and 
the scientific community to develop systems of oversight.  
Another key finding within this research is that concerns identified and expressed within the 
ELSI domain which cannot be dealt with through applying or modestly modifying existing 
systems of governance can quickly become externalised from the discourse. This means that 
the emergence of policy responses to these issues is largely at the whim of broader historical 
and political factors. For example, a key explanation for the emergence of dual-use concerns 
about synthetic biology in the US context is the sweeping changes under new homeland 
security in the early 2000s, which meant a co-ordinated federal response to dual-use was, for 
a while at least, spectre on the horizon, particularly within the scientific community. This fear 
has been reflected each time dual-use concerns have come to public attention. In contrast, 
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within the UK the prospect of such a response in the name of security is taken less seriously; 
instead, backlashes in the name of safety have been more significant. 
This suggests that, while lessons may certainly be learned from oversight initiatives which 
have reached the implementation stage, such developments should not mean that we forget 
the political obstacles to policy development. In particular, it is essential to remember that the 
state, and its regulatory bodies, plays a fundamental role in the fate of ‘bottom-up’ initiatives. 
For example, the prospect of intervention by regulatory bodies can motivate action, and 
financial and other forms of institutional support can validate bottom-up initiatives and 
support successful implementation. However, it is also clear that such bottom-up initiatives 
tend to be heavily truncated in scope, focusing primarily on galvanising existing governance 
structures such as laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. 
8.2.3 The Prospect of Anticipatory Governance  
Within the case studies it became clear that anticipatory governance can involve the pre-
emptive development and institutionalisation of various aspects of risk pre-assessment of 
dual-use issues. To recap, risk pre-assessment involves the four different types of activity 
problem framing: systematic searches for new hazards, the identification of relevant systems 
of oversight, and the adoption of scientific criteria and procedures for risk assessment. This 
research has demonstrated the extent to which it is possible to distinguish which of these 
goals have been pursued and reached in national contexts in relation to specific dual-use 
issues. In the cases of the US and the UK, for example, the predominant role of the NSABB 
framing of the problem of dual-use research was identified. It is also possible to argue that 
there was greater evidence of systematic searches for new risks, reflected in the work of the 
Sloan report and NSABB. A point worth noting here is that such ‘systematic searches’ are 
likely to systematically exclude certain concerns from consideration, as they tend to be 
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focused on immediate challenges, as demonstrated in the Sloan report in particular. Dual-use 
research and gene-synthesis technology within the US and Europe can also be contrasted in 
relation to the significance of scientific conventions for risk assessment. With regard to gene-
synthesis screening, conventions were developed which focused primarily on gene-sequences 
homology with select-agent pathogens.  This quickly became a metric which all stakeholders 
could agree on, even if there remained some disagreement on the specifics of 
implementation. In contrast, the issue of dual-use research remains a matter of contested 
expert judgement, rather than ‘objective’ technical assessment. Such ambiguities extend well 
beyond the field of synthetic biology, and have been reflected most recently in discussions 
about H5N1 avian influenza gain of function research (Edwards, Revill, and Bezuidenhout 
2013).  It is likely, however, that in the near future, certain lines of research and emerging 
laboratory techniques currently associated with the field of synthetic biology will become 
embroiled in comparable debates, particularly in research involving pathogens.  
It is worth noting that ambiguities related to dual-use research manifest in both the US and 
UK discourses; however, a key distinction is that the issue has received a much greater airing 
in the forum that the NSABB has provided. This suggests that the existence of such 
institutional focal points are also important to thinking about the governance of dual-use 
issues in national contexts. This work has also demonstrated that ‘official’ institutions such as 
the NSABB can have a political significance which can extend beyond its primary purpose of 
advising government. The position of such bodies can all too easily become conflated with 
the position of the Executive within political debates. However, as has become clear in this 
research, not only has government tended to follow a few years in the wake of its blue-ribbon 
institution, it has also been selective about which policy recommendations to implement. For 
those that would like to see a more prominent role for such expert panels in dual-use 
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governance in the US, EU or elsewhere, there are valuable lessons to be learned from this 
institution. This includes, for example, the role that such institutions can play in validating 
industry and academic initiatives which by and large run before government engagement.  
Another key observation, is that anticipatory discussions are informed not only by claims 
about the potential of science and technology, but also by assumptions about the political 
feasibility of responses to a given concern. In particular, it is worth bearing in mind that those 
involved in anticipatory governance may have incentives, as well as biases, which lead to the 
to the  communication of narratives of transformation. Such claims, however, tend to under-
emphasise the extent to which governance initiatives in these fields, while often novel and 
inspiring, are subject to a broad and entrenched set of challenges. Such challenges, for 
example, have hampered attempts to move governance ‘up-stream’ within the innovation 
process through transforming human practices in the context of SynBERC. It is essential, 
then, not only to focus on the question of why such initiatives emerge, but why they don’t, 
and the extent to which such initiatives can be understood to have resulted in comprehensive 
transformations of governance in relation to a specific issue.  A key part of such analysis is 
therefore focusing on the failings and limitations, as well as the promise, of such initiatives in 
order to stay sober about the scope and feasibility of responses to dual-use concerns in other 
national contexts, or in relation to other technologies.  
8.3 Dual-use Governance and Securitization Theory 
Dual-use governance has proved an interesting issue area for the application of securitization 
theory. First, this research has drawn attention to the role of epistemic communities and  
scientific consensus positions on given issues in the context of complexity and uncertainty 
(Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 72–73). In particular, this work has emphasised the 
fundamental impacts of the emergence of these factors on agenda setting and problem 
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definition.  Added to this, the work has drawn attention to the idea that systemic risks are 
made governable rhetorically with reference to complex webs of collaboration between 
institutions in the development and implementation of risk governance activities. This 
includes, for example, bio-preparedness models of governance which have developed in the 
US and Europe. However, the work also draws attention to the idea that such collaboration 
faces a series of political challenges, particularly in the context of anticipatory modes of 
governance which attempt to deal with challenges beyond the scope of existing risk 
management structures. 
Second, this work has outlined that it is in this context that actors (including state and non-
state institutions) engage in two key modes of engagement with security politics. The first is 
the primary mode, which involves engagement in activities designed to set the rules for 
future policy making processes in relation given issue. This includes, for example, deciding 
which institutions are in charge of developing and implementing policies, and the nature of 
collaboration between actors within these processes. Within this work, it has been argued that 
the epistemic communities embodied in the NSABB and Sloan report processes, for instance, 
have been central to such processes. 
The other mode of engagement is secondary, which involves engagement in the context of 
agreements about the overall process of policy development. Within this mode of action, 
actors seek to impact directly on the policies which are being developed and implemented. 
This may include initiating, advocating, facilitating or resisting specific initiatives.  
Third, this work has outlined the extent to which policy models are useful to those who study 
processes of securitization in the context of systemic risks. In chapter three, it was argued that 
these models could provide focus, structure and limits within analysis, which are of central 
importance in interdisciplinary studies, as well as in multi-level approaches, and that this 
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could help the analyst to identify which activities, discourses and actors are and are not 
relevant with regard to policy outcomes.   
It is certainly the case that these models performed these roles in two important senses. First, 
they provided a central narrative for the life and death of single initiatives and policy 
proposals. For example, they allowed for the exploration of the extent to which forward-
looking oversight proposals have been rejected within political and policy streams within the 
US. A case in point is recommendations made by the NSABB in relation to synthetic biology 
research and technology, which have often struggled to garner federal US support. Another 
example was the 2004 bio-hazard non-proliferation proposal of George Church, which was 
dropped in favour of other governance options developed within the academic channel of 
polynucleotide synthesis policy development.  
It was also argued  in chapter three, that such policy models could provide a straightforward 
institutionally, historically and politically situated ‘environment’ for discourses and ‘speech-
acts’ to occupy within an overall process of securitization. Such claims were made in the 
context of the concern that analysts studying securitization processes who rely on a linguistic 
approach may struggle to adequately account for the socio-historical context of speech acts, 
and to sufficiently trace the impact of such acts on policy outcomes. Simply put, it was 
argued that some approaches focus much more on those ‘speaking’ security in relation to an 
issue, and much less on those actually developing and implementing security policy. During 
the analysis process, policy process models provided a framework to help understand why 
actors were speaking security in some contexts, and what the actual implications of this was 
for emerging policy. A key example related to the NEST domain, where the scientific 
community, as well as associated social scientists, have been identified as a first line of 
defence in dealing with dual-use issues. Placing these assertions in a broader political 
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context, however, revealed the extent to which these claims were contested, as well as the 
extent to which such assertions often belied low levels of action. Further to this, reasons were 
given to explain why NEST initiatives were struggling within both a US and UK context to 
transform innovation practice, as well as to encourage key regulators to engage pre-emptively 
with broader dual-use concerns.   
Finally, this research also demonstrated the extent to which the questions of ‘why’ actors 
engage with securitization processes could be addressed within analysis. To recap, in section 
2.6, it was argued that the issue of intentionality was largely neglected within predominant 
approaches to the study of securitization for various theoretical and methodological reasons.  
In response, a new means of conceptualising intentionality in the study of securitization was 
outlined. Specifically, it was argued that there were two types of explanations for the 
behaviour of actors within security politics. The first related to pragmatic actions and 
interests, which involve identifying the context of specific actions, such as publications, or 
lobbying at a specific event. In this thesis, for example, some of those interviewed identified 
specific actions with which they had engaged in order to alter specific policies. Such actions, 
however, can also be explained with reference to institutionalised practices, interests, values 
and favoured policy responses, which point to a broader underlying political landscape which 
informs pragmatic actions. This latter set of explanations can also highlight more 
generalizable findings which highlight the lessons provided by the analysis of specific 
episodes and initiatives in relation the issue area. This includes, for example, the types of 
policy are and are not feasible in the existing political context. However, this work has also 
drawn attention to the idea that changes in the political environment, such as those which 
resulted from the terrorists attacks in the early 2000s, can have fundamental impacts in 
motivating action by freeing up resources, and creating a sense that that dramatic changes in a 
 240 
 
given policy area are possible. There is no guarantee, however, that future transformations in 
the governance of dual-use synthetic biology will be motivated primarily by the threat of 
federal responses to terrorism; in fact, it appears that market forces will play an ever 
increasing role in the field as it becomes more industrialised.  
8.4 Future Research 
The majority of research into dual-use aspects of synthetic biology and indeed the dual-use 
issue more generally has sought to make observations relevant to policy makers or to aid the 
implementation of policy initiatives. A potential risk of such work, as with all policy driven 
research, is that it becomes easy to focus on addressing policy challenges within the existing 
political environment, rather than questioning the environment itself. My aim within this 
work was to engage in both types of activity, and I hope that this apparent within the work. 
Below I highlight some key questions that the process of conducting this research has raised.  
The first relates to the lessons which can be learned about dual-use politics as the field of 
synthetic biology develops. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that over the coming 
decade, the field of synthetic biology will produce a range of foundational technologies and 
techniques which will become fundamental to new practices of innovation, as well as in the 
production of new products. A key question will be the extent to which early dual-use 
discussion and initiatives translate into later-stage initiatives which continue to have 
discernable impacts upon the industrialisation of aspects of this field. This includes, for 
example, ELSI components of future synthetic biology research initiatives such as the 
recently announced EU wide SYNENERGENE131 project. It also includes national level 
initiatives which focus on supporting the translation of synthetic biology research for 
applications, and which incorporate synthetic biology into plans for the emerging bio-
                                                            
131
  http://www.synenergene.eu/. 
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economy; this has already been reflected in The White House US National Bio-Economy 
Blue Print, which was produced in April 2012.  
This question is particularly important, and challenging, as the field of synthetic biology is 
the first techno-scientific field to address contemporary dual-use concerns so early in its 
development. Such research could have significant implications for understanding how field 
specific early- and mid-stage ELSI dual-use initiatives should be designed and implemented 
in the future if they are to ensure regulators and other stakeholders adequately anticipate and 
engage with advances in science and technology.  
A question relates to the consequences of developments in the field of synthetic biology for 
thinking about future dual-use concerns.  It is likely that over coming decades, experiments in 
dual-use governance which have occurred in relation to the field of synthetic biology will be 
important in discussions of other dual-use issues. This not just in the sense that development 
will have rhetorical significance as an accessible exemplar in policy circles, but also in the 
sense that developments in the field may have contributed the new epistemic communities 
and institutional relationships and capacities. In essence, then, this issue involves questioning 
the impact of synthetic biology dual-use governance initiatives on the governance of the dual-
use life sciences and biotechnology more generally. This may, for example, include the 
spread of specific approaches developed in the field of synthetic biology to other fields and 
national contexts.   
The third question relates to the significance of national experience in governing dual-use 
aspects of synthetic biology for the governance of dual-use aspects of life science innovation 
at an international level. In both the CWC and BWC there exists a requirement for state 
parties to take into account the impact of advances in science and technology upon the 
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implementation of the convention, including in relation to developments which could 
contribute to the prospect of misuse. However, this work has identified many of the 
conceptual and political obstacles which face those wishing to develop anticipatory responses 
to such developments. For example, it is clear that many key regulatory institutions do not 
engage policy focused dual-use discussions beyond the scope of laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity. This suggests that, if broader dual-use concerns about developments in the life 
sciences are to be taken seriously, then new institutional capacities are required. Future 
research could be conducted to examine the extent to which discussions at international level 
could usefully be informed by accounts of these national level experiences. In particular, 
these experiences seem relevant to discussion about the implementation of the BWC and 
CWC at national level, as well as to the review of scientific and technological developments 
which occurs within these regimes.  
A further line of enquiry also developed during writing this thesis relates specifically to 
research being conducted on securitization. This research has demonstrated that securitization 
theory could benefit greatly from further engagement with policy theory, particularly in the 
context of analytically eclectic research which focuses on specific ‘real world’ policy 
challenges. Within this thesis, emphasis has been placed on two relatively simple heuristics: 
specific linear and multiple stream models of policy development. This work has also 
touched upon ideas which are central to several other explanatory models of policy change 
and development, including, those which focus on epistemic communities for example. It is 
apparent that the utility of such concepts to securitization theory requires further 
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